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Why Some Animals are Neither Persons nor Property 
by 
Sharisse Kanet 
Advisor: Steven Ross 
All animals with non-borderline sentience are deserving of certain legal considerations 
independent of their use and relationship to human beings. That is, all sentient beings 
should have some rights. Given the current organization of the U.S. legal system, which 
divides all entities into property or persons, it is not surprising that animals are relegated 
to property status. I put forth a proposal to fix this whose central suggestion is that we 
create a third legal designation, legal patient, into which all non-person sentient animals 
(those which do not properly belong on either current category) would fit. These animals 
would receive certain limited rights, which would be implemented through legal 
structures already in place, such as those used in providing legal advocacy for children.  
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Chapter 1: Background and the Current State of Affairs 
I. Introduction
There is a growing agreement today that animals need more robust legal 
protection than they currently have. The past two centuries have seen both 
increased industrialization of animal use and exploitation and a slowly expanding 
popular concern for animal welfare. With the advent of factory farms, animal testing 
regulations for new products, exponential increases in the destruction of animal 
habitats, and so on, the situation for many animals, both domestic and wild, has 
been getting consistently worse, as they have been forced to pay the costs of the 
advancements of our modern society. The atrocities that animals under human care 
are currently subjected to are various and ubiquitous, from factory farms, to 
experimentation, to circuses, and so on. (For a review, see Beauchamp 2008.) Some 
of these uses of animals will be addressed in later chapters in so far as they provide 
examples of what changes may be necessitated by my proposal. Interestingly, the 
same abuses which have hurt so many have also brought issues of animal welfare to 
the forefront in a way they may have not been otherwise. 
Animal welfare legislation has been expanding in places like Norway, 
Germany, and Switzerland, to name just a few.1 Often times, these expansions 
recognize that animals have value beyond their mere instrumental value in their 
many present-day uses. For instance, Norway’s Animal Welfare Act states “Animals 
1 This project is a work about US law; however, I will reference other countries from time to 
time when comparison seems useful. 
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have an intrinsic value which is irrespective of the usable value they may have for 
man. Animals shall be treated well and be protected from danger of unnecessary 
stress and strains.” (2011) In this country, some states have been making advances, 
for example California’s recent ban on battery cages, (The Times Editorial Board 
2014) and the public appears to have begun a slow awakening to the horrors of 
animal cruelty inflicted on the millions and billions of mammals and birds we use 
for research, food, etc. 
 This progress is heartening, and it is also insufficient. Even in countries like 
Norway, the ethics of animal treatment is phrased in terms of welfare, that is, in 
terms of improving the conditions of animals that we use, without a consideration of 
the underlying assumption that we may use them at all. Welfarists, such as Robert 
Garner, generally tend to focus on how we may use nonhuman animals without 
questioning whether we can use them. Another side of the debate is comprised of a 
varied group of people we may call animal rights activists, including Steven Wise 
and Gary Francione, who believe that certain animals should possess rights. What 
criteria make this determination, and therefore which animals get included, varies 
by thinker. The suggestion of giving animals rights is often accompanied by the 
claim that these animals should be made legal persons. Such animal rights activists 
are usually extraordinarily critical of animal welfare projects as perpetuating a 
broken system. As Tom Regan has said, “To reform injustice is to prolong injustice.” 
(Regan 2011, par. 3) Giving certain animals rights is a way to identify them as beings 
who are more than instrumentally valuable, and deserve consideration because of 
who they are, not how we feel about them. Other legal, philosophical, and political 
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theorists have offered suggestions, but these are either problematic for their own 
reasons or do not offer much by way of practical solutions.  
This gap can be better understood when we consider our insufficiently 
nuanced legal system. Our legal system acknowledges only two sorts of being: 
persons and property. The former are beings with rights and the latter are not. 
Currently all animals are legal property. Many thinkers have aimed to work on 
improving animals’ conditions within the confines of the property designation, 
trying to improve living conditions, slaughter methods, and so on. Others have 
argued for giving some animals the person designation. This would involve the 
abolition of certain animal-based practices in totem.  
My project aims to address this space from several angles. First, I will argue 
that there are fundamental flaws on both sides of this welfare/rights debate. In 
some ways, I think that even animal rights proponents are asking too little. In 
focusing on personhood for a small group of animals, as many of them do, they are 
leaving out many other creatures that require our moral attention. Animal welfarists 
are also asking too little in that they seem to ignore the important normative 
difference between being protected as property and having rights. Other proposals, 
such as Kagan’s, do nothing to address the legal questions at all. 
As I see it, these issues and others are all symptoms of a larger problem— the 
acceptance of a legal system with just the categories of persons and property. In 
such a system we are required to put animals (as a whole, by species, or by 
individual) into one of these two buckets. I will argue that the majority of animals 
used in the U.S. today for food, experimentation, etc. do not belong in either. In 
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particular, I will argue that all (non-borderline) sentient animals deserve more 
consideration than toasters (i.e. inanimate property), but not all sentient animals 
deserve the same consideration as humans (i.e. legal persons). Many definitions of 
person revolve around complex cognitive abilities such as self-awareness, which do 
not delineate a sensible moral threshold. Therefore, what our legal system needs is 
for a third category of being to be recognized: the sentient nonperson. I call these 
beings legal patients, and argue that they deserve to be accorded certain minimal 
rights, including the right to bring a civil suit and receive damages. 
I think that creating a third category will resolve many problems. First and 
foremost, it will avoid the false dichotomy that the person/property divide 
perpetuates. Persons are not the only type of being deserving of rights. This is 
especially true since the concept of personhood has been expanded to include non-
living beings such as corporations and ships. By creating a third category, we also 
avoid the psychological resistance many humans may experience by belonging to 
the same legal category, person, as other animals, and therefore avoid much of the 
associated pushback.  
One obvious question regarding this project is whether it is practically 
feasible. I think it is, and will discuss the practical implications in some detail. If we 
look to our current legal system, there is already a framework in place to 
acknowledge and enforce the rights of incompetent humans (children, the mentally 
incompetent, etc.) whom we believe to be persons and to have the associated rights, 
but who cannot themselves implement those rights. This involves, among other 
things, assigning a representative to speak on behalf of said persons in legal 
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contexts. I see no reason why we could not expand the application of this framework 
to legal patients. I will explore legal documents, laws, and specific court cases in 
order to make the argument that such a change is realistic.  
 
II. Animal Treatment in Farms, Labs, and Zoos 
 Animals are used in a great variety of industrial and social contexts. They are 
used as food, subjects of experimentation, as entertainment, companions, workers, 
and much more. Given the pervasive presence of such animals under human care 
and control, it seems natural that we should offer them fairly robust protection. As 
we will see shortly, there is some indication that lawmakers agree. From anecdotal 
evidence, such as a dog owner’s sensitivity to her pet’s emotional states, to videos 
that animals activist groups like PETA have put out, to growing scientific evidence 
such as recent pain studies, there is a widespread awareness that many animals can 
suffer and are suffering (I will define “pain” and “suffering” more formally in the 
next chapter). While it may turn out that some animals cannot suffer, it is extremely 
rare in this day and age for a scholar of any merit to claim that no nonhuman 
animals can suffer, or that their suffering has no moral import.2 Further, many 
animals may be capable of suffering, not just on a physical level, but on an emotional 
level as well. For instance, many species can feel such things as boredom, jealousy, 
anger, etc. that are not necessarily caused by physical damage. I will review some of 
this literature in Chapter Two. But let us assume that many animals suffer. Given 
this, it is not surprising that we should care about such suffering. And it is clear that 
 
2 There are exceptions of course. The theologian William Lane Craig holds a version of this 
view wherein only higher primates and humans can really suffer. (Craig 2009) 
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there is a great deal of it to care about.3 I will not, and cannot, give a detailed account 
of current animal uses and conditions here. But I will supply a brief account of some 
of the more common circumstances in which domesticated animals find themselves. 
Those familiar with this topic may wish to skip to the next section. 
 Many animals live their entire lives on factory farms. At least 35 million cattle 
are killed each year in the U.S. for food alone, along with 110 million pigs, almost 9 
billion chickens, and hundreds of millions of other animals. (USDA 2011) Their 
living standards are by and large quite low (although there are occasional 
exceptions). Some of the circumstances they experience include overcrowded cages, 
bodily mutilation without painkillers, forced and constant pregnancy, separation of 
parents from their young, poor nutrition, large doses of antibiotics, living in unclean 
conditions including cages lined with their own excrement, living with dead and 
rotting conspecifics, infections, illnesses, and injuries resulting from their poor 
housing conditions, high levels of stress, cages too small to turn around in, inability 
to perform species typical behaviors, an almost complete lack of veterinary care, 
and so on. Not all factory-farmed animals experience all of the things on this list, but 
the majority experience most. 
While their lives can be painful, it is during transportation and slaughtering 
that some of the most objectionable practices occur. During transport, the animals 
 
3 Despite my use of the word “care” here, a full discussion of care ethics would blur the focus 
of the current section. Instead, I’ll say a few words here. Nel Nodding (1984) makes the 
distinction between caring for and caring about, where the former refers to actions that 
provide actual services and the latter refers to caring ideas or intentions. Without using 
precisely that language, Chapter Two (on sentiocentrism) will deal mostly with the question 
of whom we should care about and why, and Chapter Five (laying out my proposal) will deal 




are forcibly crowded into trucks (the method by which this is done varies by 
animal) to the extent that they often are forced to stand due to lack of space. They 
can be legally kept in this space for up to 28, or in some cases 36, hours (The 28-
Hour Law4) without receiving food or water. These spaces do not have to have 
temperature control, and many animals become sick or die when the trucks reach 
ninety degrees or fall to below freezing temperatures. In some cases, animals have 
actually frozen to the sides of the (metal) truck, and have to be pried off with 
crowbars. Many animals die during shipping alone. If an animal is unlucky enough to 
fall during transport, it may be crushed underfoot. 
 Those that make it to the slaughterhouse have no relief. They are urged to 
exit the vehicle, which many do willingly. But others are timid, and so are shocked 
with electric prods in their faces and rectums or dragged off with chains. Once off 
the truck, cows are funneled into a chute where they are shot in the head with a 
captive bolt. This is meant to render them insensible to pain. But the workers are 
often ill-trained, and the shot does not always hit the mark so they continue to be 
processed while still alive. Ramon Moreno, a slaughterhouse worker, told The 
Washington Post that he often had to dismember conscious cows. “They blink. They 
make noises,’ he says. ‘The head moves, the eyes are wide and looking around. … 
They die piece by piece.’” (Warrick 2001) The cows are usually hung upside-down 
by their legs, as they move down a precession line where their throats are slit. This 
 
4 The 28-Hour Law is rife with loopholes, often ignored, and rarely enforced. For a few 
examples: The law only applies to ground transport across state lines, and does not extend 
to air or water transport. Sheep can be kept loaded for up to 36 hours. And any animal can 
be kept for “36 consecutive hours when the owner or person having custody of animals being 
transported requests, in writing and separate from a bill of lading or other rail form, that the 28-
hour period be extended to 36 hours.” The cost of violating the law is $100-$500. 
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is supposed to be a quick death. But, “Another worker, Martin Fuentes, told the Post 
that many animals are still alive and conscious for as long as seven minutes after 
their throats have been cut. ‘The line is never stopped simply because an animal is 
alive.’” The particular accepted slaughter methods differ by animal, but the general 
experience remains much the same. 
 Laboratory animals are also often the recipients of brutal treatment. Each 
year in the U.S., about 100 million mice and rats are used in research (biomedical 
experimentation, product and cosmetic testing, and science education), as are about 
300,000 primates, cats, dogs and guinea pigs. (USDA 2019) Most of these animals 
are bred specifically for laboratory use. The quality of their lives in the lab largely 
depends on what sort of study they are being used in. Some studies are fairly benign. 
These include most cognition tests, behavioral observations, and other non-invasive 
tests that are meant to generate knowledge about the way animals behave on their 
own and what cognitive capabilities they have. Even so, they are still generally kept 
in a man-made environment, with limited social access, and an inability to perform 
many of their species typical behaviors.  
 Some of the more invasive studies include the subjects being intentionally 
addicted to drugs and cigarettes, kept in extreme isolation, deprived of basic bodily 
needs such as sleep and food, intentionally caused pain, deafened, blinded, 
vivisected, infected with or caused to develop diseases such as AIDS, Parkinson’s, 
diabetes, and cancer, and much more. The army used to blow up pigs to test the 
result of certain explosives. The animals are often are not given painkillers due to 
the worry that relieving pain would skew the studies’ results. Most of these animals 
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are used only once, and the majority either dies during the experiment (as in LD 50 
tests where the goal is to determine what dosage of a toxic substance will kill 50% 
of the population) or is euthanized after the experiment has concluded. Methods of 
euthanization vary by species, largely depending on the animal’s size. 
 Zoos and aquariums are a third sort of environment in which we keep 
animals, and they vary quite a bit in regards to how the animals are treated.5 Open-
range zoos and safari parks tend to provide their animals with a large land area over 
which to roam, including many natural aspects to the landscape. Because there is 
space to move, they are not forced to continually encounter humans. They can often 
form social groups and interact with other species in a relatively natural way. This is 
much different than many popular zoos. While zoos tend to enjoy a relatively 
positive reputation, many of them are, in fact, places where animals live in artificial, 
stressful, and confined conditions. They are often deprived of mental and physical 
stimulation and socialization. (Kleiman 2012) Many of these animals are kept in 
concrete enclosures with little or no access to the natural environment. Many are 
kept alone, and so suffer from unnatural isolation. Animals are often held in 
locations that are very different from their natural climate. For instance, polar bears 
are kept in many zoos which have much higher average temperatures than their 
native ecosystem. Such changes put a lot of physical and mental stress on the 
animals. 
Animals in those conditions often suffer from various psychological 
problems, informally called “zoochosis”. (Born Free n.d.) Symptoms of psychosis, 
 
5 We can, for example, distinguish between roadside zoos, petting zoos, animal theme parks, 
open range zoos, and safari parks.  
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called stereotypical behaviors, include such behaviors as bar-biting, coprophagia, 
self-mutilation, circling, rocking, swaying, pacing, rolling/twisting, head-nodding, 
vomiting, excessive licking, and excessive grooming (often to the point of creating 
lesions). Some zoo animals have caused themselves serious injury or death by these 
actions. (Wolfensohn 2018) Additionally, zoos kill thousands of animals each year 
because they are the result of unwanted breeding. 
 There are many more ways that animas are utilized, but I’ll close this section 
by looking at pets, also called ‘companion animals.’ Of the uses listed in this section, 
the use of animals as pets or companions is probably the least problematic. As of 
2012, over 60% of American households had at least one pet.  The number of owned 
animals has tripled since the 1970’s, and there are about 180 million pets in the U.S. 
(AVMA n.d.; PFMA 2015) Of these, about 4% enter the shelter system annually, 
more than a third of which are euthanized. (ASPCA, n.d.) Even so, we know that 
many pet owners love their animals, and often consider them part of the family. 
Such inclusion frequently comes with enrichment tools (toys), high quality medical 
care, and other benefits. But there are many pets who are not as lucky. 
 Many people adopt animals only to give them up because their place of 
residence does not allow pets, they feel they do not have not enough time, the 
animal has behavior issues, or the human has allergies. (Greenwood 2016) Further, 
those who keep their pets often abuse them. Dogs, cats, horses, birds, and livestock 
are frequently given inadequate food and water, forced to stay outside in extreme 
conditions with little to no shelter, kicked, whipped, or otherwise beaten, made to 
fight other animals to incapacitation or death, and so on. Thousands of these cases 
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are reported every year, and undoubtedly many more go unreported.6 This is 
despite the fact that all 50 states have felony provisions within their animal cruelty 
laws. (Wisch 2010) 
 
III. Current Animal Protection Laws 
Some places in the world have begun to restrict some of the ways we 
mistreat animals. In this country, Illinois, Oregon, Maine, California, and Michigan 
stand out as leading the way with legal protections for animals. California is in many 
ways our country’s most progressive state when it comes to redefining what the 
boundaries of humane treatment are. In 2015, California passed a law banning 
routine use of antibiotics in animal agriculture. This will likely mean that animals 
will receive more humane treatment in order to prevent the diseases CA farmers 
used to prevent through those drugs. They have also outlawed battery cages for 
hens, and intend to extend this rule to require that each hen will have enough space 
to stand up, lie down, turn around, and spread her wings without touching another 
hen. (LA Times 2014) Despite limited improvements in individual states’ laws, I will 
focus on federal laws for the rest of this section, as it is the federal level at which I 
will make my proposal for legal reform. 
Most agree that a large-scale, organized movement for animal welfare began 
in the U.S. in the 1960’s and 70’s. As we will see, even though the addition of animal 
welfare laws is straightforwardly a good thing, these laws all leave a lot to be 
desired. Let us consider three of these laws in detail, beginning with the well-known 
 
6 Interestingly, there is a correlation between domestic violence and animal abuse. 71% of 
violence victims report that their abuser also targeted their animal (Ascione, 1997). 
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Animal Welfare Act (AWA). This law was first passed in 1966, though it has seen 
several revisions since, most recently in 2008. It is really the central animal 
protection law, because, as stated by the USDA, “It is the only Federal law in the 
United States that regulates the treatment of animals in research, exhibition, 
transport, and by dealers. Other laws, policies, and guidelines may include 
additional species coverage or specifications for animal care and use, but all refer to 
the Animal Welfare Act as the minimum acceptable standard.” (n.d., par. 1) 
In the AWA, we see a sort of bifurcated attention paid to animals. There are 
many standards of minimum care described in the law, and these standards do 
appear to stem from a concern to minimize suffering. For example, part of the stated 
purpose of the document is to “assure the humane treatment of animals during 
transportation in commerce.” (§2131.2 AWA) Another example comes later in the 
section regulating animal care, treatment, and practices in research facilities, 
specifying that “animal pain and distress are minimized, including adequate 
veterinary care with the appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, tranquilizing 
drugs, or euthanasia.” (2143.3a AWA)  
Even though there is no justification for such criteria expressed there, or 
anywhere else in the text of the law, one is left with the sense that the law is 
intended to prevent an unnecessarily high level of animal suffering for the sake of 
the beings themselves, and not (solely) in virtue of their value to humans. And to 
some extent, that appearance is confirmed by the simple observation that if we 
cared not for animal suffering, many aspects of research operations, animal housing, 
etc. would be made easier and cheaper without these minimum standards. There is 
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clearly some form of moral obligation that lawmakers appear to feel toward 
minimizing suffering that is not based in making human lives easier. 
On the other hand, human needs and wants clearly trump objective 
valuations of different species in ways that are not scientifically justifiable. Dogs are 
the prime example of such a case. The AWA contains three sections that solely 
regulate treatment of dogs and cats (2135, 2137, and 2138), and an additional 
section (2148) only regarding dogs. The section “Protection of Pets” (2158) is also 
only about dogs and cats. No other animals covered by the law have even one 
dedicated section. Dogs and cats are also afforded extra considerations throughout 
the law. For example, section 2140 includes this requirement for record keeping 
(emphasis added):  
Dealers and exhibitors shall make and retain for such reasonable period of 
time as the Secretary may prescribe, such records with respect to the 
purchase, sale, transportation, identification, and previous ownership of 
animals as the Secretary may prescribe. Research facilities shall make and 
retain such records only with respect to the purchase, sale, transportation, 
identification, and previous ownership of live dogs and cats.   
 
Such exception also occurs in 2141. Further, in section 2143.a2B, dogs are specified 
as the only animals for which exercise is required.  
 Let us move on to look at the limited definition of “animal” in 2132g 
(emphasis added): 
The term “animal” means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate 
mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the 
Secretary may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, 
testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet; but such term 
excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and mice of the genus Mus, bred for 
use in research, (2) horses not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm 
animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use 
as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for use for improving 
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animal nutrition, breeding, management, or production efficiency, or for 
improving the quality of food or fiber. With respect to a dog, the term means all 
dogs including those used for hunting, security, or breeding purposes… 
 
The definition does not include animals used as food, including cows and pigs. 
Nowadays, there is a lot of evidence that pigs lead internally complex lives, on par 
with or beyond the internal lives of most dogs. Pigs have been shown to possess rich 
emotional lives, complex and meaningful social groups, and the ability to make great 
companion animals. (Marino & Colvin 2015) Given all this, the distinction in the law 
between dogs and pigs must arise from social norms rather than from an objective 
valuation of the animals. Dogs are commonly loved as pets and are named “man’s 
best friend”; pigs are usually neither. In this country, we would not accept the use of 
dogs as food, but we readily accept this use of pigs, and this double standard is 
reflected in our laws. So there is an undeniable social aspect to the AWA and other 
animal protection laws. For example, two other prominent laws regarding animal 
protection, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Humane Slaughter Act (HSA), 
can be shown to contain the same split. 
 The ESA is meant to protect (in so far as they are in their natural habitats) 
endangered or threatened plant and animal species. The law states early on that 
humans are responsible for many extinctions, saying, “various species of fish, 
wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a 
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate 
concern and conservation” (2.a.1) We see further that the law is committed to 
“provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the 
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conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such 
steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and 
conventions.” (2.b) 
One notable difference between the ESA and the AWA is that the ESA does 
not exclude whole categories of animal from its jurisdiction. In section 3.8, it is 
explicitly stated that the law applies to “any member of the animal kingdom, 
including without limitation any mammal, fish, bird, … amphibian, reptile, mollusk, 
crustacean, arthropod or other invertebrate, and includes any part, product, egg, or 
offspring thereof, or the dead body or parts thereof” (emphasis added). This is a 
much more comprehensive law insofar as all animals are included, and perhaps 
most interestingly, all invertebrates.7 In particular, this law does not appear to make 
the large compromises in favor of human interests that the AWA does.  
This all seems good. However, if we look again, it becomes clear that the 
underlying motivation for this law is not to benefit the animals themselves. In two 
places, the document states that these provisions are based on human concerns. In 
2.a.3 we read, “[T]hese species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its 
people…” That is, they are worth protecting because they are valuable to us. Shortly 
after this, the sentiment is further clarified by identifying our commitment is to 
“better safe-guarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation’s heritage in fish, 
wildlife, and plants.” “Citizen” only refers to humans. Therefore, despite the 
expanded range of the ESA’s reach, it is clearly motivated by human interests, and 
 




protects endangered species only insofar as biodiversity is instrumentally valuable 
to us.  
 Lastly, we’ll turn to the Humane Slaughter Act (HSA).8 This law is intended to 
regulate how animal products are processed, from slaughter to distribution. I’ll be 
focusing here on the regulations regarding slaughter. In section 1, we read  
“[T]he congress finds that the use of humane methods in the slaughter of livestock 
prevents needless suffering; results in better and safer working conditions for 
persons engaged in the slaughtering industry;  brings about improvement of 
products and economies in slaughtering operations;  and produces other benefits 
for producers, processors, and consumers which tend to expedite an orderly flow of 
livestock and livestock products in interstate and foreign commerce.” 
 
Of the four reasons for humane slaughter, only one is based on a moral 
consideration of animals; but it is first on the list. Further, that reason is not put in 
terms of human needs, nor is there any reason to interpret it that way. Now 
consider the definition of “humane slaughter.” It is when: 
“a) In the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock, all 
animals are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, 
chemical, or other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, 
thrown, cast, or cut; or  
b) by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Islamic and 
Jewish faith … whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the 
brain…” 
 
In practice, the most common methods of slaughter are electrocution, CO2 stunning, 
and captive bolt stunning. Such methods are supposedly instantaneous and render 
the animal unconscious, but there is reason to doubt both of these claims. (Grandin 
& Smith 2004) Further, the Act defines being unconscious only as making no effort 
to right oneself. This is clearly an insufficient criterion. There are many cases in 
 
8 Formally called the Act of August 27, 1958, 7USC 1901-1907. 
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which an animal may be temporarily paralyzed while maintaining full 
consciousness, including the ability to feel pain. (Warrick 2001) 
 Perhaps the most egregious failing of the HSA, however, is its exclusion of the 
vast majority of animals who are slaughtered in the U.S. each year, including poultry 
and fish. Poultry (the majority of which are chickens) and fish each constitute a 
much larger percentage of all animals killed for food than the animals protected by 
the law. (Meyers 2016) As I will describe in Chapter Two, the science indicates that 
all vertebrates have the requisite physical structures for pain experiences, and many 
of them are also capable of some aspects of psychological suffering, such as stress 
and fear. Therefore, any law that presents itself as caring to minimize animal 
suffering cannot consistently exclude such animals. 
As an aside, I have focused this section on American law, though the same 
sorts of issues can be seen in many nation states throughout the world. An in-depth 
look at international law, though fascinating, would be outside the scope of this 
paper. Therefore, I will continue to discuss American law, and make suggestions 
regarding only the American legal system. I think it will be clear, however, that my 
suggestions could be expanded to other countries, or perhaps even to an 
international treaty regarding animal treatment.  
 
IV. What to Expect in the Chapters Ahead 
I have so far endeavored to make clear that our current way of incorporating 
animals into the U.S. legal system is inadequate. There is a lot of precedence for 
arguing that all pain and suffering should be morally considerable. In philosophy we 
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have many ethical systems that incorporate this intuition, including Bentham’s 
utilitarianism, Singer’s preference utilitarianism, Regan’s rights view, feminist 
ethics, and so on.  
I will therefore begin in Chapter Two by establishing the long and growing 
tradition of considering sentience as the only morally acceptable cut-off for moral 
consideration. I will also reference the growing body of scientific evidence that 
many animals are sentient and experience suffering.  While such a position has been 
well established in philosophy, it has been stunted in the legal arena by the false 
dichotomy of personhood and property.  Given these considerations, it is long past 
time that our legal system caught up to our philosophical and scientific knowledge 
to provide more, and more robust, protections for sentient animals. 
 In making a case for sentiocentrism, I will have to clarify the various ways in 
which the term is used, and how I intend to use it. While there is much that 
sentiocentric views agree on, there is often an underlying assumption about what 
‘sentience’ refers to that can confuse the discussion. Sentience can be described as 
an aspect of consciousness, a cognitive ability, the ability to perceive, the general 
ability to feel, or the specific ability to feel pain and/or suffer. As an aspect of 
consciousness, it may refer to the ability to have subjective experience. As a 
cognitive ability, it may require certain processing structures in the body and the 
brain. The abilities to perceive and feel are perhaps the broadest definitions of 
sentience, as they do not specify the nature of those perceptions or feelings. Finally, 
I take the ability to feel pain and/or suffer as being the same as having the ability to 
experience an event as negatively valenced.  
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It may turn out that all normally developed beings who possess one of these 
abilities possess them all, but I will not assume that to be the case. Further, I am 
making a moral argument, and as such will use the definition that I consider to be 
the most morally relevant: the ability to feel pain and/or suffer. It may turn out that 
this ability is a matter of degree, but this will not affect my proposal. I take the 
question of whether an animal is sentient to be a "yes" or "no" question, even while 
acknowledging that all pain and suffering may not be similar to humans', or perhaps 
even recognizable to us. Once an animal has passed the threshold of sentience, it 
automatically belongs to the category of sentient nonperson (SNP). If any 
considerations of degree are to be taken into account, they lie outside the scope of 
the current project. In this chapter, I will also discuss objections to sentiocentrism 
and do my best to show their inadequacy. While sentiocentrism alone cannot solve 
all moral dilemmas, I believe it should be one of the central pillars of our applied 
ethics. 
Chapter Three will focus on the distinction between animal abolitionists, 
animal welfare advocates, and animal rights advocates, with the understanding that 
these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. I will discuss the central ideological 
and methodological differences between them, including disagreements that arise 
within each group itself. Gary Francione will be the primary representative of the 
abolitionists, Robert Garner will be one example of a welfarist, and Steven Wise will 
be discussed as offering what we might term “partial abolitionism”. We will also 
look at a couple other views, including Shelly Kagan’s hierarchical view and  
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s citizenship model. 
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I will argue that abolition is both unattainable socially, and unnecessary to 
secure compassionate treatment for sentient beings. I agree with Francione to the 
extent that sentience is the only acceptable threshold for determining which animals 
should matter, but I feel that he takes his prescriptions for actions much further 
than they need be taken. In particular, I will disagree with his insistence on ending 
animal companionship (i.e. having pets), and raise several objections to his claim 
that animal research is never morally justified. 
Welfarists usually focus on improving the conditions of the animals in our 
care, without necessarily allowing them any rights beyond mere protection. They do 
not necessarily object to the designation of animals as property, but only to the 
mistreatment of property that happens to be capable of suffering. I will argue that 
this, too, is insufficient, since it does not recognize the sentient animal as a legal 
entity which itself deserves consideration, but rather as beings to which we only 
owe indirect or discretionary duties.  
Steven Wise does not argue for abolitionism, but rather that certain animals 
are deserving of legal personhood, and thus, human-like rights. While this is an 
admirable goal, and is perhaps the right thing to do for particular species such as 
gorillas and dolphins, it is still insufficient. No matter how many species are 
eventually granted legal personhood, there will be many leftover species who are 
sentient, but fall well below the required cognitive threshold for consideration as a 
person. 
Kagan puts his discussion in terms of a hierarchy of value, which distracts 
from rather than clarifies the current issues. He focuses very heavily on agency, 
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considering it more important than sentience. This view and his reasons for it are 
both flawed, and so sentience comes to play a suppressed role in his theory, while I 
believe it should be central. He also provides several ad hoc arguments for giving 
humans more value than other animals that appear to be based in human 
exceptionalism. 
I will argue that each of these positions is insufficient to accommodate 
sentient nonpersons within our legal and social framework. 
In Chapter Four, I will discuss existing legal distinctions in U.S. law. In today’s 
legal environment there are two legal categories: legal personalities and property. 
This is not sufficient. Legal personhood is generally restricted to those with certain 
high-level cognitive abilities, while everything else is relegated to the realm of 
property (or else it is not even regarded at all). If a person is injured by another 
person, there is legal recourse and compensation available for that individual. If a 
sentient nonperson is injured, there is no legal recourse or compensation for that 
being. All that exists is punishment for the doer of the injury and possible removal of 
the injured.  
Here, I will aim to make the landscape of current issues in personhood clear, 
both in the legal and philosophical realms. First I will elaborate on the two currently 
existing legal categories, personalities and property, and the implications that result 
from assigning something to one of these groups. Specifically, only those considered 
persons under our laws have any legal standing to sue on their own behalf to make 
themselves whole if injured. Persons come in a variety of shapes, and with a variety 
of rights. I will lay out the similarities and differences between these types of 
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persons, raising issue with the seeming inconsistency of applying the same term to 
such disparate beings, while excluding all nonhuman entities as a matter of course. 
In regards to personhood, I will also be discussing Supreme Court cases that give 
corporations certain rights. 
I also wish to highlight the difference between holding rights and merely 
being protected under the law. Essential to this discussion will be the observation 
that inanimate objects and sentient animals are both considered property, and 
therefore only afforded protection. At the same time, our laws clearly indicates a 
preference for avoiding “unnecessary harm” to certain animals, while they indicate 
no such concern for inanimate objects. One important aspect to our property laws 
thus appears to be that not all property is truly equal. While calling all sentient 
animals persons would be an error, I will argue that putting them in the same 
category as inanimate objects is a far more egregious error. I will emphasize this 
discrepancy as a problem that my proposal will aim to resolve. 
I will then argue that while personhood is an interesting, and perhaps useful, 
category, it is far too restrictive to be the only morally significant, legally recognized 
designation. I believe modern day efforts to expand the circle of personhood by 
abolitionists and animal rights activists (to fetuses, nonhuman, animals, rivers, and 
so on) largely stem from a conviction that sentient beings should not be property. 
Though I agree with that claim, I do not believe that all sentient beings are deserving 
of legal personhood either. Welfarists and abolitionists have long been at odds over 
the correct way to incorporate nonhumans into our society.  
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I believe part of the discrepancy is due to the fact that we lack the legal 
framework to deal with beings which are neither property nor persons. In this 
paper, I will outline a new legal category, legal patiency, which would provide 
certain rights to sentient nonpersons. I will explain the philosophical import of such 
a move, and how it may be practically applied in the current U.S. legal system. 
By Chapter Five, I will have argued that all sentient beings are morally 
important, and that our current legal system which divides all beings into persons 
and property contains both gaps and inconsistencies. In this section, I will suggest a 
way to fix this. Importantly, I will not be suggesting that we treat all sentient beings 
as persons, nor that all animals are sentient. Likewise, I will not try to identify 
exactly which animals may be deserving of legal personhood. Whether or not any 
animals should be considered as persons is really irrelevant to my thesis, and I will 
explain why this is the case. 
The animals I will be discussing are those that are sentient nonpersons 
(SNP’s). These beings are deserving of some legal rights so that they receive more 
than mere protection under the law. But what kind of rights would those be, and 
how could they be accommodated in our current legal system? I will discuss two 
main categories of rights that such animals need. The first is some degree of 
freedom from bodily harm or injury, and the second is the right to receive 
recompense directly for any harm or injury done to it by the ability to bring a civil 
case to court and sue for damages. I will use existing establishments and explain 
how they can be expanded to accommodate this legal category. 
Lastly, Chapter Six will provide an explanation of how I envision this 
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framework being applied in practice. This will include both legal and social effects, 
and the degree to which the SNP’s rights must be regarded. I will also give examples 
of case studies, and how specific situations may be resolved under such a system. As 
with any new proposal, the specific guidelines would need to be worked out, but the 
underlying philosophy would provide the framework for fleshing out the necessary 




Chapter 2: Sentience matters – Animal Pain and Suffering 
All animals that can experience negative sensations are sentient on my 
account, and thus will fit into my proposed category of legal patiency. That being 
said, I will not offer a conclusive account of which animals, specifically, will be 
included and excluded. For one, I am not a pain scientist. Much of the necessary 
work to figure out which species are sentient has yet to be done, and once it has 
been, those involved in the research should be the ones who decide what the results 
mean. Secondly, I am not a legislator. Once science has presented the relevant 
information, it is the legislators who must decide how that information fills out the 
ethical system I am laying out, and therefore how it will apply in any particular 
domain. I am therefore going to set aside a great range of important questions in 
order to focus on animals that are relatively well understood to us. 
Despite our lack of certainty in the realm of animal experience, there are 
some things we do know. There is a wealth of data demonstrating that many species 
of animal can suffer.9  We have some ideas as to what physical markers indicate the 
ability to feel pain, and we have a fair amount of evidence that many animals have 
those. I will review some of that data here in order to demonstrate that suffering is a 
widespread occurrence that requires much more of us than we currently give.  
 
9 Some of the literature distinguishes between “pain” and “suffering,” although I do not place 
emphasis on that distinction here. First, I assume that any animal capable of suffering is also 
capable of pain. There may be a few individuals with medical conditions for whom this is 
not true, but that should not affect my overall argument. Second, as I am concerned with 
who is capable of pain, not individual instances of it, I do not think it is important to name 




Animal cognition research does not focus on sentience per se. It has mainly 
concentrated on specific areas of social cognition such as theory of mind, deception, 
individual recognition, etc. Most relevantly, there has been a fair amount of research 
on pain. The term ‘pain’ is reserved for the subjective feeling of a particular sort of 
discomfort, which is usually thought of as localized, having a specific duration, and 
having certain qualities. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines 
pain as “An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” However, it goes on 
to say that “Activity induced in the nociceptive pathways by a noxious stimulus is 
not pain, which is always a psychological state, even though we may appreciate that 
pain most often has a proximate physical cause” (IASP 2017)  
These definitions clearly indicate that the experience of pain requires 
sentience. If sentience involves the ability to experience subjectively, and pain is one 
type of subjective experience (whatever else it may or may not be), then pain 
requires sentience. Therefore, we may use the pain research as a minimum standard 
for determining which animals are sentient without fear of over-ascription. In the 
following pages I will focus on this research, and in so doing, assume that all animals 
who feel pain are sentient and are consequently deserving of some legal standing. 
In fact, one can identify three categories of animals: 1. Those who can almost 
certainly suffer, 2. Those who most likely cannot suffer, and 3. Those who fall in a 
gray area between the two. While there are many species of animal whose ability to 
suffer is understudied and about which we know very little, there are several groups 
who are clearly capable of it and I will place these in the first category. I will not be 
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discussing animals in the second group in any real detail due to the low likelihood of 
their sentience. Such animals include insects (as discussed by C.H. Eismann et al.) 
and those such as sea cucumbers that appear to have no real brain. (Barnes 1982). 
The animals in the third group are often those species whose physiological 
structures and markers differ significantly from humans, but who nevertheless 
engage in some pain behavior. We simply don’t know enough about these creatures 
to reach a conclusion. Should it turn out that any such species can, in fact, feel pain, 
they would be included in my rubric. In the meantime, and for the purposes of 
future chapters, I will only accommodate the likely candidates.  
 
I. Nociception, Pain, and Identifying Sentience 
Part of the difficulty in making pain determinations is that it is very hard to 
obtain empirical evidence of pain. As Peter Singer points out, “Pain is a state of 
consciousness, a ‘mental event’, and as such it can never be observed.” (1990) Nor 
can we just ask most animals, the way we can ask most humans, whether or not 
they’re experiencing it. We cannot observe pain, but we can observe nociceptive 
processes. ‘Nociception’ refers to the capacity to sense noxious stimuli, and includes 
both conscious and subconscious responses to such stimuli. Nociceptive receptors 
are a certain kind of nerve ending that is present all over the body. (Basbaum et al. 
2009) The nociceptors send signals through the body’s peripheral nerves to the 
spinal cord and thus to the brain. (Giordano, 2005) There are different types of 
nociceptors that respond to different sorts of stimuli, but they all share the same 
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job: alerting the body and/or brain to potential physical harm. (Moseley 2012; Fein 
2014)  
 In much of the scientific and philosophical literature, the presence of 
nociceptors has been used as a shortcut to concluding that an animal feels pain. This 
often makes use of the dual assumptions that 1. Nociception is necessary for pain, 
and 2. Nociception is sufficient for pain. In other words, some writers accept that 
one cannot have pain experiences if nociception is absent. Such a view would imply 
that only animals with nociceptors are even capable of suffering in any way. Further, 
some accept that the discovery of nociceptors in another species is enough to 
conclude that the species can feel pain. Such suppositions are rarely identified, and 
are likely made for the sake of convenience. (Moseley 2012) But are they justified? 
Regarding the first assumption, there are kinds of discomfort which do not 
appear to depend directly on peripheral neuronal stimulation. Emotional suffering 
is like this, but so is the pain some humans feel in phantom limbs. Generally 
speaking, there are many instances of pain perception which seem to be initiated in 
the brain rather than by an external stimulus which damages the body. While 
nociception is not necessary for individual experiences of pain, it may be the case 
that nociception is a prerequisite for the general ability to feel pain. In other words, 
it may be that only animals with nociceptors have developed the cognitive 
architecture required to experience negatively charged sensations of any kind. This 
would mean that only animals with nociceptors feel pain. While we do not have a 
definitive answer on the matter, I have no direct objection to such an assumption at 
this time. Regarding the second assumption, nociception is not sufficient to indicate 
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a pain experience. There are nociceptive processes which result in no unpleasant 
sensation, such as a cut that you don’t notice until well after it has clotted and 
started to heal. More generally, it is thought that nociception appears at an earlier 
stage evolutionarily than pain perception, so that there may be any number of 
animals in whom we can observe the former without being confident in the 
presence of the latter. (Brandeis 2010) Victoria Braithwaite discusses the 
distinction between nociception and conscious experiences of pain in her book Do 
Fish Feel Pain? She says, “pain is not just single process, but rather a series of 
separate events” many of which take place unconsciously. Therefore, “just because 
an animal detects injuries through nociception does not mean that they feel pain 
too.” (31, 33) 
Therefore, although we can use nociceptive processes as a starting point for 
identifying which SNP’s feel pain, we must also consider other aspects of the animal 
in order to make more confident deductions. Researchers often defer to the 
“argument by analogy” in these realms: if an event is painful or distressing to 
humans, it is possible that a similar event would have similar effects on animals with 
comparable physiologies and behavior. 10 Likewise, similar responses may indicate 
similar experiences, “The presence of pain in an animal cannot be known for certain, 
but it can be inferred through physical and behavioral reactions.” (Abbot et al. 1995)  
There are generally three types of indicators that take place when trying to 
determine whether or not a particular animal is (or is capable of) suffering. Those 
are physiological changes (including nociception), behavioral changes, and 
 
10 Though popular among animal scientists, this view is not without naysayers: Harrison 
1991, for example. 
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structural similarity. (Bateson 1991; Sneddon 2014) These known and suspected 
markers of pain may occur at both the micro and macro levels. For instance, 
physiological elements such nociceptors and endogenous opioids are possible 
indicators at the micro level. At the macro level, we may look for behavioral changes 
and structural similarity. I will examine these categories and then show how each 
applies to the different classes of vertebrate. 
From the physiological standpoint, there are at least three important things 
we may look for: nociceptors, opioids, and physical changes. It is likely that the 
presence of nociceptors and physical changes are necessary, though not sufficient to 
indicate pain experiences, while the presence of opioids may be sufficient but not 
necessary. Nociceptors respond to three types of stimulus: chemical, mechanical, 
and thermal.11 They also stimulate a variety of responses including reflex 
withdrawal, autonomic responses, and pain. (Everaerts et al. 2011) Mechanical 
nociceptors respond to higher levels of pressure and incisions. Chemical nociceptors 
respond to a wide variety of noxious chemicals, including certain spices and spider 
toxins. (Woolf & Ma 2007) If these are not present, then we do not know what might 
account for the perception of bodily injury. The second physiological marker is 
endogenous opioids (such as endorphins) that are neurochemicals known to 
moderate pain in mammals. (Rech at al. 2012) The opioid system involves widely 
scattered neurons that make three opioids that act as neurotransmitters and 
neuromodulators at certain receptors and lead to analgesia, or pain relief. (Holden 
 
11 There are also nociceptors that respond to none of these, but appear to be sensitive to 
inflammation. These are not well understood and do appear to follow rather than initiate 
the body’s response. For these reasons, I won’t rely on their presence to make 
determinations regarding which animals feel pain. (Jessell et al. 1991) 
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et al. 2005) The interesting thing about opioids is that moderating pain appears to 
be their main, if not only, function. It is therefore a strong indication of pain 
experience. Thirdly, physical changes include subconscious, physiological responses 
such as changes in heart rate, respiratory rate, and blood pressure. These things are 
often used to assess pain in humans and other animals, but can be quite unreliable 
and nonspecific; similar changes may be observed in excited or mating animals, for 
instance. (NRC 2009) 
Pain behaviors are a second kind of pain indicator which must not be 
ignored. Although, like nociception, they may be neither necessary nor sufficient to 
indicate pain. To see that it is not necessary, consider some of the instances in which 
human pain experiences are not accompanied by pain behaviors. These range from 
extreme cases such as paralysis, to the familiar refusal to act as if one is hurting for 
any number of (often) social reasons. Pain behavior is also not sufficient to indicate 
pain as both humans and other animals have been documented as acting injured 
without any actual injury. Take, for example, the well-known case of the piping 
plover who will act as if she has a broken wing in order to lure a predator away from 
the nest. (Potter & Abbot 2012) 
Behaviorally, there are a large number of actions (or inactions) that may 
indicate pain. These behaviors may be intentional or unintentional, linguistic and/or 
communicative, and be demonstrated through either excitations or depressions of 
activity. Since behaviors are generally externally observable, they can be recorded 
and measured more easily than the endogenous processes mentioned below. 
However, given the wide range of pain responses, identifying them is not always a 
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straightforward task, and a comprehensive list will vary depending on whom you 
ask.  Keefe et al. include in their list “complaints of pain, reductions in activity, 
increased medication intake, or alterations in facial expressions or body posture” for 
humans, and “withdrawal from the painful stimulus or other self-protective 
maneuvers” for animals. (1991, p. 3) Other lists are much longer, including such 
things as facial grimaces and winces, crying out, restlessness, rubbing the affected 
area, distorted posture/mobility, fatigue, and insomnia. (Feldt 2000; Vlaeyen et al. 
1987) Despite the wide range, many of these behaviors will be recognizable to us as 
we often respond to pain similarly. A second issue is that sometimes the very act of 
observation changes the behavior of the observed, as is the case with rabbits and 
guinea pigs, who may remain immobile in the presence of unfamiliar persons. If a 
rabbit is suffering, he may only display pain behaviors when no human is around. 
These concerns are further complicated by the fact that species vary widely in their 
pain responses, and individuals of the same species will respond differently to 
different types of pain. (NRC 2009) Therefore, any extrapolations from behavior to 
pain must involve a lot of guesswork, and so we use behavioral information in 
tandem with other considerations to arrive at a more complete picture. 
Structural similarity, such as having a central nervous system, may represent 
a more direct connection to pain experience, although this, too, is not a necessary 
condition. We use the human case as a basis for determining which structures are 
involved in pain, but it is entirely possible that other creatures have different pain 
recognition and processing systems, so that animals lacking the same architecture 
as humans may nevertheless suffer. There are certainly some interesting structures 
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out there, as can be seen in the case of the octopus who has, in addition to a central 
brain, what we might call “mini-brains” in each of her tentacles. (Godfrey-Smith 
2016) The argument might also be made that structural similarity is not sufficient 
for pain similarity. But if there were (and there often are) structural similarities in 
pain processing mechanisms between those who certainly feel pain and those who 
possibly feel pain, one who denies that those with similar structures can suffer 
would seem to have the burden of proof. This common sense, better-safe-than-sorry 
policy is Singer’s view (1990), and I tend to agree. If another creature shares our 
basic pain-sensing structures, then it makes more sense to treat them as pain-
feeling, at least in the absence of convincing countervailing evidence. 
Structural similarities we look for include a central nervous system (CNS), a 
rudimentary cortex, and possibly a neocortex. The cortex is a part of the brain 
common to all vertebrates, and is thought to play a central role in many higher-level 
cognitive abilities such as memory and perceptual awareness. (Zimmer 2010) The 
neocortex evolved later, and is unique to mammals. It is thought to be the seat of 
such functions as cognition, consciousness, and language. (Rakic 2009) In humans, 
pain impulses are transmitted from the site of injury to the spinal cord, and then to 
the brain stem and thalamus. The brain does not have a dedicated pain center, and 
so the stimuli are processed in multiple areas of the brain, each with certain 
functions. This is one reason that pain processing is not simple to detect. 12 
 
12 The three main areas that we know are involved in pain processing are: 1. The reticular 
system, which connects the brain stem to the cortex, triggers automatic responses such as 
flinching when something comes at your face. It is also responsible for affective-
motivational responses such as looking at and assessing the injury. 2. The somatosensory 
cortex plays an important role in the perception and interpretation of sensations. It 
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If an animal were to exhibit all or most of these various pain indicators, we 
could feel pretty confident that they feel pain. I will not claim that possession of 
these is the only way an animal might have developed the ability to feel pain; that 
would be anthropomorphic hubris. But, taken together, these various markers seem 
to me more than sufficient. Peter Singer sums up this idea: 
 “[Since] nearly all the external signs that lead us to infer pain in other humans can 
be seen in other species … It is surely unreasonable to suppose that nervous systems 
that are virtually identical physiologically, have a common origin and a common 
evolutionary function, and result in similar forms of behavior in similar 
circumstances should actually operate in an entirely different manner on the level of 
subjective feelings.” (1990) 
 
In other words, if an animal were to exhibit all three of these markers, the burden of 
proof would lie with the pain denier to indicate evidence to the contrary. 
 
A.  Which Animals are Almost Certainly Sentient? 
 It is commonly accepted that mammalian species are clear cases of animals 
who can suffer. (Smith 1991) Physiologically, they possess all three of the markers 
we are looking for: nociceptors, opioids, and physical changes. In fact, all mammals 
appear to have the same types of nociceptors as humans: chemical, thermal, and 
mechanical. Mammals also possess endogenous opioids, which play an important 
role in pain transmission and reward mechanisms. (Dreborg et al. 2008; Stefano et 
al. 2012) Physically, it has been well-documented that mammals react in many of 
the same ways as humans do in the presence of painful stimuli. They exhibit 
 
recognizes the intensity, type, and location of the pain sensation and relates it to past 
experiences. 3. The limbic system, which acts as a sort of bridge between the cortex and 
lower region of the brain, is responsible both for the emotional and behavioral responses to 
pain and processing pain in terms of past experiences. (Nursing Times 2008) 
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increased heart rate, higher blood pressure, faster respiration, changes to their 
blood-cell counts, etc. (Carstens & Moberg 2000; National Research Council et al. 
1992) Structurally, they possess an extremely similar sensory architecture to 
humans, and they share with humans the possession of slow and fast pain pathways. 
Pain is also transmitted through their CNS’s in the same way as ours. (Sherwood et 
al. 2012) They have the same three areas of the brain that are involved in human 
pain. Further, all mammals possess at least a small neocortex, which is thought to 
process pain and suffering through “higher” cognitive processes. So if higher pain 
processing is reliant on this piece of architecture (which I doubt, but some believe) 
then they are good candidates. Behaviorally, each species shows most if not all of 
the pain behaviors that humans do, excepting (perhaps) the linguistic markers. One 
point that bears note is that not all mammals express pain in the same situations 
that a human would. For instance, some prey animals, such as elk, will not always 
cry out when injured in order to avoid alerting prey to their location. Some animals 
also have a high pain threshold, such as cats who walk on broken limbs. We are not 
looking for identical behaviors in identical situations, but in the broader context of 
their day-to-day lives. 
Despite a greater difference from humans in all three of these areas, birds are 
another class of vertebrate that can almost certainly suffer. While birds do not have 
neocorteces, they do possess at least a cortex, which some argue is necessary for 
processing pain as a negative sensation rather than simply as an aversive stimulus. 
(Key, 2016) Since there has only been serious analysis of pain done on a small 
number of the approximately 10,000 species of birds, these conclusions come from a 
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few genera that are considered representative of the class. 13 In fact, the majority of 
our knowledge about bird physiology comes from pigeons and domestic poultry. 
(Gartrell n.d.)  
Starting with the physiology, we see three types of nociceptors identified in 
chickens specifically: thermal-receptors, mechanical receptors, and pain receptors 
(aka chemical receptors). (Gentle 1992) Of these, Gentle says, ““it is clear that in 
terms of discharge patterns and receptive field size, they [nociceptors] are very 
similar to those found in a variety of mammalian species.” Birds, like mammals, he 
says, have “a well developed sensory system to monitor very precisely external 
noxious or potentially noxious stimuli.” (p. 237-8) Also, endogenous opioids appear 
to affect sensory input processing and memory in birds, (Reiner et al. 1994) and 
they have some similar opioid receptors to humans. (Danbury et al. 1998) Physical 
changes are also evident in chickens experiencing potential pain events, most 
notably their heart and respiratory rates increase rapidly when subjected to certain 
stimuli14 (Gentle 2011) as does their blood pressure. (Gentle et al. 1992) 
Structurally, a bird’s skin possesses sensory nerve endings, capable of 
detecting heat, cold, pressure, and pain. They have a central nervous system which 
is structured and functions similarly to that of mammals, integrating sensory 
impulses and storing learned information. (Ornithology 2016) One main difference 
is that birds’ brains do not possess a neocortex. The structure of the bird brain is 
admittedly quite different from the structure of the mammalian brain, however, 
 
13 If this assumption turns out to be false, I will revise the conclusions accordingly. 
14 Physical changes like these can indicate stress rather than pain per se. (See Grandin 
2002) But under my broad definition of pain as any aversive stimulus negatively perceived, 
certain kinds of stress may be included. 
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recent studies have shown that birds have parts and cells in their brains which 
appear to preform similar functions to the mammalian neocortex. (Wood 2018)  
Behaviorally, birds exhibit many of the same behaviors as humans and other 
mammals do, and they do so in situations which mammals would find painful. They 
exhibit efforts to escape, distress cries, guarding of wounded body parts, passive 
immobility, feather picking, increased aggression, anorexia, absence of species-
typical behaviors, and so on. (Gentle and Hunter 1990)  
Despite all these similarities, it is necessary to point out that bird pain 
perception and behavioral expression are also different from mammals’ in 
important ways. Prey species tend to have the more subtle pain behaviors which can 
easily go undetected to the untrained eye. In some cases, even veterinarians are only 
able to assess bird pain through their response to analgesia. Despite these 
considerations, Gentle concludes, “close similarity between birds and mammals in 
their physiological and behavioral responses to painful stimuli would argue for a 
comparable sensory and emotional experience.” (p. 243) Brett Gartrell likewise has 
determined “it is beyond doubt that birds are able to perceive pain.” (n.d.) 
 
B. The Jury is Out on Some Animals… 
  There are many species that will fall in the gray area, including fish, reptiles, 
amphibians, mollusks, crustaceans, and others.  Those that are vertebrates are the 
most likely among this group to experience suffering as they have more highly 
developed brains and advanced nervous systems. In fact, many researchers are 
coming to believe that all or most vertebrates experience pain. (Abbot et al. 1995) 
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They exhibit cephalization which may be crucial to integrating various bodily 
experiences in a way that can be processed as a single pain event. It is also likely 
that a complete endogenous opioid system was developed early in vertebrate 
evolution. (Dreborg et al. 2008)  
All vertebrates have a central nervous system and at least a rudimentary 
cortex. Fish have been shown to record noxious stimuli in higher brain areas 
(Dunlop and Laming 2005; Nordgreen et al. 2007), and certain reptiles seem to have 
the requisite neurochemistry. (Kavaliers et al. 1984) But the exact way that pain 
gets processed in the brain is an extremely complicated matter, particularly since 
there is a lot of disagreement. For that reason, I will not go into more detail here, but 
merely point out that the presence of the cortex in many animals makes it at least 
plausible that many of them can suffer. 
However, there has been very little research done on other vertebrate 
groups: reptiles, fish, and amphibians.15 And there has been even less done on 
invertebrates. So I will recuse myself from a discussion of pain in these animals and 
only make arguments based on mammalian and avian abilities to suffer. 
 
II.  Sentiocentrism: Why suffering is the right threshold 
Based on the above considerations, I therefore take it as a given that many 
species of animals can suffer, even if that suffering is not identical or experienced to 
the same degree as human suffering. In this section, I will argue the position that 
 
15 For evidence of endogenous opioids in the various vertebrate classes, as well as for 
differences in their respective functions, see West et al.’s Zoo and Animal Wildlife: 
Immobilization and aneasthesia. 
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such suffering matters morally. To make this claim is not to argue that all suffering 
should be eliminated. Not only would that task be impossible, it would also reveal a 
gross misunderstanding of pain itself. For much of pain is useful, both from an 
evolutionary standpoint and from a social one. But we can agree that there is a lot of 
suffering that can be eliminated without any major loss of life function or meaning. 
(An exact specification of which types are which is beyond my abilities.) Here I will 
expand upon the moral importance of suffering in general, and why I believe that 
“beings who can suffer” is the right group to include in our realm of ethical concern.  
First, it should be made clear that sentiocentrism is a well-established 
philosophical position, and so the arguments rehearsed below are from that 
literature. I do not aim to add new arguments that being sentient qualifies one for 
moral consideration, but an acceptance of the arguments presented is central to my 
larger project. 
In a nutshell, sentience is the ability to experience perceptions subjectively.16 
These sensations are called “qualia” in Western philosophy, and are seen as 
necessary for the ability to suffer. It may be that all beings who possess qualia are 
also capable of suffering, but if this is true, it would seem to be a contingent fact 
rather than a necessary one. Using sentience as a minimally sufficient quality for 
moral consideration is a method that has been used at least since Jeremy Bentham’s 
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). It is in this work 
that he famously intones, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? 
but, Can they suffer?” Although this quote has been all but worshipped by modern 
 
16 The definition of suffering is not without its controversies, but there is no space here for 
that discussion. (See Nay & Fetherstonhaugh 2012 and Hall 1989 for example) 
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animal rights groups, Bentham was not against the use of animals for food (if they 
were killed painlessly), or against the use of animals in experiments (even if they 
suffered). In other words, he did not believe that suffering was an absolute wrong to 
be avoided at all costs, but rather a negative motivation to action that must be 
considered, even if animal suffering for human benefit is justified. 
Peter Singer’s account of the role of sentience is more nuanced. Singer sees 
sentience, or “[t]he capacity for suffering and enjoyment” as ‘”the only defensible 
boundary of concern for the interests of others” because all and only sentient beings 
have interests of the morally relevant sort. (1989) For Singer, only sentient beings 
have interests, where ‘interest’ is minimally understood as being demonstrated by 
acting to avoid pain.17 (Singer, 1993) And having interests is required for moral 
consideration. For Singer, though, interests come in degrees, and stronger interests 
are to given greater weight than weaker ones. For example, a human’s interest in 
having sufficient shelter is considered weightier than his interest in having a Ferrari. 
Interests are to be considered in terms of their strength, and not in terms of the 
particular individual who possesses them. In particular, Singer considers species 
membership irrelevant to solving moral quandaries. Thus, a goat’s interest in 
sufficient shelter is also more important than a human’s desire for a nicer car. 
Importantly, Singer does not view sentient beings as equal. He believes that 
interests are the moral bottom line, and that certain beings have the capacity for a 
wider variety of interests than other beings. For example, a human has a wider 
variety of interests, than say, a dog. A human can conceive of and have preferences 
 
17 I think there is some work to be done in explaining the relationship between sentience 
and the ability to have interests that Singer takes for granted. (See Irvin 2004) 
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regarding the future of her life, of her family, of her career, etc., while a dog may only 
have interests rooted in the present. Specifically, he believes that only beings with a 
sense of temporal self are able to have the interest in continuing to live. (Singer 
1975, p. 20-21) In a situation where all other interests are equal then, we should kill 
the dog rather than the human because only the human has the explicit interest in 
living.18 In this way, we can resolve moral dilemmas even while incorporating the 
interests of other animals. Note, in the example case of dog versus human, we are 
not ignoring the dog’s interests, nor are we claiming that an ability to conceive of the 
future is required for moral consideration. In fact, Singer says, “as long as sentient 
beings are conscious, they have an interest in experiencing as much pleasure and as 
little pain as possible.”  (1993 p. 131) 
Let us compare this to Tom Regan’s view. Regan has a set of criteria which he 
believes make a being worthy of moral consideration, and he calls such beings 
subjects-of-a-life. Many of these criteria sound merely like variations of sentience 
(such as having desires and feelings), but they also include “having a sense of the 
future, including their own future.”  (Regan, 1983 p.243) This will obviously exclude 
many sentient animals. It may be, for instance, that conceiving of the future requires 
the higher cognitive abilities found only in animals with neocorteces. In this case, all 
 
18 Singer, and most people who argue that humans have a higher capacity for suffering due 
to higher cognitive abilities, use this fact to argue that humans should receive preferential 
treatment in situations where the physical level of suffering is apt to be equal. I find this 
curious since those same cognitive capacities also give humans the ability to suffer less. For 
an easy example, consider a human and a dog getting a shot. The human can say to things to 
himself like “this will only last five minutes” or “this is good for me” which can temper the 
suffering felt. A dog has no such recourse and may genuinely think his life in danger though 
the physical experience is similar. Even in more extreme cases, such as starvation, higher 
cognitive abilities allow us to disassociate and put “mind over matter”. 
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non-mammals will lack such an ability. I don’t think this criterion is useful in 
delineating moral patients, therefore, because it is too restrictive. But it may be that 
this notion is a good approach for hashing out personhood in a more even-handed 
way than the law currently allows. (We will discuss personhood in detail in Chapter 
Four.) 
 Martha Nussbaum also assumes the sentience threshold in her work, even 
though she considers other traits as well. Her capabilities approach treats each 
individual according to his own capacity to experience, and considers what it would 
mean for each one to flourish.  In other words, the capabilities approach “concerns 
the dignity of a form of life that possesses both deep needs and abilities; [and] its 
basic goal is to address the need for a rich plurality of life activities.” (Francione & 
Garner 2010, p. 305) Sentience comes into play when she is considering which 
animals are subject to this kind of attention. In answer, she says, “it seems plausible 
to consider sentience a threshold condition for membership in the community of 
beings who have entitlements based on justice.” (Animal Rights p. 309) Thus, we are 
only to be concerned with flourishing in the cases where lack of flourishing can be 
experienced as negative. 
Elizabeth Anderson (1993) distinguished between three groups: animal 
welfarists, animal rights supporters, and environmental ethicists, claiming that they 
each have a different threshold for moral considerability.  She says these are 
sentience, subjecthood, and being a system of life, respectively. (AR p. 278) We are 
not concerned with the latter here, but note that even those with more advanced 
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criteria, such as Regan, also include sentience as one requirement. So a highly 
intelligent robot who could not suffer would be excluded from these systems. 
Joel Feinberg is another important thinker who identifies pain as the central 
criterion for identifying moral action. He uses the same vague distinction that I will 
employ (and hopefully explain to the reader’s satisfaction) of “unnecessary 
suffering”. He says, “If we define ‘cruel treatment’ as behavior that inflicts 
unnecessary pain or torment on a creature capable of suffering—that is, pain for 
which there is no good or sufficient reason—then I should think everyone would 
agree that cruel treatment (so defined) always violates the rights of the being so 
treated…” Not only is causing unnecessary suffering a breach of rights, but further, 
“those rights rest on no ‘condition’ but the capacity to suffer and cannot ever be 
justifiably withdrawn or nullified.” (Feinberg 1978)  
 Jeff McMahan (2002) also maintains that all sentient beings have some degree 
of moral status. He says, “[T]he hypothetical sentient creature [whose] mind is so 
simple that it altogether lacks either synchronic or diachronic psychological unity… 
it seems wrong to suppose that the sequence of the creature’s mental states cannot 
matter at all. It matters impersonally whether, for example, the creature’s 
experiences are pleasurable or painful.” (p. 475-6) 
The above are only a sample of the wide variety of thinkers who argue the 
moral import of sentience. What I have not done here is to elaborate on those who 
disagree. That is, there are many who believe that the suffering only matters if it is 
accompanied by such abilities as holding beliefs to be true or false, (e.g. Frey 1983, 
though he has since changed his mind) or being able to enter into a moral contract 
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and demonstrate “moral autonomy” (e.g. Carruthers 1992). Others believe that 
agency, not sentience, are the relevant threshold (e.g. Kagan 2019) or see autonomy 
as primary (as many writers within the Kantian tradition hold). This gap reveals the 
audience for whom I’m writing: those who take it as a given that causing certain 
kinds of suffering are wrong, regardless of what other abilities the subject may or 
may not possess. I see this as a given, and therefore take it as a starting point.19  
 
III. Defending Against Criticisms of Sentiocentrism 
We can take note that there are different sorts of sentiocentrism. One distinction 
we can make, for example, would be between strong and weak sentiocentrism 
(focusing solely on the interests/experiences of sentient beings vs. including 
aesthetic and intellectual values, etc.). However, since this is not a treatise on the 
theory itself, I will aim to keep the discussion of criticisms relatively general. Below 
are two of the more common attacks on sentiocentrism.20 
 
A. Sentiocentrism does not object to painless killing 
 This criticism is pretty easy to understand. If our ethic is primarily concerned 
with pain and suffering, then killing a being in a way that does not cause pain or 
 
19 Those interested in more detail regarding different thresholds philosophers have used, as 
well as those who argue against animal rights and even welfare, may refer to DeGrazia’s 
1996 book, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental life and moral status. 
20 There is a third area of concern from the realm of environmentalism that bears 
mentioning. Environmentalists often object to a sentience-based ethic for one of two 
reasons: either it is too narrow because it excludes things as rivers, trees, and whole 
ecosystems, or it entails anti-environmental outcomes in that it would ethically require us to 
meddle in nature in the wrong ways. (Jamieson 2008; Sapontzis 1992) The response to both 
of these is that assigning more value to sentient beings does not preclude assigning value to 
others as well. 
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suffering does not violate that ethic. On this view, the continued killing of well-
treated animals in various industries such as factory farms and research 
laboratories would be acceptable insofar as the animals do not suffer in dying. 
 I take it that there are three ways one can respond to such a challenge. The 
first is to accept the outcome, bite the bullet, so to speak. For those who are 
primarily concerned with the physical suffering and not with other notions such as 
dignity and autonomy, a version of the food industry that kills animals painlessly 
may be acceptable. However, this would also entail accepting that killing (at least 
certain) humans painlessly is also all right, a conclusion that would make many 
uncomfortable. The second is to present an alternative view on what makes killing 
wrong. There are multiple views available, for instance, the idea that killing is wrong 
because it causes loss of consciousness (McMahan 2002), or Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Frank Miller's view that killing is wrong because it causes an 
individual to be completely, irreversibly disabled. (DeGrazia 2013) These are not 
without their problems, however they give us an avenue forward to avoid the 
unsavory conclusion above.  So suffering is not necessarily a requirement of 
wrongful killing. The third is to deny strong sentiocentrism. Weak sentiocentrism 
makes sentience a sufficient marker for moral consideration. It does not, however, 
require that all other values are expunged in the process. For example, we may view 
using animals for human purposes as infringing on their dignity. Then the additional 
value of maintaining dignity for those that have it is itself an injunction against 
killing those beings needlessly. So long as we accept a plurality of values, of which 
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avoiding unnecessary pain is only one, it is perfectly consistent to be a sentiocentrist 
who takes issue with killing animals painlessly. 
 This type of response can also be used against a related objection to 
sentiocentrism, namely that uses of animals which do not cause pain are acceptable. 
This may be said about certain animals in certain zoos and aquariums or some 
animals in the movie and TV industries. But again, if we include other values in our 
system, the lack of pain may not be our only concern. 
 
B. Sentiocentrism Entails Unreasonable Positive Obligations 
 Whatever ethic we choose to adhere to, certain obligations will follow. If one 
follows sentiocentrism, it appears that the primary obligation will be to minimize 
suffering and pain wherever they occur in whichever ways we can. Part of this may 
be accomplished through negative obligations such as the obligations to not fight 
dogs, not eat meat, not destroy habitats, etc. However, minimizing suffering may also 
involve positive obligations, such as actively helping injured animals, freeing captive 
animals, and restoring compromised habitats.21 The concern is that positive 
obligations of this kind can be problematic. First, they may require too much of us. If 
you are morally required to save every animal that you can, your life would be 
overtaken by this task alone. Second, helping every suffering animal or preventing 
every animal from suffering would invariably cause more suffering. We cannot 
protect every prey animal without harming predatory animals. Likewise, were we to 
 
21 Alastair Norcross has stated that his guiding principle is that “we are morally obligated to 
eliminate all unnecessary suffering.” (2011) Such a view may lead to precisely the 
consequences criticized here. 
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protect every deer over the winter, come spring there would be an overpopulation 
which could not be supported by the land, leading many to starve. 
Regarding the first issue, it is common among deontological thinkers (from 
Kant to Korsgaard to Scanlon) to believe that negative obligations are stronger or 
more primary than positive obligations. (Kant called them perfect and imperfect 
duties, respectively.) Likewise, the constitutions of many democratic countries 
guarantee negative rights but not necessarily positive rights. For instance, you may 
be morally (and legally) required not to stab someone, but you are not similarly 
required to save a stab victim. One reason is that positive obligations generally 
require more of us than negative ones. (This is not universally true, of course, but 
seems to be generally accurate.) 
Regarding the second issue, it is again possible, perhaps advisable, to have an 
ethic with a plurality of values. Taking the predator/prey concern as an example, 
lessening suffering may only be one axis of our decision making process. Another 
may be to interfere as little as possible with wild animals’ lives, instead focusing on 
preserving wilderness and biodiversity. As Holmes Rolston III put it, “The strong 
ethical role is this: Do not cause inordinate suffering, beyond those orders of nature 
from which the animals were taken…. Going further can be commended but not 
required… we have no obligation to reduce suffering below levels found 
independently of human presence.” (Rolston 1989, 60-61). If we accept a multi-
value framework, we can suitably restrict the scope of our obligations such that 




Neither of the above subsections is meant to be a full-scale defense of 
sentiocentrism, as that would involve a much longer piece of writing and a more 
comprehensive discussion of the ethical issues involved in killing and obligation. But 
perhaps the above sketch is enough to indicate that there are responses to the main 
criticisms that come up in the literature, the strongest of which may be to take 




Chapter 3: Problematic Paradigms – Current Proposals for 
Addressing Animal Protections 
 
           The distinction between personhood and property has become muddled in 
U.S. law (as will be highlighted in Chapter Four). Unfortunately, the philosophical 
realm is not necessarily any clearer. This result is not surprising when we consider 
that many of the more well-known animal ethics scholars accept the current legal 
system’s dichotomy between personhood and property in formulating their 
theories, although some have moved beyond it. The two main traditional positions 
ethicists have taken regarding animal treatment are animal welfarists and animal 
rights activists, who loosely represent keeping animals as property and reassigning 
them to personhood, respectively. This distinction is overly simplistic, as there has 
been a diversification of views in the past decade or so. Even so, conceiving of the 
issue in this way is useful toward understanding the ways in which the discussion 
had been and is still deeply flawed.  
I will begin this chapter by discussing some of the plurality of views of 
contemporary animal ethicists. In recent years this field has diversified 
considerably, and although it won't be possible to mention every relevant thinker, 
this sampling should provide the reader with a useful transection of the current 
literature. Each view will have its own strengths and weaknesses, and, as I have 
come to understand them, each falls short of providing an adequate approach to 
resolving the "animal question." In providing either too much or too little for 
sentient nonhumans, they fail to provide a satisfactory solution to incorporating 
them into our legal and social frameworks. The criticisms made here will inform 
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Chapter Five, where I will propose a new legal category which would not only find a 
middle ground between legal persons and property, but also philosophically 
between these views. 
I. An Animal Welfare View -- Robert Garner 
The purpose of welfarist philosophy is to strengthen animal welfare laws and 
increase their enforcement. A welfarist examines the conditions that animals are 
kept in, and thinks that the protections they are afforded are insufficient at best, or 
egregious at worst. What is common to the views under the umbrella title of 
“welfarist” is that they each have the goal of improving the conditions of the animals 
in our care, although they vary considerably on how much to change and what sorts 
of changes are required. Furthermore, they do not necessarily object to the 
designation of animals as property, but only to the mistreatment of property that 
happens to be capable of suffering. In particular, it is common belief that we can still 
use animals primarily for our benefit as long as we treat them humanely in the 
process.  
Proponents of animal welfarism usually hold that giving animals rights is 
anywhere from unnecessary to impractical to preposterous. For instance, Richard A. 
Posner, an animal welfarist, intones, “One way to protect animals is to make them 
property, because people tend to protect what they own.” (Posner 2004, p.59) We 
have seen that there are laws in the U.S. that protect animals, and some of those 
laws appear to distinguish animals from other forms of property. The welfarist 
position can therefore take at least three forms. One form states that the laws we 
have are sufficient, but the enforcement of them is lacking. Another version argues 
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that the laws we have would be sufficient, if only they didn’t exclude whole 
categories of animals such as farm animals, poultry, mice, rats, and non-mammals. A 
stronger animal welfarist position asserts that our laws should prevent all 
unnecessary suffering of animals under our care and control. Some of these are 
more compatible with particular animal rights views than others.  
The welfarist I will discuss in detail is Robert Garner. Garner calls his form of 
welfarism “protectionism,” a position he defines as supporting “any measures that 
lead to the protection of animal interests, whether they be labeled animal welfare or 
animal right.” (Francione & Garner 2010, p. 104) This is distinguished from 
traditional welfare views in that it is not opposed to animal rights. (Francione 
identifies and criticizes this type of position, although he calls it “new welfarism.”) 
Garner believes that protectionism is the correct position because it accepts the 
aspirations of the animal rights movements while following what he sees as a more 
practical route. In particular, he believes in the positive effects of incrementalism 
and taking political and cultural realities, what he calls the “dominant narrative,” (p. 
168) into account rather than focusing solely on the conclusions of moral 
philosophy. Much of his writing focuses on defending his position against attacks 
from other views, such as animal abolitionism. My aim here is not to rehearse that 
exchange, but to examine the merits and detriments of his position in terms of what 
it does and doesn’t accomplish in giving various animals the moral and legal 
considerations they deserve. There are three areas of Garner’s philosophy that I 
would like to discuss, namely his views on unnecessary suffering, property and 
personhood, and practical measures. 
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Garner defines unnecessary suffering to be any instance where “the level of 
suffering inflicted on an animal outweighs the benefits likely to be gained by 
humans.” (107) Therefore, unnecessary suffering designates a relationship with 
human needs and welfare. In other words, “unnecessary” applies equally to the 
animals and to the humans involved. Animal suffering is necessary when there are 
significant human interests at stake, and where the means of satisfying those 
interests cannot be achieved without it. 
Garner observes, mostly correctly, that most animal welfare advocates focus 
more on limiting or eliminating unnecessary animal suffering than on the right to 
life and liberty. This is because there is a general consensus that many animals feel 
pain, whereas there is not a consensus that many, or any, nonhuman animals 
understand concepts such as life and liberty, and could therefore share those values. 
(107) For example, Peter Singer believes that only those with an explicit interest in 
the future can be harmed by removing that future. (Singer 1990) Likewise, many 
think that only those with an explicit interest in liberty can be harmed by taking 
away that liberty. These claims often rest on the distinction between intrinsic and 
instrumental value, or direct and indirect interest. A cat may have an indirect 
interest in the freedom from being caged, not because he finds freedom intrinsically 
valuable, but because the limitations of the cage prevent him from fulfilling his 
direct interests, such as playing with a toy on the other side of the room. Humans, on 
the other hand, are said to value freedom and life intrinsically. (Cochrane 2009) 
Singer does not engage in this debate, but merely states it to be the general 
concurrence. Therefore, since we are confident that necessary suffering happens, 
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but not that other animals directly value life and liberty, the former is what we 
should focus on.  
Although I don’t agree that animals have no intrinsic interest in life and 
liberty, that issue is irrelevant here. I do agree that the capacity for suffering is what 
matters, and that is a category that includes more animals than those who value 
freedom. I also agree that we cannot eliminate all suffering, but that much of what 
animals experience at human hands is unnecessary. (Refer to Chapter Two for 
related criticisms against sentiocentrism.) Some forms of unnecessary suffering are 
obvious, such as that caused by factory farms. But there are many gray areas, 
including animal experimentation on fatal illnesses, which will be discussed 
somewhat more fully in the last chapter. I say “somewhat” because providing a 
precise definition of “unnecessary” is not an aim of the current project, although I 
will paint some broad strokes. 
Next Garner discusses the status of animals as property. Early on, he 
dismisses the concept of personhood as useful because putting some animals in the 
category of person would leave the vast majority of animals behind. Rather, we 
should examine sentient animals in terms of their interests. He argues that “if we 
accept that animals have a right not to suffer rather than a right to life and liberty… 
the equality between humans and animals can be consistent with ownership if we 
adopt the principle that we should treat the interests of animals equally with those 
of humans.” (128) That is, the right to life and liberty is presumably something that 
only persons have. Beings without them can be considered property, which is not, 
by itself, a bad thing as far as he concerned. 
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He discusses two aspects of what it means to be property, possession and 
use. About possession he says, “What we have to decide is whether ownership runs 
contrary to the interests of animals.” He does believe that for many animals, 
including apes and wild animals, that ownership may infringe on animals’ interests, 
but that this isn’t that case with all animals. Regarding use, as long as the way in 
which the animal is used does not cause it suffering or death, and as long as the 
animal is not autonomous, there is nothing wrong with using the animal for our 
benefit. He defines “autonomy” as animals “having an interest in developing and 
pursuing their own life plans.” (129) So, any animals that do have autonomy should 
not be used in ways that interfere with it. Therefore, some, but not all, animals are 
harmed by the designation of being property. He sees no issue with keeping those 
who are not so harmed in the category. 
Although I disagree with the assumption that animals do not value life and 
autonomy, let’s put that aside. I also don’t agree that we should so quickly disregard 
the concept of personhood altogether, as we may decide that some animals are 
deserving of the considerations given to that group. But that is also a side-note. My 
main dispute with Garner’s analysis is that he seems to be redefining the concept of 
property to fit his argument. Property, by definition, does not have rights. To have 
rights in today’s legal system is to be a legal person. All persons have rights, and all 
rights-holders are persons. If we were to redefine property to allow some sub-
categories to have rights, I’m not sure why, in this hypothetical world, we couldn’t 
put humans into the property category as well, simply as a class of property with 
more rights than other classes. That is, if we are going to eliminate the fundamental 
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distinction between those two categories, why not just eliminate the second 
category in toto? His solution seems to eliminate the only relevant distinction we 
have in the legal system now. My solution, outlined in Chapter Five, will not 
eliminate a category, but add one. My hope is that such an addition elucidates, 
rather than obfuscates, the difference between different types of beings.  
Garner makes a claim later on regarding keeping sentient animals as a form 
of property which I think points precisely to a common misconception with regards 
to legal categories. He says, “[W]elfare statutes are sometimes weak and enforced 
ineffectively, although this is not primarily because animals are regarded as 
property.” (133) I couldn’t disagree more. The person/property division is, 
unquestioningly, a higher/lower distinction as well. The very fact that sentient 
beings are in the same category as inanimate objects says a lot about our national 
psyche and where our priorities lay. It is a social construct that devalues an entire 
group for economic benefit. David Nibert, in his book Animal Rights, Human Rights 
discusses the importance of social and political structures in shaping a culture’s 
system of values. In particular, he argues that prejudice is not the cause of these 
structures, but becomes widespread because of them. Eventually, such views 
become “naturalized,” so commonplace as to be an invisible premise in our daily 
lives and actions. (2002) So it is very much the case that animals’ status as property 
affects the seriousness with which we treat laws protecting them.  
Garner has a pretty bleak (he would say practical) view of how we should try 
to implement animal protection laws. He quotes John Gray (1997) as pointing out 
that “[P]ublic policy is formed and implemented by human beings. No measure that 
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does not promise a benefit to human is likely to gain a hearing.” (as quoted on p. 
126) He uses this idea to argue that we should focus on animal reforms which have 
tangible benefits to humans, that “associat[e] animal protection with human 
interests.” (156) Such a view rests on at least two assumptions, 1. That none of the 
animal welfare laws we currently have is altruistic, and 2. That there will not likely 
be such laws. Both of these are suspect. First, if we consider U.S. welfare laws in 
detail (as I do with some of them in Chapter Four), it is not immediately obvious that 
his first assumption is true; neither is it obviously false. But the second claim is 
demonstrably false when we consider some laws that other countries have passed. 
For example, Britain’s law prohibiting veal crates does not appear to have positive 
economic ramifications for veal farmers, nor does it improve the “quality” of the 
meat as having more room to move actually makes the meat tougher. Rather, it is 
designed to prevent certain kinds of suffering at a cost to both the consumer and the 
producer. Second, although it may be true currently that it is difficult to pass laws 
that do not benefit humans, it is the intent of animal activists to change precisely 
that. Because things are a certain way does not demonstrate that they are unlikely to 
change. And as noted, things are already changing, albeit in other countries.  
 For these reasons, I believe the leading animal welfare position to be 







II. Animal Rights Views    
A. Steven Wise 
Animal rights activists have as their modern-day leader Steven Wise, an 
animal law scholar and lawyer currently petitioning for New York City to recognize 
four chimpanzees as persons.22 He and his team are appealing a petition that was 
denied to act on a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of two of the chimps. Habeas 
corpus is a writ that requires a government to bring a person under arrest to be 
brought before a neutral judge to determine whether there are lawful grounds for 
their detention. (Center for Constitutional Rights 2019) In other words, a person 
cannot be unlawfully detained. Although this only applies to legal persons, Wise 
bases his argument on the fact that chimpanzees are autonomous creatures who are 
as cognitively capable as two or three year old humans, and more cognitively 
sophisticated than younger humans and those with severe mental handicaps. He 
defines autonomy as including “desires, intentions, and a sense of self resembling 
ours.” (Wise, 2004, p. 34) When one of his petitions was denied, he collected written 
affidavits from animal experts that argue that chimps “routinely shoulder duties and 
responsibilities both in chimpanzee communities and in human/chimpanzee 
communities.” (Choplin, 2016)  
Wise takes these abilities to be a clear indication that chimpanzees should be 
considered persons for two reasons: 1. If so-called marginal cases of humans 
deserve rights, so do chimpanzees, and 2. Chimpanzees deserve rights because of 
who they are, without comparison to anyone else. That is, on one hand the legal 
 
22 He actually believes that many species should be considered persons including all species 
of ape, cetacean, and elephant.  
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system is inconsistent. It denies rights to cognitively advanced nonhumans such as 
apes, while according rights to humans with lesser capacities purely based on 
species membership. This is an accusation of speciesism, which has been most 
famously explicated by Peter Singer. On the other hand, Wise holds that any 
creature with such abilities deserves rights, regardless of the values a given legal 
system or society employs. That is, it would be wrong to deny chimps rights even if 
humans were also denied rights.  
I am inclined to agree with Wise that certain animals do display the 
necessary abilities to be considered philosophical or legal persons, and that some 
animals will fit almost any non-speciesist definition of personhood, of which there 
are many. So this is not a point of contention. Identifying exactly which animals fall 
into each category is not my goal, rather, I wish to demonstrate that our current 
two-category system is insufficient. Including more animals in the “person” category 
will not address that. 
Wise does have a version of a multi-level system though. Even though he 
believes chimpanzees should be “full-blown persons,” he does not believe that 
personhood is an all-or-nothing designation; ”Personhood and basic liberty rights 
should be given in proportion to the degree that one has practical autonomy. If you 
have it, you get rights in full. But if you don't, the degree to which you approach it 
might make you eligible to receive some proportion of liberty rights.” (Wise, 2004, p. 
39) My criticism with this point of view is more practical than substantial. While it 
makes an intuitive sort of sense to award rights in various degrees, I do not think 
today’s legal system will accommodate such an open-ended process. The logical 
 
 59 
conclusion of such a view would require each species to be analyzed under its own 
rubric and to receive a unique set of rights. In fact, the ultimate accommodation of 
such a method might require each individual to be given rights accordingly.  
 Likewise, some of the difficulties already present in my current proposal, 
would be magnified considerably. One such issue is the question of who would 
decide which animals belong to each category. This will be a task for knowledgeable 
committees, and may well take many years to resolve. Asking the legislature to 
codify a sliding scale is several steps further down that road, and would likely be 
met with considerable resistance. So while individualized treatment may ultimately 
be the fairest method of rights allocation, it is also a legislative nightmare. 
In addition, I do not think that any nonhuman animal will be accorded the 
status of person anytime soon. Animals have only been property in this country. 
Despite recent advances in public knowledge of the conditions in which animals are 
kept, there seems to be little public support for such a radical move. (More will be 
said about this in Chapter Four.) To call other animals “persons,” even if that 
designation is understood to be only partial, will imply that they are equivalent to 
humans in important ways, and this is not something that most citizens will readily 
accept. We have seen that people are often ready to admit that animals suffer, but 
they are not ready to acknowledge higher cognitive abilities in certain animals and 
therefore to accept the changes in treatment such knowledge would entail. This is 
despite the fact that many animals do share the advanced abilities that most people 
take to be indicative of higher moral status. A focus on cognitive abilities is to fight 
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an uphill battle. A focus on suffering would meet the majority of the population 
where they already are. 
A further problem I have with Wise’s account is that there are many species 
of animal that belong to a vast grey area. Wise addresses this to some extent when 
he says that those animals with a 0.7 probability of possessing autonomy would be 
“presumed to have practical autonomy sufficient for basic liberty rights.” (Wise 
2004, p. 37) He views this as an extension of the “precautionary principle” which 
states that if an action or policy is suspected to be harmful, “in the absence of 
scientific consensus that the action or policy is not harmful, the burden of proof that 
it is not harmful falls on those taking an action.” (Wikipedia 2011) This is 
instantiated, for example, in the U.S. Endangered Species Act (discussed in more 
detail later), and Wise would like to apply it to animals who are probably 
autonomous. In other words, better safe than sorry. As a theoretical point, there is 
little reason to disagree with Wise on his approach, even if one might disagree about 
the threshold he chooses. But even so, there is glaring omission in this sort of 
thinking: He does not address the large number of species that can clearly suffer, but 
would fall well short of personhood, and thus short of deserving rights on Wise’s 
account. Of them, he says nothing. 
I focused on Wise first because of his prominence and his clear stance on the 
issues. But there are others on the side of animal rights who are in a similarly 
insufficient boat, Gary Francione for one. How he and other thinkers differ primarily 
is in terms of which qualifications they take as conferring rights on an animal, and 
what those rights would require of humans.  
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B. Gary Francione 
Francione believes that certain animals (those with at least some interests) 
should be considered persons, and that this acknowledgement requires us to stop 
using them in any way that treats them as “merely resources.” (Francione 2015) 
Because we would have to stop these uses in their entirety his view is often called 
“abolitionism.” Francione’s endgame is two-fold: 1. “[T]o abolish the 
institutionalized exploitation of animal subjects-of-a-life” which entails the 
“eradication of the property status of nonhumans.” The uses of animals for food, 
biomedical experiments, entertainment, clothing, and companions all fall under this 
umbrella. 2. “[I]n seeking this long-term goal, the rights advocate cannot endorse 
the sacrifice of fundamental interests of some animals today…” (Francione 2007 
p.190) He believes that incrementally introducing prohibitions (small-scale 
abolitions) is an acceptable course, as long as this second criterion is not violated. 
The set of examples he uses to clarify the distinction is the difference between 
decreasing the number of hens that can be kept in a battery cage from 4 to 3, and 
eradicating battery cages completely. The former is a change of degree, while the 
latter is a change of kind. Incremental changes, which do not constitute a change in 
the kind of activity allowed, are not in line with his view of the rights theory, for that 
would be tantamount to endorsing another form of exploitation. Regarding the first 
criterion, prohibitions must result in a state-of-affairs that is consistent with the 
status of animals as inherently valuable. 
Francione views these prohibitions as recognizing the inherent value in 
nonhuman animals, and thereby incrementally assembling a notion of nonhuman 
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personhood. For him, persons are beings with inherent value, and therefore cannot 
be treated merely as resources. As for what characteristics one needs to be 
considered a person, he says, “No characteristic other than sentience is required for 
personhood.” (2006) He particularly rejects the “similar-minds theory” which 
requires animals to have at least some humanlike cognitive abilities, and in doing so 
disagrees with Regan’s Right View, discussed below. 
The problems with his view are many. First let’s touch on the concept of 
abolitionism in general. His argument can be summarized as follows: 
P1 It is wrong to treat animals as mere resources. 
P2 All of our uses of animals treat them as mere resources. 
C  We should end all uses of animals. 
I will not discuss P1 here because the obvious falsity of P2 negates the argument. Not 
all uses are abuses. In particular, if we think about companion animals, the majority 
of which are not mistreated in any significant or systematic way, we have an entire 
category of animals that Francione thinks should be abolished (by grandfathering 
them out). I would not deny that we treat pets as resources, but most of us do not 
treat them as mere resources. Studies have shown quite the opposite. Most 
observations make it clear that pets are viewed as having a similar place in many 
humans’ lives as other humans do. In other words, they are often viewed as having 
intrinsic value. This second premise of Francione’s seems so misguided that one 
might worry this isn’t his intended point, but I can find no evidence to the contrary. 
His next argument is that accepting incrementalism will stifle greater, 
categorical change in the future. Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence to 
support this, nor was I able to uncover any. In fact, incremental changes bring 
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people on board with reforming animal treatment who would not, at that time, be 
willing or able to make greater changes. For instance, if the only two choices of diet 
were omnivore and vegan, many vegetarians would not have stopped eating meat, 
myself included. If we argue that we need to abolish chickens as food, many people 
will turn away without giving the idea a second thought. If, on the other hand, we 
say, wouldn’t it be great if chickens raised for food were treated better, people will 
generally agree. Planting the seeds of compassion is a worthy goal. We are creatures 
of habit, and as such, need time to adjust to changes. Not only does incrementalism 
fit human nature, it also is how the law works. The law changes abruptly only on 
rare occasion. Most changes happen piecemeal and over many years. Having any law 
that helps animals for their own sakes on the books means that such principles are 
valuable to us. Such “gateway laws” indicate that, as a species, we are willing and 
able to open up the sphere of moral considerability. Once that barrier has been 
broken, there is room for further improvement. 
Francione is also working within a traditional animal rights theory 
framework which, according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, has two related core flaws: 
It focuses on negative obligations instead of also incorporating positive and 
relational ones, and it assumes that animal-human relationships are inherently 
exploitative and that animals should be let to live independently. (2011) Negative 
obligations will never be capable of capturing the full range of ways in which we 
interact with animals or allow any meaningful prescriptions for how inclusive 
human-animal communities can be formed. My proposal, on the other hand, 
 
 64 
includes both negative and positive obligations (though I don’t enumerate relational 
obligations here) as well as assumes the existence of human-animal communities. 
The last issue with Francione’s view that I’d like to discuss is his conflation of 
the concepts of personhood and sentience. To say that all sentient animals should be 
considered persons is to negate the important distinctions that personhood entails. 
There are many definitions available from both legal and philosophical perspectives, 
but a common theme among them is that personhood designates certain cognitively 
advanced characteristics. (A sampling of such definitions is presented in Chapter 
Four.) My project’s focus on the importance of sentience does not come with a 
denial of the importance of personhood. It is only that personhood is currently taken 
as the sole characteristic by which entities gain legal rights, and that seems too 
narrow. To conflate the two categories is to miss the point entirely. For the time 
being, I’m perfectly happy to leave personhood alone, both in terms of whom it 
describes and what it confers. At the same time, we need to raise up sentience as 
another designation, one which also confers significant legal consideration. 
 
III. Other Paradigms 
A. Shelly Kagan 
Another recent account comes from Shelly Kagan’s book How to Count 
Animals. (2019) He argues that the correct way to incorporate animals into our 
moral system is through a hierarchy, where humans are (usually) at the top, and 
nonhuman animals cascade down in the way one might expect (mammals above 
birds, birds above reptiles, etc.) until one reaches animals with no moral standing, 
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such as, he thinks, insects. He believes that agency and sentience are what give 
beings moral standing because those determine how much good a life may have, and 
that these things can come in degrees which correspond to their relative moral 
status. Agency and sentience are the important characteristics, because they allow a 
being’s life to matter to it. The more welfare or good a life can achieve, the more a 
life matters, which makes that life more valuable, and therefore raises that being’s 
status. (I’m paraphrasing, but not, I think, inaccurately.)  
He believes that deontology is a good framework to accommodate this 
methodology (for reasons I won’t go into), and that the most practical way of 
instantiating such a system would be through a step-function, where there are a 
certain number of statuses (he says not more than 6), and all beings can be matched 
with the status that is appropriate for them. For example, persons (whether human 
or not) would have full moral status, and plants would presumably have no status. 
There is one aspect of his theory that I find both intuitive and attractive: the 
step-function. As I mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, the logical extension of 
Wise’s view would require us to individually evaluate each being to identify her 
level of autonomy. This is both unpractical and unnecessary when accurate 
generalizations about a species are available. Surely, there may be some individuals 
who are more or less advanced than their typical conspecific, but those instances 
could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, as they are with humans (when a court 
finds someone legally incompetent, for example). So instead, we can have several 
categories, and divide living beings up among them, knowing that every species 
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within a particular level will not be identical in terms of whichever abilities we find 
morally relevant (some may have more agency or sentience than others).  
Kagan vaguely gestures at there having to be thresholds dividing the levels, 
though he never makes an attempt to specify what they might be. My own legal 
proposal will follow the broad strokes of his suggestion in that I will suggest three 
“status levels” though I won’t call them that (the word “status” is uncomfortable in 
this context). But I will go further than Kagan in suggesting the boundaries between 
them should be personhood (for comprehensive rights) and sentience without 
personhood (for a subset of those rights). 
Despite this happy agreement, there are some core elements of his thought 
that are problematic. First, he places a lot of emphasis on agency. In fact, he believes 
agency to be more important than sentience. He supports this partly with general 
claims about being able to imagine agency without sentience. That’s fine; artificial 
intelligence may well develop into something like that. However, the other part of 
his assumption is that a non-sentient agent could be harmed by having its agency 
thwarted. This struck me as a curious claim, since I can’t see why agency would 
matter to a non-sentient being. What kind of harm could he be talking about? 
Although he doesn’t make this clear until near the end of the book, Kagan eventually 
explains that his version of sentience only includes physical pain and pleasure. By 
contrast, when I use the term “sentience,” I am including all forms of suffering and 
pleasure, including psychological forms. So to suggest that agency matters because it 
causes psychological suffering is, to my mind, just another way of saying that 
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sentience matters. So his focus on agency appears to unnecessarily complicate the 
discussion rather than illuminate it. We can just talk about sentience. 
 I alluded earlier to his focus on status. This is another aspect of Kagan’s 
theory that gives me pause. In giving an account of a moral theory, he believes that a 
moral hierarchy is required. First, he seems to ignore that moral considerability is 
only one way to matter. Developing a system of how much or little to consider 
others in our moral theory should not be confused with an all-encompassing 
hierarchy which is capable of determining someone’s status. On my system, the 
levels are not determinative of a hierarchy. The two main theories about what laws 
do are Interest Theory and Will Theory (wherein law protect one’s interests or 
make one a small-scale sovereign over oneself and property, respectively). (Wenar 
2015) So laws are likely either based on interests or will, not status per se. 
 I have several other issues with his work as a whole, such as his heavy 
reliance on intuition. However, I will focus on one more problematic aspect in his 
reasoning as it pertains to identifying different levels (statuses) of beings. He makes, 
it seems to me, several ad hoc arguments for preserving humans, and particularly 
“marginal humans,”23 as having the same status as normally developed and 
functioning humans. He seems to do this out of a discomfort with a consequence of 
his own system, whereby some humans (based on their level of agency) would have 
the same status as some nonhuman animals.  
 
23 He uses this term, which is problematic for several reasons, not least of which because it 
implies that some humans are barely human. I will therefore avoid it when discussing 
certain populations of humans in Chapter Six. 
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There are at least two sections guilty of this offense. The first is 5.3 where he 
discussed which psychological capacities are relevant to moral status. He says, 
“What matters isn’t the kind of welfare that one can in principle achieve (given one’s 
capacities), but the kind of welfare to which one can aspire.” “Aspiring” to him 
includes even cases where one has “no realistic chance of attaining it ” (the 
particular type of welfare or good). (122) I just don’t see why aspiring to some 
psychological capacity or good counts at all toward the kinds of good that Kagan 
thinks make a life more valuable. This whole idea is seemingly just a device to give 
humans higher moral status so long as they can aspire to have the abilities that 
confer such a status to other humans. (He has a similarly suspect discussion 
regarding potential in 5.4 that I will decline to engage.) 
 The other ad hoc addition appears in 5.5 as a discussion of what he calls 
modal status. The idea here is that if a particular human had the potential to become 
a person when she was born, but then had some accident which now precludes that 
development, “she could have been a person now, since she would have been a 
person had the accident never happened.” (137) She is therefore a modal person, 
and has a higher moral status than another being with the exact same psychological 
capacities who never had personhood potential. He doesn’t really offer any 
argument for this other than it avoids the uncomfortable conclusion of giving some 
humans the same moral status as, say, dogs. Contrary to Kagan, I am not interested 
in finding ways of forcing all humans to have a higher status than most or all other 
animals. I think it is perfectly acceptable to say something (which I do later) along 
the lines of: “Following our theory consistently would imply that in some cases 
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humans would have the same rights as dogs. However, for practical reasons we 
won’t follow the theory in all cases.” That would be more honest. 
B. Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka 
I’d like to conclude this section by mentioning an important piece of work in 
political theory. The book Zoopolis, by Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka does very 
interesting and important work in discussing the various roles that nonhuman 
animals play in (what we think of as) human society. They distinguish different 
groups of animals by degree of domesticity, along with what those designations 
might entail morally and politically. In particular, they argue for three categories of 
animal: domestic animals as citizens, liminal animals as denizens, and wild animals 
as sovereigns. Citizens would have rights that allow them to exercise their agency so 
long as those didn’t end up infringing unacceptably on the rest of society (such as 
the right to use public spaces, the right to procreate, etc.). Their model therefore 
includes different rights than mine does (see section 5.2). Animals that are neither 
domesticated nor wild (like pigeons and rats who live in cities) would be designated 
liminal animals and given rights as well, though less robust ones. Wild animals are 
thought of as having “the ability to respond to the challenges that a community 
faces, and to provide a social context in which…individual members can grow and 
flourish,” (p. 175) and are therefore to be treated as autonomous and sovereign.  
There are a lot of things I like about this system. For instance, they take care 
to address the issue of how to include animals in a contractualist society when 
animals are not widely thought of as being able to participate in contract-making. 
This work intersects with work on disability rights, some of which I’ll return to in 
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Chapter Six. Despite all the useful theoretical development in Zoopolis, one thing 
that is lacking is an explanation of how these measures would be accomplished 
legally. This is exactly what I am aiming to do. My legal paradigm and their levels of 
domesticity/citizenship seem to me to be largely compatible, although I won’t fully 
explore that compatibility here. I therefore see their work as adjacent, rather than in 
conflict, with my own. 
 
Given that the above systems of thought represent some of the main avenues 
for thinking about how animals fall into our societal and legal structures, we need 
another option. None of the above gives protections to all sentient beings that go 
beyond property status while maintaining the useful distinction between persons 




Chapter 4: Caught in the Middle – The Gray Space between 
Personhood and Property 
“Legal thought is, in essence, the process of categorization.”  (Vandevelde 1980) 
U.S. law, as most law, is founded on making distinctions. The central 
distinction being discussed in this paper is the one between persons and property. 
Any thing considered by the law, be it living or inanimate, is shuffled into one of 
these groups. This unnatural dichotomy has confused and muddied our legal 
system. It has forced things which are not property to be called “property” and 
things which are not persons to be called “persons.” There are many examples of 
such things: human incompetents, fetuses, and corporations, etc., and, of course, 
nonhuman animals. I therefore argue that we need a third category, legal patients, to 
fix this unfortunate oversight. I discuss this new category mainly in relation to 
sentient nonhumans, but will suggest in Chapter Six that it can be used more 
broadly. For now, I will use two groups, corporations and fetuses, to show how 
being limited to these two options has led our courts to create a de facto 
intermediate category by attributing to some things traits of both persons and 
property. Following this, we will see that nonhuman animals often pose a particular 
dilemma for some courts and judges, many of whom are of two minds on the 
subject. I will use this as ammunition for my contention that a third category not 
only makes sense philosophically, but would simplify and clarify the legal standing 
of all those who are categorical nomads, resting for a moment here or there, but 
never fully belonging.  
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In doing so, I will begin by elaborating on what the legal terms “person” and 
“property” mean and what each designation means for those so categorized. As we 
explore the constituents of the categories, I hope the reader will see that each 
contains inconsistencies and unintuitive inclusions. At the end of this chapter, I will 
take a brief, comparative look at the ways in which some other countries address 
the animal question specifically. 
 
I. Criminal and Civil Law 
Cases that are brought to court can be criminal or civil. Criminal acts are acts 
committed against the country or state, while civil violations are acts committed 
against persons or property. Criminal cases involve the breaking of law, either at the 
national, state, or municipal level. Civil cases involve the failure to adhere to legal 
duties to individuals, including respecting rights established under the Constitution 
or federal or state law. (Find Law 2019b) This distinction is central to my argument. 
Currently, there are federal and state laws regulating how certain animals may be 
treated in many scenarios. Although I believe such laws to be inadequate, they exist, 
and may be thought of as granting certain animals certain rights (a point discussed 
in more detail below). However, on the civil side, animals are clearly considered 
property and therefore have no rights. The proposal I lay out in Chapter Five is 
intended to remedy this oversight, and describes how we may enact a system that 
grants animals certain civil rights. The discussion that follows includes where 




II. Persons vs. Property 
According to a commonly used definition, a legal person (or legal 
personality) is any entity capable of holding legal rights and obligations. (Martin 
2003) The U.S. legal system recognizes several categories of being under the 
umbrella of personhood. There are so-called natural persons, a term which 
encompasses all living, birthed humans as well as some pre-natal humans, and 
artificial or juridical persons including corporations, partnerships, and sovereign 
states. (Williams v The Shipping Corporation of India) Humans acquire legal 
personhood as soon as they are born (if not before); juridical persons acquire legal 
personhood when they are legally incorporated.  
There are different theories as to what justifies the acknowledgement of an 
entity as a legal person. I won’t enter into this particular debate although I will list a 
few options to acknowledge that there is room for discussion as to what exactly we 
believe or want the category to mean. One theory holds that legal personalities 
represent the intersection of personal (economic) interest and substantive law. 
(Carnelutti 1955) This allows for collective interests which can be held by collective 
or compound persons “who” are comprised of two or more individuals (i.e. 
corporations, etc.). A second theory maintains that juridical persons are legal 
fictions, that is, they are created (rather than identified or discovered) for the 
purposes of the law. (Savigny 2009) They therefore do not have free will and are not 
subject to the law. This view would grant personhood only to natural persons, 
excluding compound persons from the category. Yet a third view argues that all 
persons are juridical (artificial) persons insofar as the law “creates” all persons for 
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specific purposes. This view identifies the unifying thread of all persons as those 
whose conduct is able to express moral values. (Barker 1980) Therefore natural and 
juridical persons are equally deserving of the personhood designation. These are 
just a few of a large number of views of the essence of personhood.  The motivation 
on which our system is based is most likely closest to the first. 
So the philosophical underpinnings of legal personhood are not agreed upon, 
even by those who are in the best position to identify them. A brief survey of courts’ 
decisions in cases where inclusion in personhood was at stake would reveal a 
similarly varied group of views from our nation’s judges. But perhaps this is not 
surprising. After all, much of the history of our nation can be described in terms of 
an ever-expanding circle of legal rights. From slaves and women to corporations and 
gay humans, the limits of citizenship and personhood have developed along a 
largely uninterrupted path of expansion.  
The difficulties with delimiting personhood are mirrored in the question of 
property. Black’s Law Dictionary states, “The ownership of a thing is the right of one 
or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the 
thing of which there may be ownership is called ‘property.’”24 (Civ. Code Cal.) Those 
who own property have property rights defined as “The rights given to the person 
or persons who have a right to own the property through purchase or bequest. 
These are basic rights in any society though absolute right for a property is rare in 
any society.” (Ibid)  
 
24 Some theorists identify a difference between the uses of “ownership” and “possession”. 
((Donahue & Alexander 2007) I make no such distinction here. 
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Persons may possess property. In some extreme cases, those humans who 
were disallowed property were not considered persons, as happened in the 
institution of slavery. Although the concept of property has been part of widely used 
legal systems at least since ancient Rome, it has changed a lot in that time. The 
previous status of women and so-called slaves are two of the clearest cases of what 
today would be considered the misuse of that designation. Today we whole-
heartedly believe that human beings are not property. Or do we? I will discuss the 
apparently mixed feeling we have about fetuses below. 
Generally speaking, only persons can own property, and everything that is 
not a person can be considered property.25 In other words, the U.S. legal system 
divides the world up into these two categories; as such, they are (mostly) mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive. And within certain limits, persons have absolute 
right over their property. For example, if I own a painting, I can preserve it, gift it, or 
even destroy it. (Donahue & Alexander 2007) There are several categories of 
property that the law recognizes, but the only one we will be discussing is tangible 
personal property. What is important is that 1. Property is the only alternative 
category to personhood, and 2. Both categories contain entities of vastly different 
types. The next section provides brief synopses of the particular and peculiar 
instances of corporations and human fetuses. I use these to demonstrate the lack of 
clarity in the U.S., and as evidence of problems that arise in pigeonholing all beings 
into two groups. 
 
 




III. Corporations & Fetuses as Legal Entities 
Corporations are an example of juridical persons: entities which are legally 
classified as persons that are not born human beings. The Bill of Rights and 
subsequent amendments to the Constitution represent the core sort of right that 
persons are granted, or perhaps are entitled to, under U.S. law. Natural persons are 
granted these rights automatically. And while certain rights can be revoked (such as 
a driver’s license or citizenship) and other rights are only conferred at a certain age 
(such as voting or running for elected office), there are specific and often stringent 
restrictions to the limitation of rights of natural persons. On the other hand, juridical 
persons, even once incorporated, are only afforded some of the rights of natural 
persons. They do not, for instance, have the second amendment right to bear arms, 
the right to vote, or the right to marry. (Witt 2011) Corporations do, however, have 
many of the same rights as natural persons.26 But, they are also not considered full 
persons, and are often treated as property. For one, they do not have many of the 
rights that natural persons do, such as the majority of the constitutional 
 
26 Back in 1791, personhood was limited in the Bill of Rights to include only white, male 
landowners of 21 years or more. Corporations were first given standing in the Constitution 
in 1819. (Dartmouth College v. Woodward) Corporations were excluded from the rights of 
citizenship and the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments in 1868 and 1873, respectively. (Paul v. 
State of Virginia; Slaughterhouse Cases) Then in 1886, the Supreme Court gave corporations 
inclusion in the word “person” in the 14th Amendment. (Santa Clara County v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad) They are given further rights with their inclusion under the 5th amendment 
in 1890. (Noble v. Union River Lodging) Corporations get 4th and 6th amendment rights in 
1906 and 1908. (Hale v. Henkel; Armour Packing Co. v. U.S.) Corporations are granted 
limited 1st amendment rights in 1936. (Grosjean v. American Press co.) In 1939, the Court 
held that only individuals (i.e. natural persons and not corporations) can hold 1st 
amendment rights. (Hague v. CIO) Corporations are granted the right to a trial by jury (7th 
amendment) in 1970. (Ross v. Bernhard) In 2010, the Supreme Court held that corporate 
funding of certain broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited, protecting 




amendments. This marks a stark contrast to other historically marginalized human 
groups, such as people of color, who have been acknowledged as full persons with 
all the corresponding rights and privileges. Second, and quite importantly, 
corporations can be owned, bought and sold, traded, broken up, and liquidated, 
things that can be done with property but not natural persons.  
Due to their status as persons, corporations have both criminal and civil 
rights and obligations just as natural persons do. As specified in 1 U.S.C. §1, “In 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates 
otherwise… the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals…” (1 U. S. Code §1) On the federal (criminal) side, corporations have 
duties towards the country and state, such as paying taxes, accurate representations 
of their financials, and not manipulating the stock market. If they violate these 
duties, members of the company may be subject to imprisonment, fines and 
community service orders. On the civil side, they have to abide by many rules which 
protect their customers, such as adhering to contracts, disclosing changes in 
services provided, etc. Violations of these rules are usually handled with injunctions 
or monetary damages. (Coppolo & Gelb 2002; Carlson 2011) In terms of civil cases, 
corporations are able to both bring a third party to court and be brought to court by 
a third party. That is, they can sue and be sued by other persons. (Deputy Attorney 
General 1999) Therefore, we can think of corporations of an example of entities 
which can be conceived of as either persons or property, depending on the 
circumstance. They exist in an undefined grey area, straddling the two realms, not 
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fully captured by either. 
A second contentious category of personhood is unborn humans. Fetuses are 
not considered legal persons at the moment (at least at the federal level), though 
there is a healthy debate around the issue. This is an interesting group to consider 
because these are living human beings, even though they’re treated differently than 
other humans. The central question is, at what point, if any, do fetuses qualify for the 
status of person? Answers to this question vary from the point of conception, to 
zygotes, embryos, fetuses, and the moment of birth. On the latter end of the 
spectrum is the Supreme Court, and thus current U.S. law. “In Roe v. Wade all nine 
justices agreed that the use of ‘person’ in the Constitution always assumed a born 
person, and therefore that the 14th Amendment’s mention of person did not confer 
constitutional rights until after a live birth.  In the years since Roe, when the make-
up of the court has changed, no justice has ever disagreed with that conclusion, 
including those who would overturn Roe and Casey.” (Robertson 1994, p. 457) 
While this is the federal law, states are free to enact legal protections, such as 
homicidal laws, for embryos or fetuses, but only insofar as they do not interfere with 
the federal right to an abortion within certain gestational limits.27 In other words, 
fetuses are not persons, but they do possess some basic protections that are 
reminiscent of those afforded to persons. 
 
27 States are also able to set their own abortion restrictions beyond Roe v. Wade regarding 
whether, when and how a woman may obtain an abortion. Some (Nebraska and North 
Carolina) prohibit aborting fetuses as early at 20 weeks, though there are exceptions for 
some extreme circumstances. (Find Law 2019a) And, of course, some states have enacted 
laws which directly challenge Roe v. Wade, but those have not yet been addressed by the 




On the criminal law side, there are both national and state laws regulating 
the rights of fetuses, though this is a relatively new development in American law. 
As late as the 1940’s, wrongful death cases in general, and specifically for fetuses, 
were not common in the courts. But around this time, it became seen as 
unacceptable for the fetus to have no legal standing. (Shah 2001) As of 2014, thirty-
eight states provided some level of criminal protection for fetuses, twenty-three of 
which protect the fetus from conception to birth. (Boudreaux & Thompson Jr. 2015) 
Federally, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999 makes the injury or death to a 
fetus a federal crime if it takes place while committing a federal crime against the 
mother.  “By attempting to enact a new statute that would endow an unborn child 
with the same legal protections granted to a ‘person,’ the legislature avoided both 
determining when a fetus attained personhood and construing any existing statutes 
to encompass the unborn.” (Shah 2001, p.932) With criminal cases, the plaintiff is 
the government whose law was violated, not any individual. Therefore, it’s really 
civil law that has the ability to confer personhood, not criminal law. 
Fetal protection laws in civil courts vary from state to state as well. Courts 
have been divided over whether dead fetuses should be seen as people in wrongful 
death cases and under what conditions such lawsuits can be brought. Many states 
require that a fetus be born alive before a wrongful death suit can be brought on 
their behalf. Other states allow wrongful death suits on behalf of an unborn fetus, 
though some require the fetus to be viable at the time of death and other states do 
not. (Robinson 2003) In addition, a majority of states allow suits to be brought on 
behalf of injuries to a born child caused during pregnancy, regardless of the 
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developmental stage at which the injury was inflicted. (Linton 2011) As we can see, 
most states do allow a civil suit to be brought on the fetus’s behalf, although some 
require the fetus to be viable at the time of injury or death. Suing in civil court 
means that the family can receive financial damages from the liable party. These 
damages usually include loss of consortium and lost future earnings. (Find Law 
2019c)  
There are some questions left unanswered by current case law. First, I could not 
find any instance in which a case was brought for injury to a fetus while they were 
still in the womb. What that means is, it is unclear whether an actual fetus (through 
a representative, of course) is legally allowed to sue. This is not the same as when a 
child born sues for an injury they sustained as a fetus, because then there is a clear 
natural person who is suing. There are cases where a mother sues for injury while 
still pregnant, but this appears to only be for her own injuries, not that of the fetus. 
Another open question is whether damages received on behalf of the now born child 
can be delimited for use only in their interest. This question is important because a 
positive answer would indicate that the courts are concerned with making the child 
whole, whereas a negative answer would indicate the concern was with either 
making the mother whole or punishing the injuring party.  
Without these assurances, fetuses are not full persons under the law. This is 
despite the fact that fetuses have a myriad of rights usually associated with 
personhood and increasing social pressure to resolve fetuses’ legal status. However, 
fetuses are not considered property either. In 1992, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee heard the appeal of a Louisiana case which resolved that fetuses were 
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“tiny persons.” (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (2000).  The Court held that 
frozen embryos are neither persons nor property, “but occupy an interim category 
that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.” 
(Davis v. Davis 1992) In 1998, New York Supreme Court rejected the “interim 
category” approach and saying instead that embryos are a “bundle of rights” that the 
biological parents hold. (Kass v. Kass 1998) These are only a couple examples of the 
views and disputes that categorizing fetuses has produced.28 This debate is 
primarily about whether the property framework can be applied to embryos and 
fetuses in the first place. 
Many believe that fetuses are correctly categorized as property, and we can 
see that in some ways, the law treats them as such.29 For one, early stage fetuses 
(embryos) are viewed as a valuable commodity, both as a source of potential 
children, and a source for stem cells. (Berg 2005) In this context, embryos have 
significant economic value and are treated much more like property than persons. 
Early stage fetuses may also be viewed as an organ of one’s body, akin to a lung or 
kidney. Insofar as one owns one’s body, one would also own the fetus. On this 
account there are some limitations as certain things are illegal to do even with one’s 
own body, such as selling vital organs. (Robertson 1994) Also, one might argue that 
insofar as reproductive liberty rights (e.g. being able to choose to get an abortion) 
take precedence over fetal rights, that fetuses are seen as property. This is perhaps 
 
28 For a more comprehensive list of examples, see Berg 2005. 
29 Although the question may be better described as: Are there “interests in the entity that 
can and should be defined in terms of property and, thus, basic precepts of property law 
applied.” (Robertson 1994, pp. 454-55; Berg 2005) 
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more convincing at the early stages of development when fetal rights are either 
limited or non-existent (which varies by state).  
By examining the various fetal laws in the U.S., it is clear that fetuses are not 
treated as belonging entirely to one category or the other. "Like animals... potential 
humans dwell in a hybrid place between property and person." (Animal Law, p. 73) 
In fact, our current law suggests that fetuses have both property and personhood 
rights, and that these two are not always in conflict with one another. Another way 
of putting this might be to say that fetuses do not really belong to either category, so 
we do the best we can with the designations available to us. In this way, the question 
of fetuses’ legal status mirrors some of the issues with animals’ legal status, which 
will be highlighted next. 
 
IV. The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals 
In Chapter One, I outlined the main animal protection laws that the U.S. 
currently has. I argued there that those laws are not as effective as they may first 
appear, and further, that the motivations behind them are not very animal-centric. 
In this section, I will begin by furthering this point, briefly highlighting some 
important points from the history of animal law. Afterwards, I will take a somewhat 
different approach, demonstrating through several judges’ rulings that we can see a 
clear hesitance to agree to animals’ purely property designation. As with fetuses and 
corporations, there appears to be an underlying discomfort with the 
person/property ultimatum that exists in the law. Or, as Gary Francione puts it, 
“[A]ttitudes about animals are hopelessly confused.” (1996) In Chapter Five I will 
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explain my solution to this, but for the present it will suffice to show that there is a 
problem, and one which has not gone unnoticed by our courts. 
 
A. Legislative Motivations: How We Got Here 
There are others who have written thoroughly on the history of animals as 
property30, and so I will only give a few snippets here. In 1641, the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony passed the first anticruelty law in North America. (Francione 1996) 
Later, in 1822, Richard Martin succeeded in passing Dick Martin’s Act, “an act to 
prevent the cruel and improper treatment of cattle.” (Cruel and Improper Treatment 
of Cattle Act 1822) The law begins, “Whereas it is expedient to prevent the cruel and 
improper Treatment of Horses, Mares, Geldings,” etc. In other words, the stated 
purpose of the law was human convenience. In the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the U.S. saw several cases which allowed criminal prosecution for causing 
animal harm. One type of reason the courts gave for this was “malicious mischief.” 
One court stated, “There is a well-defined difference between the offense of 
malicious or mischievous injury to property, and that of cruelty to animals. The 
former constituted an indictable offense at common law, while the latter did not.” It 
went on to say that in recent years, harm to animals has been included under the 
title of “mischief.” (Favre & Tsang 1993) As Favre and Tsang say, “The pain and 
suffering of the animal was not as much of a legal concern during this time as was 
the moral impact of the action on humans.” This point is enforced by the observation 
 
30 See, for example, Steven Wise’s Unlocking the Cage and David Favre & Vivien Tsang’s The 
Development of the Anti-Cruelty Laws During the 1800's. 
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that many states at this time limited anti-cruelty laws to those with commercial 
value, which excluded pets and wild animals. The goal was clearly to protect the 
monetary interests of humans, not the well-being of nonhuman animals. In states 
that did protect animals themselves, it was often only cruel or malicious beating that 
were prohibited, not any other harmful acts. This demonstrates that while animal 
welfare may have been a concern for some, it was certainly not a given, and was not 
a pivotal factor in the passing of many anti-cruelty laws. 
Favre & Tsang (1993) further explain this point (emphasis added): 
Initially, the societal concern about cruelty to animals contained mixed motives. 
While some did not believe moral duties were owed to animals, they did accept 
that cruelty to animals was potentially harmful to the human actor, as it might 
lead to cruel acts against humans. Thus, the concern was for the moral state of the 
human actor, rather than the suffering of the nonhuman animal. This focus of 
concern was reflected in the early state laws by the location of the anti-cruelty 
provision within the criminal code. In many states, these provisions are found in 
chapters of the criminal code entitled, "Of Offenses Against Chastity, Decency and 
Morality." 
The ideas contained in the 1829 Act were replicated by many state legislatures 
over the following thirty years… [and] they applied to acts against not only horses 
and oxen but to other animals, so long as the animals were owned by someone… 
[There was] continued confusion about the intended purpose of the law: to protect 
valuable personal property or to restrict the pain and suffering inflicted upon 
animals. 
Then in 1866 Henry Bergh started the ASPCA, which had the explicit purpose 
of preventing cruelty to animals, enforcing laws, and getting violators prosecuted. 
After this, the laws slowly began shifting focus away from such things as ownership 
and human virtue, and toward what the animals themselves were experiencing. 
Many laws expanded to include not just intentional acts, but also negligent ones. 




Besides their stated purpose, an important aspect of anti-cruelty laws is how 
they define their terms. “Cruelty,” “torture,” and “torment,” are three examples of 
commonly used words, and are all defined at least partly in terms of whether or not 
there was justification for the harm caused to the animal(s). As it turns out, such 
“justifications” are usually fairly open-ended, often including any actions which are 
considered “common practice.” For example, if it is common practice to castrate 
bulls without anesthesia, then, legally speaking, it’s not cruel. These and other 
exemptions render anti-cruelty laws largely ineffectual.  
The 1981 case, Knox v. MA Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
revolved around the interpretation of G.L. ch. 272 sec. 80 which states “No person 
shall offer or give away any live animal as a prize or an award in a game, contest, or 
tournament involving skill or chance.” This law sounds as if we have animals’ 
interests in mind, however, in its judgment, the court said that these statutes are 
“directed against acts which may be thought to have a tendency to dull 
humanitarian feeling and to corrupt the morals of those who observe or have 
knowledge of those acts.”  
Certain kinds of animal uses are illegal in the U.S. now, but things such as 
bearbaiting and cockfighting “are prohibited only in part out of the compassion for 
suffering animals; the main reason they were abolished was because it was felt that 
they debased and brutalized the citizenry who flocked to witness such spectacles.” 
(Kristol 1972) In People v. Garcia, where a man was convicted for violating the NY 
anti-cruelty statute, the judge wrote, “The crime was established in recognition of 
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the correlation between violence against animals and subsequent violence against 
humans. Thus, it must be inferred that the Legislature’s concern was with the state 
of mind of the perpetrator rather than that of the victim.” (29 A.D. 3d 255 
2006) These examples represent the clearly mixed motivations that legislators have 
had for passing laws to protect animals. This lack of clarity is mirrored in the mixed 
feelings modern courts have about animals’ legal status.  
 
B. Judicial Ambivalence: What are Animals and What Do They Deserve? 
Judges are not all of a mind about the legal status of animals. Some judges 
appear to have no qualms about relegating animals to property status. In 
Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assoc. Animal Hospital (2003), a dog, Poopi, was given an 
operation she didn’t need, and her owners sued for veterinary malpractice, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of companionship. In the 
summary judgment, the court stated: 
Plaintiffs concede that dogs are currently classified as personal property under Ohio law and 
that the law does not recognize noneconomic damages for personal property. Nonetheless, 
plaintiffs contend that we should “do the right thing” by distinguishing between inanimate 
property like chairs and tables, and animate property like dogs, cats, birds, and other animals 
who may serve as companions. Such a change in the law may one day occur, but this is not the 
proper case for plowing new ground… sentimentality is not a proper element in determining 
damages caused to animals.  
 
The judgment goes on to affirm that, as property, animals cannot bring civil suit 
saying, “Although Poopi was obviously directly involved in the incident, a dog 
cannot recover for emotional distress—or indeed for any other direct claims of 
which we are aware. We recognize that animals can and do suffer pain or distress, 
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but the evidentiary problems with such issues are obvious. As a result, the claims on 
Poopi’s behalf were also not viable.”  
This sort of ruling exemplifies the norm when it comes to animals as 
property. It would be needless to list numerous cases in which similar judgments 
were made. Instead, we can turn to consider the other side of this picture: cases 
where judges clearly felt that animals are not mere property. In Carl Bueckner v. 
Anthony (Tony) Hamel and Kathy Collins (1994), there was a question over whether 
fair market value was an acceptable compensation for the loss of a pet dog. 
Regarding this, the judge wrote: 
“[Must] bereaved pet owners accept the market value of their pets as the measure of 
actual damages for their pets' wrongful killing, or [do] they have the option of 
accepting either the market value or the special value... the general rule of market 
value [is] inadequate … I would hold that the pet owners have the option of accepting 
either measure of damages. … The value of dogs to the human families … often has 
nothing to do with a pedigree that is registered with the American Kennel Club.” [My 
emphasis] 
In another case, Morgan v. Kroupa, the court recognized that pets generally 
do not fit neatly within traditional property principles... Instead, courts must fashion 
and apply rules that recognize their unique status. (Wagman et al. 2010 p.74) And in 
Rabideau v. City of Racine, where a dog was shot and killed by a police officer, the 
judge makes a relatively passionate statement about the place of dogs in our society 
and law: 
At the outset we note that we are uncomfortable with the law’s cold 
characterization of a dog, such as Dakota, as mere “property.” Labeling a dog 
“property” fails to describe the value human beings place upon the companionship 
that they enjoy with a dog. A companion dog is not a fungible item, equivalent to 
other items of personal property. A companion dog is not a living room sofa or 
dining room furniture… Nevertheless, the law categorizes the dog as personal 
property… To the extent this opinion uses the term “property” in describing how 
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humans value the dog they live with, it is done only as a means of applying 
established legal doctrine to the facts of this case. (Wise, 2004 p. 28-9)  
 
Likewise, in Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital, Inc. (1979): 
Before answering these questions the court must first decide whether a pet such as a 
dog is only an item of personal property as prior cases have held, Smith v. Palace 
Transportation Co., Inc., 142 Misc. 93, 253 N.Y.S. 87. This court now overrules prior 
precedent and holds that a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place 
somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property… In ruling that a 
pet such as a dog is not just a thing I believe the plaintiff is entitled to damages 
beyond the market value of the dog. A pet is not an inanimate thing that just receives 
affection; it also returns it… To say it is a piece of personal property and no more is a 
repudiation of our humaneness. This I cannot accept. 
 
The statement in this case, that pets are in between a person and a piece of 
property, “and the few cases that follow it, are aberrations flying in the face of 
overwhelming authority to the contrary,” for example, cases such as Snyder v. Bio-
Lab, Inc. and Stettner v. Graubard. (Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc. 1994) Even 
so, we can see that in these, and many other judgments, there is discomfort with the 
property status of animals, and the resulting inability of most courts to award the 
owners damages for emotional distress and sentimental value when their pets are 
wrongly injured or killed.31 
Even among those judges that do not take issue with calling animals 
property, there are those that recognize animals as being a special kind of property. 
In Green v. Leckington (1951) we read “…certain property, by its very nature, has an 
element of sentiment essential to its existence.” In Bueckner v. Hamal (1994), the 
judge says “Because of the characteristics of animals in general and of domestic pets 
 




in particular, I consider them to belong to a unique category of “property” that 
neither statutory nor case law has yet recognized. Sentiments like these 
demonstrate an acknowledgement that whatever animals are, they are not 
equivalent to inanimate objects. However, the law is not set up to recognize such 
distinctions. 
 
V. The Difference Between Protection and Right-Holding  
Elements of the discussion above may seem to indicate that certain animals 
do already possess certain rights. In a sense, that’s true. Animal cruelty laws, which 
exist only in criminal law, may be seen as affording to those animals the right not to 
be treated in certain ways. But I wish to question this interpretation. I will show that 
1. Animal cruelty laws are not animal rights, that is, they are not rights belonging to 
the animal him or herself,32 and 2. There is nothing approximating animal rights in 
civil law. To make this case, we have to answer two questions: What does it mean to 
have a right? What is the purpose of a right?  
There is an entire field of legal theory devoted to such questions which I’ll 
not enter into. Instead, for clarification of the issues involved, I will use the widely 
accepted Hohlefdian framework for understanding what rights are and what they 
entail. Hohfeld divided rights into four categories: claims, privileges, powers, and 
immunities. (Wenar 2015) The kind of rights we are interested in is claim-rights. To 
have this kind of right means that you have a claim on another to act or not act in a 
certain way. For instance, I have a claim on you not to assault me without 
 
32 On my understanding, no criminal violations are violations of non-governmental persons 
because they are all crimes against the government. 
 
 90 
justification. The correlative of a claim is a duty. My claim on you indicates that you 
have a duty toward me, in this case, the duty to not assault me without justification. 
There are, of course, non-legal senses of the words “claim” and “duty,” but here we 
are talking about only those claims which are codified by law. 
Given this rubric, it may appear as if anti-cruelty laws can be understood as 
claims-rights that animals have against legal persons, with the correlative duty of 
persons not to engage in cruel behavior toward those animals. But here is where the 
distinction lies: In the assault example, I have a claim against you. What that means 
is, regardless of any criminal proceedings that may take place, I can seek restoration 
for myself through the civil system. In the case of animal cruelty laws, the entity that 
is acknowledged as having been wronged is either 1. (In criminal cases) the 
American people/government (federal, state, municipal) which enacted the law, 
and/or 2. (In Civil cases) the person who owns the harmed animal. In other words, 
the government or person has the claim against certain types of animal harm. The 
animal itself does not have a claim, and therefore has no right. 
To be protected against some form of action means that others are restricted 
in certain ways. For example, the illegality of selling a member of an endangered 
species imposes a restriction on the would-be purveyor, and if that person violates 
the law, he or she is held responsible. What that protection does not entail is the 
right of the animal not to be sold. A right is a just or legal claim on something or on 
some action. If the animal were to have a right, it would be the animal who would 
have been wronged (not the government), and the animal (with the help of a human 
advocate) who would be able to bring a claim to court. 
 
 91 
Mere protection is something that is afforded to all property. My stereo is 
protected by law. Any and all property is protected in the sense that if it were to be 
unduly taken from me, broken, or otherwise damaged, I would be entitled to 
recompense. In this case, it is very clear that being protected does not confer rights. 
The stereo has no right not to be stolen or broken, even though it is the stereo which 
is protected. It is my right not to have my property messed with from which the 
stereo’s protection derives. Comparing animals, such as pets, to property, such as 
stereos, seems to me painfully insufficient. While there is undoubtedly a great 
difference between my cognitive ability and a cat’s, there must admittedly be a 
much larger difference between a cat’s cognitive ability and my stereo’s. So, if our 
argument for maintaining animals as mere property is that they are not similar 
enough to humans to deserve personhood, that is only a partial answer. For surely, 
they are closer to humans than they are to the inanimate objects that comprise the 
bulk of material protected under property law.  
At this point, one may point out that in my example it is not technically the 
stereo that is being protected under the law, but rather it is I who am being 
protected from having my property damaged. Therefore, one might say that anti-
cruelty laws, in specifically protecting animals, are really conferring rights on them. 
I’m willing to acknowledge that it may seem like animals already do possess some 
rights (though rather paltry ones) in the realm of criminal law. However, “criminal 
rights” is not a real category, since under these laws it is really the government that 
is being protected. The only rights individuals have are in the civil realm. And there 
is no analogous law in civil court that directly protects animals.  
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Animals do not have legal claims, because only persons do. All entities 
considered property have no recourse under civil law. They cannot seek damages 
and they have no legal voice. Thus, when an animal is abused by its owner, there is, 
somewhat absurdly, no crime against the animal. Therefore, even if the abuser is 
found guilty, the animal is not guaranteed to receive any benefit from any fines (civil 
or criminal) that the abuser is required to pay. This is an essential difference 
between causing damage to a person and to a nonperson; the former can receive the 
damages, and can decide how to spend them, while the nonperson is at the mercy of 
the suing party. Some of the money may be used to help the animal, or it may not be. 
That is to say, legal protection does not entail legal rights. 
 
VI. David Favre’s Equitable Self-Ownership 
The person who has come the closest to providing a solution to this 
discrepancy is, in my opinion, David Favre. Although his proposal is not entirely 
satisfying in terms of the points made in the previous section, if an argument could 
be made that sentient animals could remain property and be treated fairly, Favre 
makes it.  
Favre (2010) states that his goal is make the relationship of an owner to her 
cat less like that of an owner to a rock and more like that of a parent to a child, that 
is, a custodial relationship. He asks, “Can there be created a new property status that 
would allow animals to have rights?” (p. 12) He discussed, as I have done, the 
difference between criminal and civil rights, correctly saying that such rights “must 
be actionable, enforceable by the animal him or herself. The key limitation of the 
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present right of animals… is that… if the state decides not to act in a particular case, 
then the harmed animal is without remedy.” (p. 16)  
He notes that our legal system allows a property owner to divide the title 
over property into two: the legal title and the equitable title. This is a tool commonly 
used when the owner of property is not the one who is in control of it. An example of 
when this might happen is when an estate is bequeathed to a child who is incapable 
of maintaining it. In this case, while the child maintains the equitable title to the 
estate, someone else is given the legal title in order to make decisions about the 
estate on behalf of the child, and in his or her best interest. 
 Since animals are a kind of property, one could split up the elements of their 
title in the same way. According to Favre, this would provide a framework for 
allocating more rights to some animals. An owner of an animal could transfer the 
equitable title of the animal to the animal his or herself. The human would maintain 
the legal title, essentially creating in the human a legal obligation to act in the 
animal’s best interest, i.e. making the human a guardian. 
 On the surface, this appears to accomplish a lot of what is missing. But this 
view has several problems, ranging from moderate to serious. One moderate 
problem is that Favre’s view says nothing about what qualities make an animal able 
to possess equitable self-ownership. In other words, could all domestic animals 
theoretically have equitable ownership over themselves? One might think that some 
criterion, such as a certain level of intelligence or sentience would be a good way to 
make the distinction, but he makes no suggestion. To the contrary, he asserts that 
such a system would apply to any living thing, saying, “unless a human has an 
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affirmatively asserted lawful dominion and control so as to obtain title to a living 
entity, then a living entity will be considered to have self-ownership” (p. 236) It is 
not entirely clear whether he is using imprecise language here or making a rather 
strong claim that he only discussed in detail regarding animals. Either way, I 
consider this is a moderate problem because it is easily fixed by specifying the 
domain over which such a paradigm would range. 
The biggest problem, however, with Favre’s view is that it further confuses 
the categories of personhood and property rather than clarifying them. On one 
hand, he acknowledges that animals would still be property, as the title of his paper 
on the topic is “A New Property Status for Animals.” On the other hand, he seems to 
consider those animals persons as well, saying, “As entities with legally recognized 
interests, self-owned animals have sufficient status as juristic persons so as to be 
able to hold equitable interest in other property.” (p. 243, emphasis added) For 
Favre, certain animals would be both property and persons. But this is precisely the 
problem we already have! Certain animals (along with other entities) do not fit 
easily into the existing legal dichotomy, and Favre’s suggestion does not fix that. 
 
I hope I have made clear the nature of the problem. Animals (and other 
groups such as fetuses) live in legal limbo. They are not fully persons, nor are they 
fully property. Many of our judges have seen the issue, but they are both bound to 
the categorical schism and are unable to fix it. The proposal that follows is my 
attempt at a solution.  
 
 95 
Chapter 5: Legal Patiency – Developing a New Category for Sentient 
Nonpersons 
 
I. A Recap of the Discussion So far 
Before introducing my framework, I’d like to rehash the points thus far 
established. In Chapter One, I introduced the issue of animal treatment in America, 
describing some of the many ways that we use and interact with animals. I showed 
how, both legally and socially, we are of two minds about which forms of animal 
treatment are acceptable. We tend to think that it is wrong to harm certain animals 
such as mammals, but only if these are animals with whom we have a special 
relationship. We protect many animals via anti-cruelty laws, but only insofar as it 
does not disrupt human industry. We simultaneously view them as vulnerable 
beings in need of protection and as exploitable resources. 
Chapter Two reviewed some of the scientific literature regarding animal 
sentience (understood as the ability to suffer). I described some of the most 
common physiological and behavioral markers of sentience, arguing that there is 
ample evidence present that many animals have this ability. Although there are 
many species about whom we are unsure, some clear groups of nonhumans that can 
feel at least physical pain include mammals and birds. Next, I argued in support of 
sentiocentrism, the view that sentience is a quality which makes any being in 
possession of it morally considerable, and also defended it against certain attacks. 
Whether or not sentience admits of degrees, any degree is enough to be included in 
the sphere of our moral concern. 
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In Chapter Three I introduced the two main camps of animal activist, the 
animal welfarists and the animal rights proponents, discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various positions found therein. Although both groups have good 
intentions, I argued that neither approach is sufficient to solving the present issue. 
In particular, welfarists don’t necessarily think that animals need rights to be 
sufficiently protected, and rights proponents often think that certain animals should 
be made legal persons. I disagreed with both of these views, and suggested that the 
paucity of viable suggestions reflects lack of sufficient legal infrastructure to deal 
with sentient nonpersons. 
Finally, in Chapter Four I began by discussing two groups who also occupy 
rather odd legal stations, fetuses and corporations, and the inconsistencies of both 
groups’ legal treatment. This was followed by a demonstration of the mixed feelings 
judges have about labeling animals (and pets in particular) as mere property. I then 
discussed the philosophical and legal differences between being protected under the 
law, and possessing rights. I argued that only rights would be able to ensure the 
proper treatment of sentient animals. 
So that brings us here, to Chapter Five, where I will lay out a framework that 
I think is capable of bridging the gap, both between the philosophical perspectives 
such as animal welfarism and animal rights and between the legal categories of 






II. Which Rights Should SNP’s Get? 
In a sense, it is helpful to start from scratch in considering rights for sentient 
nonpersons. If they deserve any rights, it would seem that a good place to begin 
would be the most basic rights that persons enjoy. Some basic rights, such as 
freedom of religion, are probably not applicable to nonhuman animals. But others 
certainly are. There are two main categories of such rights that sentient animals 
need. The first is some degree of freedom from bodily harm or injury, and the 
second is the right to receive recompense directly for any harm or injury done to 
them. The latter would take the form of the ability to bring a civil case to court and 
sue for damages. I am focusing on these two kinds of right because they are 
foundational to many other rights, but are still quite general with a lot of room for 
interpretation and development. 
These rights could also theoretically be applied to wild animals, which 
possibility I revisit briefly in Chapter Six. However, the present discussion will be 
limited to animals that are under human care and/or control for the following 
reasons. To include wild animals would require a larger scope than this paper 
allows. For example, we would need a policy that addresses Americans’ treatment of 
animals internationally, with many associated complexities. Moreover, wild animals 
in the U.S. are living under very different circumstances than the ones we choose to 
have in our lives.  
The right against bodily harm, i.e. the right to bodily integrity, is, I take it, one 
of the most basic rights a sentient being can have. Although this is not a specific 
right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the so-called right to privacy is often 
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interpreted as including bodily integrity and therefore bodily harm. This is found in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, and reads 
as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  
 
Currently, this right has only been applied to human beings. The right to bodily 
integrity is defined as, “the right of each human being, including children, to 
autonomy and self-determination over their own body. It considers an unconsented 
physical intrusion as a human rights violation.” (CRIN 2017) This principle is often 
used in reference to torture and inhumane treatment. The Eighth Amendment of the 
United Sates prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” which are defined as those 
that are one or more of 1. Degrading to human dignity, 2. Inflicted arbitrarily, 3. 
Societally rejected, and 4. Patently unnecessary. These conditions were established 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1978, which also said that no state should pass a law 
obviously violating any one of these.  
A similar protection is included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which was adopted by the UN in 1948. Though not legally binding, this document 
has been influential in the development of many international laws and 
constitutions. Article three reads, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of person." (UN) Another international treaty, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, has been adopted by 169 parties as of 2017. Excerpts from 
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Articles 6 -9 read: 
Every human being has the inherent right to life… No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation… No one shall be held in slavery… Everyone has the 
right to liberty and security of person… All persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person.” (United Nations Human Rights 1966)  
 
There are exceptions allowed to some of these as punishments for crimes.  
This gives us an idea of what our country and the international community 
consider to be the fundamental human right to freedom from bodily harm. It is 
important to note that most of these rules are not without exception. For instance, 
the death penalty is allowed by all the documents just mentioned. This may appear 
to contradict the right to life that they speak of, but such a right is not considered 
inalienable, and so it is not absolute. Whatever rights we decide sentient animals 
must have, they will likely turn out to be alienable as well. That is, there may certain 
circumstances that warrant exceptions to otherwise universal claims. 
 Given this understanding, it does not seem too complicated a task to apply 
the standards of freedom from bodily harm to nonhuman animal care and to be 
clear on when they are violated. I take it that the more complicated issue would be 
to identify those situations in which violations should be permitted. For now, it will 
be enough to argue that SNP’s do in fact need this right. If one of the bases for the 
right to bodily integrity is autonomy and self-determination, than it seems that 
many other animals have this right as well. Thanks in part to Steven Wise, there is a 
fairly large literature on whether any other species have these traits, saying “a 
minimum level of autonomy — the abilities to desire, to act intentionally and to 
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have some sense of self, whatever the species — is sufficient to justify the basic legal 
right to bodily integrity. I call this level ‘practical autonomy’ and maintain that a 
creature who demonstrates it, whether an adult chimpanzee, bonobo, gorilla, 
orangutan, Atlantic bottle-nosed dolphin or human, is entitled to this basic legal 
right.” (Wise 2002) I do not think it is necessary to argue that other animals have 
this ability, since Wise has done so at length.33 If he is right though, then the basis 
for human rights also supports rights for some nonhumans.  
So let us move on to the second type of right I am advocating, the right to sue 
and be made whole. In case any legal patients’ rights were violated, that animal 
should be able to seek damages for that infraction. As it currently stands, the state 
or country is the party considered wronged in criminal animal abuse cases, while 
the animal’s owner is the injured party in civil cases. However, all sentient 
nonpersons, or legal patients, should have the right to seek damages by suing in civil 
court in order for them to be able to take action against and receive benefits from 
the party that caused it suffering or injury. In legal jargon, this process is called 
“making whole”. To take this term literally would be a mistake, for in most instances 
it is not possible to undo the damage caused to a victim. It would be more useful to 
think of making whole as receiving reparations, compensating a party for a loss 
sustained. The precise definition varies, but making whole may include actual 
economic losses and/or non-economic losses, such as loss of companionship. 
(Gideon n.d.) 
 
33 See his books, Rattling the Cage (2000); Drawing the Line (2003). It is also worth noting 
that the word “autonomy” is not always used to mean the same thing. For an overview of 
various uses, see Christman (2018). 
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 The right to sue for damages is considered a fundamental human right in the 
U.S. In 1983, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. 
v. NLRB made the point that “the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First 
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” In another 
case in 2002, Sandra Day O’Connor noted that the right to sue in court was a form of 
petition, and said, “We have recognized this right to petition as one of the most 
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.”(BE&K Construction Co. v. 
National Labor Relations Board) Despite the more recent nature of these 
statements, the right to petition can be traced back to English documents such as the 
Magna Carta and the later Bill of Rights 1689, which clearly assert the "right of the 
subjects to petition the king." (Blackstone 2008) An individual may also sue another 
person in civil lawsuits. In either case, civil cases are there to determine whether 
the defendant is liable for the plaintiff's injuries, and if so, to compensate the victim 
for the harm done to her or him. These cases can be brought by, or on behalf of, any 
legal person.34 
 By definition, a sentient nonperson can be harmed. However, they are not 
capable (as far as we know) of filing a suit on their own behalf. Were those animals 
given the right to sue, the court would have to allow a third party to represent the 
animal in court. One of the most frequently stated reasons that courts have denied 
this right to animals in the past is the slippery slope argument. Judges have been and 
are worried that if the door is opened to animals suing as plaintiffs that the courts 
 
34 There is a further issue, legal standing, which I will not foray into. The question of 
standing is essentially about when one can bring a case on behalf of someone other than 
oneself. This issue has been brought to the forefront by animal and environmental law in 
particular, as those both involve harm to entities other than persons. (Wagman et al. 2010) 
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will be overwhelmed with such cases. A related version of this argument is that once 
we allow the most intelligent (i.e. most human) animals to sue, what’s to say that we 
will be unable to draw a line, and suddenly every half-squashed earthworm will be 
allowed to have its day in court. In Lock v. Falkenstein, a 1963 case regarding the 
legality of cockfighting, the judge presented this reasoning: 
[W]e reach the conclusion that the type of cruelty to animal statute we are 
construing was not passed with the intention of prohibiting such sports as cock 
fighting. We further believe that, to so construe the statute, would open up many 
other activities to prosecution, though they are not within its spirit. For example, 
using live minnows to bait hooks…. Society could not long tolerate a system of laws 
which might drag to the criminal bar every lady who might impale a butterfly, or 
every man who might drown a litter of kittens. (Lock v. Falkenstein 1963) 
 
Despite the remark about kittens, I do see the concern here. There is a hypothetical 
that must be acknowledged: It may turn out that many more animals are deserving 
of protection than can be reasonably protected. I think there are common sense 
responses we can make to allay these concerns, which I will return to in Chapter Six. 
 However, the main point, that there is nowhere to draw the line, is no more 
true of nonhuman animals than it is of humans. The line I am suggesting is 
sentience. Now, of course, there is debate about what counts as sentience (as 
discussed in Chapter Two) and about whether sentience is a threshold trait or exists 
on a continuum (as it appears that most abilities do). And I do agree that these 
questions require a fair amount of attention. But that does not mean that 
unanswered questions are a reasonable justification for perpetuating an injustice, 
and maintaining the legality of unnecessarily harming sentient beings in ways which 




III. Existing Legal Structures for Human Incompetents 
The most relevant group of humans is incompetent humans. Civil law 
requires legal competency to enter a contract, sign a will, or make other types of 
binding legal commitments. (Legal Dictionary 2018) Humans may be deemed 
incompetent for many reasons, but two of the most common ones are age and 
mental impairment.35 I will focus on the former for the majority of this section, and 
discuss how the current model that is in place for such humans would work for 
SNP’s. 
Child protection laws were not always as robust as they are today. The 
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children was founded in New York in 1875 as 
the first organization devoted solely to child protection. This was 9 years after 
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded. (Meyers 2008) Prior to 
this time there was occasional intervention in cruel treatment of children, but this 
involvement was infrequent and unreliable.  In fact, for a long time children were 
considered the property of their parents, and, as such, the latter were legally 
allowed to do what they wanted with them. (Wagman et al. 2010) The belief was 
that “the family was a private domain and as such should be free from state 
interference.” (p. 62) Children could be given, transferred, or bequeathed by their 
parents. They were treated as a commodity in support of the parents’ rights. 
 
35 Some states expand the realm of incompetent persons to include fetuses at certain 
developmental stages. (Roden 2010) 
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(Maillard 2012) No “governmental agency or non-governmental organization was 
responsible for child protection” at that time. (Meyers 2008, p. 451-2)36 
After the inception of the NYSPCC, similar organizations arose all over the 
country. This momentum led to the creation of America’s first juvenile court in 
1899, which had the jurisdiction to intervene in cases of child abuse and neglect. 
(Meyers 2008) The tide slowly shifted toward a realization that “if children are to be 
protected from neglect the service must be performed by public agencies.” (Falconer 
1935) The Federal Children’s Bureau was the first government agency to be formed 
for the protection of children in 1912. By the mid 1960’s almost every state had laws 
putting responsibility for child protection with the government. The watershed 
moment occurred in 1974 with the passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act. This provided federal funds for identifying and treating child abuse 
and neglect. (National Child Abuse and Neglect Training Publications Project 2014) 
But even then, it wasn’t until the 1980’s that children were actually given legal 
representation in court. (Wagman et al. 2010)  
Even today, in child custody cases, the courts more often reference the child’s 
interests than the child’s rights.37 But there are several important ways in which 
children do have rights. In the criminal realm, children are entitled to a safe 
environment, good nutrition, healthcare, and education. Parents do have a pretty 
 
36 Two of the seminal cases that reinforced those principles were Meyer v. Nebraska 262 
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) which recognized the authority of parents to make basic choices for 
their children, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925) which struck down an 
Oregon statute requiring children to attend public school.  
37 There is also an interesting question about the “peculiar triangle of rights” between a 
parent, child, and the state, and how the state approaches apparent conflicts between those 




broad right to raise their children as they see fit, but if a parent is not meeting the 
child’s basic needs, the state can remove her or him. Minors also have rights under 
the U.S. Constitution. They have the right to equal protection and are also entitled to 
due process. As children age and become more mature, they accrue other rights, 
such as a limited right to free speech and a right to work. Despite all these 
guarantees, there are some rights that minors do not have. Children are not allowed 
to vote, hold property, consent to medical treatment, sue or be sued, or enter into 
certain types of contracts, at least not without a legal guardian acting on their behalf. 
(Find Law 2019d) We will return to the issue of suing shortly. 
Minors are not only protected by criminal law, but also by civil law. There are 
two ways that children are represented in court, by a court appointed attorney (the 
specific title varies by state) and/or by a guardian ad litem (GAL). A lawyer can be 
hired to represent the child her or himself. In divorce and custody cases the court 
may appoint a lawyer for the child. If the court does not think a lawyer is necessary, 
a parent or guardian has the option to hire one. However, the court always appoints 
a lawyer in juvenile court cases involving abuse, neglect, or delinquency. (CT Law 
Help n.d.) When a lawyer is hired to represent a child, she or he must be hired by an 
adult who has been put in charge of the child’s care in one way or another. 
While the court appointed attorney represents the child’s legal interests and 
supports the child’s best interests, a GAL represents only the latter. The GAL is a 
person the court appoints to investigate what solutions would be in the “best 
interests of a child.” While the specific laws vary by state, there are some 
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commonalities nation-wide. Here is an example from Maine of the reasons for which 
a GAL may be appointed: 
The court may appoint a guardian ad litem when the court has reason for special 
concern as to the welfare of a minor child. In determining whether an appointment 
must be made, the court shall consider: 
A. The wishes of the parties…  
B. The age of the child… 
C. The nature of the proceeding, including the contentiousness of the hearing…  
D. The financial resources of the parties…  
E. The extent to which a guardian ad litem may assist in providing information 
concerning the best interest of the child…  
F. Whether the family has experienced a history of domestic abuse… 
G. Abuse of the child by one of the parties… and  
H. Other factors the court determines relevant. (Maine Title 19-A, 3.51) 
 
This is a pretty loose set of requirements, most notably with the last consideration 
of “other factors”.  
The GAL can be a lawyer or certain types of mental health professional. The 
court can ask the GAL to look into the child’s overall situation and make 
recommendations about things like parental rights. But usually, the court will ask 
the GAL to look into specific issues like mental health or medical records of the 
parents or child, or a parent’s current ability to make rational decisions about a 
child’s care. This is called a “limited-purpose appointment” and will usually name 
particular people the GAL needs to talk to. The Court may also order the GAL to 
provide an oral or written report. The law requires parents or guardians to 
cooperate with the GAL and follow all of their reasonable requests. (Pine Tree Legal 
Assistance n.d.) Interestingly, the GAL is required to make the wishes of the child 
known to the court if the child has expressed any, even if those wishes do not align 
with the GAL recommendations.  
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The other important role that the GAL has is that she or he (or the court-
appointed attorney) can sue on the child’s behalf if unrelated to the case. In that 
way, there is someone looking out not only for the child’s interests, but for the 
child’s rights.38 A parent or guardian can also sue on the child’s behalf. These three 
individuals, the parent, guardian, and guardian ad litem have prudential (court-
given) standing to sue on behalf of a third party because while older children may 
be able to file a suit for themselves in certain circumstances, children generally are 
not presumed to be able to sue on their own behalf.  
There are, of course, some disanalogies between human children and SNP’s. 
For one, SNP’s will never graduate to adulthood and be able to take control of their 
own legal battles. Most of them will never be able to express themselves in English 
to the court or take the witness stand. But that is also true of some humans with 
severe mental disabilities whom we nevertheless believe have the right to an 
attorney and to have someone looking out for their best interests. In cases where a 
person has a mental incapacity such that she can no longer understand enough to 
manage her own affairs or make important decisions about her life, a guardianship 
is necessary. (The Elder Law Clinic) In addition to the guardian, an incompetent 
person may also have a guardian ad litem and a court appointed attorney, just as a 
minor would. A person is not deprived of their right to sue merely due to 
incompetence. 
 
38 One interesting civil right that certain minors have is emancipation. In cases where a child 
both desires and deserves to be free from the control of his or her parents, the child can sue. 
Sometimes this is referred to as divorce. In either case, it involves the termination of 
parental rights and means the minor is now treated as a self-dependent adult. This sort of 




IV. Incorporating SNP’s into the Existing Structure 
Were sentient nonhumans to be given the basic rights discussed earlier in 
this chapter, they could be treated in much the same way as human incompetents, 
and this method of representation could be extended to them. Once it has been 
determined that an animal has experienced an actionable harm at the hands of a 
human, the animal’s guardian (a.k.a. owner) or other interested party would file suit 
on the animal’s behalf. This is the part where they get civil rights, because we could 
say here that an animal was suing for damages. If the guardian is not the person 
filing suit (possibly because the owner was the one who inflicted the harm) the 
court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the animals’ interests in court. 
Just as with minors, the GAL would have the authority to examine the animal’s and 
relevant humans’ medical, veterinary, and mental health records, where 
appropriate. The court would also appoint an attorney (unless the animal’s guardian 
hired one) who would legally represent the animal in the court case. Both the GAL 
and the attorney would treat the animal as their client, seeking only that which was 
in the animal’s legal and/or best interests. Importantly, just as with minors, these 
two individuals are in no way beholden to the animal’s guardian, so that there is no 
conflict of interest.39 
 Now what happens if the animal wins? The most common type of damages 
awarded in tort cases is monetary damages. The court would determine what 
 
39 While I’m focusing here on individual suits, this method could presumably be applied to 
class action suits where the care of a group of animals deviates from accepted standards, 
such as in puppy mills, factory farms, etc.  
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amount may be awarded to the animal in order to make her or him whole. For 
instance, the court could consider what kinds of care the animal would need to 
regain health moving forward, and what those would cost. In the same way that a 
guardian or GAL would be responsible for taking care of their charge’s property in 
the case of a human incompetent, the animal’s guardian or GAL would be 
responsible for seeing to the animal’s care. The fact that the money would “belong” 
to the animal is not a problem, as animals can already be the beneficiaries of trusts. 
(Dickinson 2017). The guardian would only have to follow the court’s orders and 
the animal’s best interest in dispensing the money.  
Let us now consider an example of this might play out in a likely situation.  
Say a man was fighting his dogs. First, someone would have to lodge a complaint 
with the court. Who is allowed to do this varies considerably by state. It would then 
be up to the court to decide whether the case has merit. If it does, then the case 
would go to court, and the court would assign a GAL and attorney for the dog, who 
would sue the owner on the dog’s behalf. In this hypothetical scenario, let’s say that 
the dog had suffered a broken leg and lacerated face due to the fights he was forced 
to take part in by the owner. The GAL would be directed by the court to look into the 
mental and criminal history of the owner and the veterinary records for the dog. She 
might also be asked to speak with relevant parties, such as the owner and other 
people who have interacted with the dog regularly including neighbors, etc. The GAL 
would make this material available to the lawyer and the court, and the lawyer 
would argue the case with the dog as his client. If the owner were found guilty then 
the court might determine that the way to make the dog whole would be to provide 
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him with veterinary treatment for his injuries and to find him a suitable home. The 
court would fine the owner in direct proportion to the cost of these restitutions. The 
money would be held in escrow until the GAL used the money, on the dog’s behalf, 
and in compliance with the court’s order. The dog would receive the treatment he 
needs and, legally speaking, would be made whole. 
As a reminder, the issue with the current system is that animals are not 
themselves the beneficiaries of damages received for harms done to them. If an 
owner sues another human because of harm this human caused to the pet, the 
owner is the one who gets that money. The owner can then use the money in any 
way that she sees fit, to benefit the injured pet or not. This only acknowledges that 
the owner was wronged; it does nothing to recognize that the pet was harmed and is 
himself deserving of restitution. 
Furthermore, nothing I am suggesting here would require an overhaul of our 
legal system. As we have seen, this type of system is already in place and well-
trodden in regards to incompetent humans. What I am suggesting is that we also 
include SNP’s under the existing system. Such treatment is entirely consistent with 
their lacking full personhood and it would make clear that SNP’s are sentient beings 
who can be harmed, and deserve restitution for certain of those harms. We can 
wrongfully cause damage to beings who are not capable of representing themselves 
in court, regardless of their species membership.  
Connecticut has actually made more strides toward this than any other U.S. 
state. Desmond’s Law (2016) was a law inspired by a shelter dog who was starved, 
beaten, and strangled to death by his owner. (Pallotta n.d.) The abuser got away 
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with only Accelerated Rehabilitation (a program CT has for defendants charged with 
certain crimes or violations if the court thinks it unlikely that they will commit 
future crimes), and the incident has been expunged from his record. (State of CT 
Judicial Branch) Here’s the abridged text of the law: 
Section 1. … [R]egarding the welfare or custody of a cat or dog, the court may 
order… that a separate advocate be appointed to represent the interests of 
justice… 
The advocate may: (1) Monitor the case; (2) consult any individual with 
information that could aid the judge or fact finder and review records relating to 
the condition of the cat or dog and the defendant's actions, including, but not 
limited to, records from animal control officers, veterinarians and police 
officers; (3) attend hearings; and (4) present information or recommendations 
to the court…  
The Department of Agriculture shall maintain a list of attorneys with knowledge 
of animal issues and the legal system and a list of law schools that have 
students… with an interest in animal issues and the legal system. Such attorneys 
and law students shall be eligible to serve on a voluntary basis as advocates….  
(emphasis added) 
 
There are clearly limitations to this law, not the least of which is the restriction of 
scope to cats and dogs, however the law has thus far been used with success in 
several cases.  On June 2, 2017, a UConn law student, Taylor Hansen, under the 
supervision of a professor, testified in a dogfighting case. She described the abuse 
suffered by the dogs and cited studies linking violence against animals and humans. 
Because of this testimony, the judge decided to prevent the defendant from having 
dogs in his home for at least two years. The ALDF notes that, “Though an important 
and innovative legal development, the representation provided for under 
Desmond’s Law seems to stop short of granting guardian ad litem status. According 
to the statutory language, advocates are appointed to represent the ‘interests of 
justice’ rather than those of the animal.” (ALDF 2017) Certainly this is true, 
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however, given that the intent of the law is to provide advocacy for cats and dogs, 
this still represents a huge leap in the direction of assigning GAL’s for nonhumans. 
 
V. Bridging Welfare, Rights, and Other Views 
As discussed in Chapter Three, much of the discussion of animal law and 
policy has traditionally taken place within the framework of welfare and rights. 
Welfare positions maintain that animals can be given sufficient protection while 
remaining members of the property category, while rights activists tend to argue 
that (at least some) animals should be promoted to legal personhood. The proposal 
I’ve outlined above was presented as a middle ground between the two legal 
categories, but it is also meant to be a way of accommodating the strengths of the 
various views, while avoiding the detriments found in each. 
 In the previous chapter I raised three with concerns Garner, two with Wise, 
three with Francione, and three with Kagan. We’ll start with Garner. Garner 
suggested that animals could have rights as property. I felt that this idea further 
muddled the categories of person and property rather than clarifying them. The 
distinguishing characteristic of persons is their possession of civil rights. To say 
property has these rights is to misunderstand the nature of the current dichotomy. 
Legal patiency sidesteps the dichotomy in order to give sentient beings civil rights 
without full-blown personhood. Next, Garner has said, “welfare statutes are 
sometimes weak and enforced ineffectively, although this is not primarily because 
animals are regarded as property.” (Francione & Garner 2010, p. 133) I argued 
against this claim already. I think it is mainly because they are considered property 
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that laws protecting them are weak and unenforced. Lastly, Garner also believes 
that welfare reforms are more likely to be accepted by people than animal 
personhood. I believe that welfare reforms are insufficient, though I agree that it is 
unlikely that any animals will be granted personhood either (see my response to 
Wise below).  The new category would solve both of those problems. It would do 
more than merely improve animals’ property status, and it would not require 
animal personhood. 
 Wise puts his hopes in attaining personhood for certain species. I wish him 
God’s speed. As mentioned, I think it highly unlikely that this will happen in the near 
future, although would be perfectly content if it did. Rather, I do not think we should 
put all our proverbial chickens in this one, hard-to-attain basket. For one, most 
people (as laid out in Chapter One) want animals to be protected more than they 
currently are, and they even tend to agree with the “rights” language. Second, most 
people do not think animals are the same as humans (or as high on the so-called 
evolutionary tree), and would object to including them as persons. Taken together, 
these bode well for a new category that meets both requirements. We can give 
animals real, meaningful rights without raising them to the status of humans.  Wise 
also focuses on advanced cognitive abilities only, thereby leaving out those 
creatures who are sentient but without complex cognition. Legal patiency makes 
neither of those mistakes. I argued in Chapter Two that sentience is the correct 
threshold for deserving rights. There are clearly many sentient animals who would 
not be considered fully autonomous under Wise’s account. He would ignore these 
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animals, leaving them out in the rightless cold. My account includes all sentient 
beings regardless of other higher cognitive abilities. 
Fancione believes several curious things. He thinks that all of our uses of 
animals treat them as mere resources, and are therefore unethical. However, 
identifying a large number of species as legal patients would make it illegal to treat 
them as mere resources (at least insofar as such treatment tends to align with 
mistreatment). Next, Francione is convinced that accepting incrementalism will 
stifle greater, categorical change. Well, my suggestion is literally about changing 
categories and allowing sentient beings to be classified in a manner that would 
better address their needs. Third, he focuses on negative obligations and non-
interference, ignoring positive and relational obligations. My two overarching 
categories of rights include both: the protection against certain forms of bodily harm 
is negative, while the right to sue in court is positive (and potentially relational). 
Finally, he also conflates the concepts of personhood and sentience. Legal patiency 
can avoid all these problems, real or imagined. Lastly, introducing the third category 
allows for personhood and property statuses to remain largely unaffected. We 
would not have to fundamentally redefine either in the way that Francione’s 
suggestion would require. 
Kagan’s view has several problematic elements. The first is that agency has 
more moral primacy than sentience. As discussed in Chapter Two, I think non-
borderline sentience is the morally relevant threshold to be considered a legal 
patient. Presumably degrees of agency would have a place in determining 
personhood, but that is not my present concern. The second is his focus on 
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hierarchical thinking. Although we can easily conceive of the three categories of 
property, patient, and person as being hierarchical, I don’t see that as being 
necessary to a consistent and functional legal system. Finally, he seems determined 
to maintain human exceptionalism even when there is no clear reason to do so. A 
perfectly consistent system of law and ethics would likely not consider all human 
beings as persons. This is something I explore briefly in Chapter Six. However, it is 
still plausible that, even if my proposal of third category were accepted, all human 
beings would maintain their personhood status. This would not necessarily be for 
reasons of consistency, but for reasons of practicality and comfort. I have no issue 
admitting that such concerns play a role, but object if they lead to diminishing a 
group’s rights. In the current case, the only “risk” is conferring additional rights. 
To my mind, each of the positions discussed is significantly flawed.  My hope 
is that by presenting an alternative to the current dialectical options, we can find a 
way to a system that makes more legal, philosophical, and practical sense. We don’t 
have to redefine property in such a way that it can accommodate right-bearing 
individuals. And we don’t have to make the admittedly big jump to calling some 
animals persons. Instead, we can recognize and respect sentient animals for who 
they are by separating them from both categories.  
Inherent in the above discussion of the weakness of those views is their 
strengths. It is a strength to not force humans to include animals in the same 
category as themselves, if not for moral reasons, then for practical ones. It is a 
strength not to have sentient beings in the same category as toasters. It is a strength 
to be able to give those animals actual rights, so that they cannot be wantonly 
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abused and exploited. Finally, it is a strength not to muddle the two categories we 
already have, when a large issue with the current system is those categories’ 
inadequacies. For all these reasons, I believe my proposal would be a useful bridge 
between the various views.  
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Chapter 6: Application and Practice 
I. Effects on our legal system 
Before I get into some of the broader implications of sentient 
nonpersonhood, there are some questions to answer regarding how an additional 
category would affect and fit in with our current legal system. To some extent, I 
answered this in the previous chapter, but there is more to be said about how 
guidelines of treatment would be established, given the great variety of 
domesticated animals and the many roles they occupy in our current society. 
Regarding the latter, there might be concern over whether such a move would place 
an undue burden on our courts. Additionally, it must be clear what the goal of the 
courts would be in terms of making an animal “whole”. 
 In order to clarify how new animal rights would be specified, we can look to 
existing patterns of law and policy. Generally speaking, the legislature passes laws 
which are broad: they may include vague or ambiguous wording and very general 
requirements. As part of the law, one or more government agencies may be charged 
with filling in the missing details through a process called rule-making. (Schoenbrod 
2008) There are upsides and downsides to this method which are beyond the 
purview of this chapter. As an example, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 begins 
with a statement of purpose, to “conserve to the extent practicable the various 
species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction” and to “provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved.” (16 U.S. Code § 1531) Many of the associated duties, 
 
 118 
such as determining which animals are endangered and determining which 
ecosystems should therefore be protected, are delegated to the Secretary of 
Commerce. In doing so, the Secretary is directed by the ESA to take into 
consideration input from any agency (Federal or State) which has a hand in 
conservation. The Secretary must justify, in writing, and divergence from this input. 
There is also an Endangered Species Committee whose job it is to decide on 
requests from exemptions. In day-to-day practice, agencies such as the EPA and 
USDA are very involved in the application of the ESA. For instance, the EPA is 
responsible for determining whether listed species or their associated habitat may 
be affected by use of certain products such as pesticides. The point of all this is that 
even though the legislature passes laws, there are many other people and groups 
involved in fleshing out those laws and what it means to follow them. 
Likewise, with any new animal legislation, it would fall to specific non-legislative 
parties to specify the exact meaning and scope of the law. If the U.S. legal system 
were to create this third category of sentient nonpersons, the law would not have to 
immediately specify the species that would fall under it. Nor would it have to 
determine the specific actions which would be allowed or prohibited in keeping 
with the recognition of animal rights. Much of this detail would stem from research 
and contributions from such places as the Office for Laboratory Animal Welfare at 
the National Institute of Health, whose input would fill in the particulars. For that 
reason, it would not be all that informative for me to speculate on these particulars. 
So the rest of this chapter will be talking in broad swaths about what effects civil 
rights for animals might have.  
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When I discuss this my proposal with lawyers, they often bring up the 
concern that both lawyers and courts are already swamped with human cases. 
There are two ways to answer this concern. The first is moral: Something being 
difficult is not a sufficient reason to not do it. However, understanding that there are 
real logistical concerns, and that rarely does our government change based on 
principle alone, there is a second answer: It would not necessarily increase the 
workload as much as it might first appear. To understand why this is so, we can look 
at a Connecticut law which was passed on 2016: Desmond’s Law. Desmond’s Law is 
a law that allows legal advocates to testify on behalf of cats and dogs in cruelty and 
neglect cases. Advocates can be appointed by a judge or requested by prosecutors or 
defense attorneys. These advocates are pro-bono attorneys or law students, who are 
enabled by the court to gather information, conduct research, and make 
recommendations to the court. Because they are volunteers, this process places no 
additional work on private or public prosecutors. (Pallotta 2017)  
These advocates play a role similar to the guardian ad litem role discussed 
earlier, but they are not formally recognized as such because the dogs and cats do 
not have a status that would allow them legal guardians. Even so, this program has 
so far yielded many successes. In addition to having the animals’ interests 
represented in court, law students have been able to gain valuable experience in the 
courtroom. Were the U.S. to enact a law allowing sentient nonpersons to sue in civil 
courts, the program could be begun under this framework. One hundred and 
nineteen Law schools already have animal law classes, and the Animal Legal Defense 
Fund has chapters at one hundred and forty-nine schools.  
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 I’d also like to revisit the question of making the animal victim whole.40 When 
we say that the court can award damages to an animal in order to make them whole, 
this term, to “make whole,” may give some people pause. There is, after all, no way 
to undo certain harms, no way to make an animal whole in the sense of repairing 
permanent psychological or physical damages. It is therefore important to make 
clear that in using this term, I am referencing its legal definition only. Legally 
speaking, to make whole (also called indemnity) means to “pay or award damages 
sufficient to put the party who was damaged back into the position he/she would 
have been without the fault of another.” (Hill & Hill 2005) Unfortunately, the precise 
definition varies, according to individual contracts and location. But the overarching 
idea is that to make whole is to compensate a party for a loss sustained. Even so, this 
conception does not appear to address such long-term harms as we might expect to 
result from the various abuses prohibited by law. Perhaps because of the potential 
murkiness involved in restoring a victim to a pre-damaged state, the means of 
compensation most often used is monetary. Monetary values are commonly given to 
such things as emotional distress and loss of companionship, which are not 
fundamentally monetary harms. I see no reason to think that the principles that we 
use for irreparable injuries in cases with legally incompetent humans would apply 
any differently in nonhuman animal cases. So if one dislikes the way the phrase “to 
make whole” is used in the present essay, it is a larger issue with the way we use 
that term in the legal realm, and not one that specifically applies to nonhuman 
animals. 
 




II. Reevaluating Animal Uses in Human Industry 
 The move I am suggesting would obviously have significant ramifications on 
the various animal-related industries in the U.S. It would be an overreach to try to 
specify exactly what these effects would be in each affected industry. However, we 
can identify some broad patterns across three of the biggest industries: farming, 
research, and entertainment. 
 As a reminder, I am arguing that sentient nonpersons are deserving of two 
sorts of right: the right against certain bodily harms or injuries, and the right to sue 
directly for any harm or injury done to them. Violations of the former would be 
cause of action to sue under the latter.  Much of the fallout in animal industries will 
result from certain prohibitions of treatment. The kinds of harms we might wish to 
avoid I will take from the topic of cruel and unusual punishment mentioned in 
Chapter Five. The elements of cruel and unusual punishment include those harms 
that violate one’s dignity, are inflicted arbitrarily, are socially rejected, and are 
unnecessary. On the assumptions that 1. Most of us wish to avoid such behaviors, 
and 2. Sentient animals are capable of being harmed in these ways, then we must 
reconsider many of the ways we treat sentient nonhumans. In other words, if it is 
possible to violate those criteria for nonhumans, then many things we do to them 
may be classified as cruel and unusual.  
As a caveat, I am aware that these standards “cruel and unusual” were 
developed with punishments in mind, and the ways in which we use animals do not 
generally qualify as punishments. Nevertheless, I think the standards set out there 
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are quite useful. First, it is precisely because we are not punishing these animals that 
treating them in these ways is unacceptable. They have done nothing objectionable, 
and it is likely that most of the animals we use are not even capable of acting 
immorally (on the usual understanding of what morality entails). Second, if we think 
that some treatments are intolerable for the most vile and violent human beings, 
then how much more so for those creatures who are neither. If a rapist and 
murderer or terrorist deserves humane treatment, how can we possibly argue that 
sentient animals don’t? That is why I think it is both fair and useful to consider our 
treatment of domesticated and captive animals in terms of the elements of cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
If we wish to avoid cruel and unusual punishment of nonhuman animals, 
certain large-scale changes would need to occur. First, we would have to eliminate 
most, if not all, of our factory farming sentient animals for food. The vast majority of 
animals on such farms are clearly treated inhumanely, violating all four of the 
criteria. It may be the case that more animal-centric farms which prioritize the well-
being of their animals do not violate all elements of cruel and unusual treatment. In 
particular, they may treat the animals with dignity and in socially acceptable ways.41 
The other two elements would be harder to meet, and I think necessity would be the 
hardest. There are places in the world where meat is currently a needed part of 
people’s nutrition, either because of an inability to grow crops, lack of access to 
varied foods, or other dietary, monetary, and geographical limitations. But I am only 
 
41 The concept of dignity is a complex one, both legally and philosophically. It is used to 
mean different things in different contexts. Not wishing to give a full reprisal of the topic, I 
will point the reader to “Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law” by Neomi Rao.  
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talking about the U.S. for the moment, and within that context, meat appears 
unnecessary.42 
Regarding the use of animals in research, the issue is a bit more tricky. For 
one, some animals are kept in ways that are not as obviously abusive. I personally 
worked in a capuchin lab where the animals were kept in an enclosure that was 
approximately 12 x 12 ft. (according to my memory, not a measuring tape), with 
several forms of enrichment. Of course, there is something to be said about the 
space being much smaller than would be ideal as well as the inherent unnaturalness 
of the situation, but certainly there are degrees of mistreatment. In general, it seems 
that research dubbed “pure research” which often involves primarily observation 
rather than physical experiments, is less invasive and uncomfortable for the 
animals. So the question of which studies exactly violate an animal’s dignity would 
have to be examined in detail in order to develop standards for animal treatment in 
labs. In terms of social acceptability, that would very much depend not only on the 
animal’s use, but also on the relative importance of the experiment. For example, 
people tend to balk at causing animals pain for testing incidentals like cosmetics, but 
are split for life-saving medical advances. (Strauss 2018) Concerning arbitrariness 
and lack of necessity, some studies are certainly in violation of these principles. And 
while there are laws in place intended to minimize these, the laws are insufficient. 
 
42 There may be exceptions to this rule. Some feel, for example, that meat is a necessary of 
some people’s diets. I don’t currently believe that to be true, but if it were, my position 
would have to be revised accordingly. 
There is also a point made about meat being an affordable, nutrient rich option for those 
with limited funds. (Wyness 2015) While this may be true, it is largely a result of how our 
government has decided to dole out subsidies. The meat industry is heavily subsidized, 
making it much cheaper than it would otherwise be. If other foods were subsidized, they 
would likewise become more affordable. 
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Therefore, to align research with basic rights for sentient animals would likely lead 
to a vast reduction in the numbers and ways in which they are used.  
Lastly, we would have to reconsider animals as used in entertainment, which 
includes TV and movies, fairs, petting zoos, circuses, zoos, and so on. Certainly some 
of these realms are more often harmful than others. In recent years, largely due to 
public outcry, many circuses have begun ending or phasing out their animal acts. 
(Holpuch 2015; Berenson 2015) Many zoos keep animals in enclosures which are 
much too small for them and lack natural elements and enrichment. Animals in fairs 
are usually overworked, tired, and stressed. (Russo 2015; Sullivan n.d.) Despite the 
ubiquity of mistreatment in these areas, it would be a mistake to conclude that all 
animals used in entertainment are so treated. For instance, there are many zoos 
which are actively expanding and improving their enclosures. There are open-range 
zoos, which allow animals to roam over large areas without forced interaction with 
humans. Just as with research, we would need to develop minimum standards for 
how animals are kept and treated in any of these areas. There are currently 
minimum standards for zoos in the AWA, but these are quite insufficient.  
These are only three of the many ways in which animals are used, the ways 
that probably involve the most suffering. There are many other industries that 







III. Applications to Wild Animals 
 When talking about “wild” animals, I simply mean non-domesticated animals. 
This includes both animals who have little to no contact with humans (mountain 
lions and bald eagles) and animals who live near and amongst humans (like rats and 
pigeons).  Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka call the former sovereign animals and 
the latter liminal animals, and believe each deserves separate rules for treatment. 
(2011) I largely agree with them on that score. But instead of following down that 
road right now, I’ll instead say a few words about current wildlife law here in the 
U.S., and make some broad gestures to indicate how my proposal regarding 
domesticated animals could, in theory, be expanded to include wild animals.  
 In general, states make laws regarding wildlife although federal agencies and 
then legislators can limit them. These intra-national concerns overlap with 
international concerns: animals on federal land, transportation of wild animals 
across state lines, and Indian treaty rights. Wild animals are not considered “owned” 
in the same way a pet is “owned.” In fact, “the federal government has never 
asserted any property interest, or any claim of title, in the wild animals.” (Favre 
2003) Rather, they are thought of as resources that each state, as the trustee of this 
resource, has the right to regulate.  
 This view of animals as resources (for food, trophies, etc.) has as its basis the 
same problematic assumptions about animals as property. The animals’ interests 
are not well regarded, though exceptions include the protection of threatened and 
endangered species even when those undermine human interests. Most of the time, 
however, animals are only protected in order to maintain a sufficient population for 
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humans to continue to use. For example, if we overfish, then there will be a scarcity 
of fish for human consumption. It turns out that many of the protections we offer 
wild animals are in fact motivated by self-interest. 
 How can we fix this? This is where I think Donaldson and Kymlicka have a lot 
to offer. Their view of wild animals is that they are capable of living independently 
from us and that we generally have little interaction with them. They not only 
deserve negative rights such as the right not be wantonly killed, but also positive 
rights such as the right to direct their own lives, that is, to be allowed sovereignty in 
their territories. (Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011) Importantly, we do not have many 
of the obligations toward wild animals that we do toward domesticated ones, and 
the rights that wild animals would get would likely be more limited in type and 
scope. For instance, a right not to be neglected makes perfect sense in the case of a 
companion animal, but not in the case of a wild animal. 
While the idea of wild animal sovereignty may have some naysayers,43 the 
general idea is both intuitive and strong, and, happily, it is easily aligned with my 
own. In the case of the domesticated animal, I suggest that the human be seen as a 
caretaker. In the case of the wild animal, that would not be the case. Certainly, wild 
animals do not need caretakers in the same way that domesticated ones do. In my 
earlier discussion, I said that oftentimes the domesticated animals’ caretaker would 
be the one suing on the animal’s behalf. But that is not always the case, particularly 
when the owner is the one who has caused the damage. When a wrongdoing is 
brought to the attention of the authorities, the court may appoint someone to bring 
 




suit. So it would be with wild animals. Were their rights violated, the court could 
assign someone to argue on behalf of the injured party or parties. If any damages 
were to be awarded, then they would go towards making the animal(s) whole in 
whatever manner the court deemed fit. So the animals themselves would still be the 
plaintiffs and the recipient(s) of any award.  
 
IV. Legally Incompetent Humans as SNP’s? 
 I have argued that sentient nonpersons belong not in the legal categories of 
person or property, but in a category of their own where they can both get the 
recognition and respect they deserve and not be erroneously categorized as 
persons. But perhaps it has already occurred to you that a third category would 
solve many more problems than just the animal one. In Chapter Four, I described 
two other groups who are treated as neither here nor there in terms of personhood 
and property: fetuses and corporations. Not wishing to address the odd question of 
whether corporations are sentient, there are several groups besides fetuses which 
could, I believe, rightly be called sentient nonpersons. This would include many 
humans such as certain comatose individuals, infants, those with significant mental 
impairment of one kind or another, and so on. These humans have often been 
referred to as “marginal humans” because they do not possess the abilities that 
normally developed adult humans do. But they are not inherently marginal beings, 
and neither are sentient nonhuman animals. A third category would allow us to see 
such individuals, not as peripheral to the category of personhood, fringe cases which 
represent uncomfortable moral questions, but as belonging completely to their own 
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category, as full members therein, deserving of all the associated rights and 
privileges.  
The points I am making here are certainly controversial. There has been a 
long history of humans denigrating other humans on the basis of things like race, 
sex, and disability. I am fully aware that categorizing some humans as legal patients 
would raise concerns and aggravate concerns about unequal treatment of such 
oppressed populations. (Crary 2018) This is one reason that I have avoided 
discussion of these various legal statuses as a reflection of moral status.  
Sunaura Taylor (2014) writes that we can help and care for both animals and 
other humans “without paternalization and infantalization,” thereby “moving 
conversations about animal and disability liberation away from limited narratives 
about suffering and dependence to more radical discussions about creating 
accessible, nondiscriminatory space in society in which individuals and their 
communities can thrive.” This is one reason that I’ve avoided discussions of status 
that Kagan entered into. I’m not interested in identifying varying levels of value that 
different beings have. We cannot necessarily get rid of discussions of dependence 
and its corollary, incompetence, in the legal realm, although we may like to. These 
terms are deeply woven into the fabric of our legal system. However, we can frame 
the discussion less in terms of a need to care for these supposedly poor, helpless 
beings who can’t help themselves and more in terms of developing communities 
which are capable of providing for the needs of neuro-diverse individuals, which, as 
Guy Scotton (2018) points out, can be conceived of as including both human and 
nonhuman animals. This is what I view the third category as enabling us to do: 
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expanding the law’s ability to accommodate varieties of sentient beings. As 
Donaldson and Kymlicka say, “Dependency doesn’t intrinsically involve a loss of 
dignity, but the way in which we respond to dependency certainly does.” (2011, 84) 
Let me then say a few words about such humans and why they could 
accurately be referred to as legal patients under my proposal. I have intentionally 
avoided making explicit human-animal comparisons for this reason 
(notwithstanding the other difficulties inherent in such a project). Nevertheless, if 
rights are to be based on morally relevant characteristics (of which I do not believe 
DNA structure is one), we can explore the idea that some humans are better 
described as legal patients than as legal persons as a statement of philosophical 
consistency rather than as a practical suggestion. 
Recall that the defining characteristics of legal patients are that they do not 
qualify for personhood because they lack certain high-level cognitive abilities (self-
awareness, a conception of the future, etc.) and that they are sentient (as I’ve 
defined it, capable of negatively-valenced experiences). Regarding comatose people, 
it needs to be said that there is a huge range in their levels of consciousness and 
cognitive capacity. Some (usually those in vegetative states) have no brain activity 
that could be interpreted as conscious awareness, while others appear to be able not 
only to perform basic cognitive functions such as recognizing auditory and visual 
stimuli, but also to comprehend speech and perhaps even provide nonverbal 
responses. (Cyranoski 2012) There is still a lot of mystery surrounding the issue of 
what exactly comatose patients might experience, but there is sufficient data to 
demonstrate that some patients who do not have the advanced cognition required 
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of philosophical personhood do, indeed, respond to pain in ways similar to those of 
a healthy human. (Perri et al.  2014) Despite “inherent limitations of clinical 
assessment… Neuroimaging studies support the existence of distinct cerebral 
responses to noxious stimulation in brain death, vegetative state, and minimally 
conscious state.” (Demertzi et al. 2009; Boly et al. 2008) So we can be relatively 
confident that some comatose humans fit the parameters of legal patiency. 
 What about fetuses and infants? There is still a lot of mystery about precisely 
which cognitive capacities are held by human at early developmental stages. In 
terms of self-awareness, current research suggests that self-awareness begins 
around 1 year of age, when a child begins to know her own name and refer to 
herself by name. And at around 18 months, children begin to recognize their 
reflections in mirrors (Holinger 2012) and that is also the age where they may start 
forming a theory of mind. (Baillargeon 2010) This is also the approximate age of 
significant language acquisition. Each of these claims is debatable in terms of when 
exactly a particular skill develops, but the point remains the same. There is some 
stage before which fetuses/infants possess the faculties of philosophical 
personhood. On the other hand, there’s no question that at least some of these pre-
person humans can feel pain.44 Again, it is not clear at what stage fetuses begin to be 
able to feel pain, but it is widely accepted that the neurons that carry pain signals 
from the spinal cord to the brain are not developed until the third trimester. (Miller 
2016; Derbyshire 2006) However, nociception and other apparent requirements for 
pain are present as early as 3 months. Either way, on the assumption that the ability 
 
44 Utah recently passed a law that requires doctors to give anesthesia to a fetus prior to 
performing an abortion that occurs at 20 weeks of gestation or later. (Miller 2016) 
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to feel pain develops before the requirements of personhood are met, we have 
young humans who can be most accurately described as sentient nonpersons. 
 Lastly, there are humans with severe cognitive impairments (advanced 
Alzheimer’s, certain kinds of brain injury, etc.) who would also fit into this category. 
These humans often lack the seminal markers of personhood: self-awareness, ability 
to conceive of the future, use of language, etc. (Kittay 2005) Such individuals, while 
unable to take care of themselves, are still capable of experiencing pain, both 
physical and emotional. In fact, some studies show that they experience higher than 
average levels of depression. (CDC 2011) In the current set up, between persons and 
property, of course we consider them persons. But if we had the third category, a 
category which we acknowledge includes nonpersons who are nonetheless 
deserving of rights, then we would have a structure in place through which we can 
fairly and consistently treat these beings.  
As an addendum, there is one other scenario that bears discussion. As people 
are often fond of pointing out in personhood discussions, there are times during a 
normally developed adult human’s life when he is not a philosophical person. These 
instances might include certain stages of sleep, being under general anesthesia, and 
so on. In these cases, it might still make sense to consider those humans legal 
patients. The guardianship would be split between oneself, in the form of any legal 
documentation one had prepared directing treatment, and whoever is legally 
responsible in the normal course of medical emergencies (parent, legal guardian, 
proxy, etc.). We normally don’t envision this patient/guardian role coming into play 
in the normal course of, say, sleeping every night. This is probably due to the fact 
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that one can easily be woken up. But if we are going to use this concept of legal 
patiency, we ought to do so consistently, not treating differently those humans who 
do usually meet all the requirements of philosophical personhood. 
 
V. Case Studies 
Let us look at two of the recent cases that Steven Wise is working on. As 
described in Chapter Three, his approach is fairly different from mine in that he is 
only concerned (at least publicly) with getting certain cognitively advanced animals 
(cetaceans, apes, elephants) consideration as legal persons. His fight in this direction 
has led him to bring suit on behalf of the Nonhuman Rights Project and argue that 
these animals cannot be legally detained without proper cause. I will detail two of 
his ongoing cases first and then describe how these cases would be approached 
quite differently were it to take place under my suggested framework. 
A. Belulah, Karen, and Minnie 
This first case involves 3 elephants. Belulah and Minnie are Asian elephants 
and Karen is an African elephant. All three are owned by the Commerford Zoo, 
which is headquartered in CT. The USDA has cited the Zoo over 50 times for 
violating the minimum standards required of the Animal Welfare Act. Violations to 
the elephants include, “failure to have an employee or attendant present during 
periods of public contact with the elephants; failure to give adequate veterinary care 
to treat an excessive accumulation of necrotic skin on the elephants’ heads; failure 
to maintain the elephant transport trailer; inadequate drainage in the elephant 
enclosure; failure to dispose of a large accumulation of soiled hay, bedding, and 
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feces behind the elephant barn; and failure to keep an elephant under the control of 
a handler while she was giving rides.” (NhRP 2019) Minnie has attacked and 
critically injured her handlers on several occasions, including while being ridden on. 
According to the NhRP website, the case has so far progressed as follows 
(I’ve listed only the relevant events here): 
11/13/17: The NhRP files a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus45 in CT 
to demand recognition of Beulah’s, Karen’s and Minnie’s legal personhood 
and fundamental right to bodily liberty and their release to a sanctuary.  
12/26/17: The Judge dismisses the petition. Wise criticizes the grounds for the 
dismissal. [These grounds are discussed below.] 
1/16/18: The NhRP asks the court to reverse its dismissal due to “significant errors 
in the decision, including labeling the case ‘frivolous’ simply because it is 
novel and… concluding that the NhRP does not meet the requirements for 
third-party standing…” 
6/11/18: The NhRP files a second habeas corpus petition in another CT county. 
11/13/18: Four amicus briefs are filed in the Appellate Court of CT supporting the 
elephants’ right (due to their personhood) to a habeas corpus hearing. 
4/22/19: Wise argues in court that the lower court based its dismissal of the first 
petition on serious errors of law.  
TBD: It’s expected to take 6-9 months for the judges’ decision to come down. 
The claim that Wise is making is essentially that because elephants are 
persons, and because it is illegal to detain persons without due cause, that it is illegal 
to detain these elephants without due cause. He therefore relies completely on the 
claim that these animals are persons to make his case. He has to, because the writ of 
habeas corpus only applies to persons. The understanding is that all and only 
persons are entitled to bodily liberty and autonomy protected by habeas corpus. 
(Memorandum of Decision 2017)  
 
45 Wherein the detainment of a person must be legally justified. 
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The court brings up that habeas corpus can be used in the case of children, 
but only by those who have standing, who are the parents and/or legal guardian(s). 
The court notes that were the elephants to be considered persons, it would be their 
caretakers and not the NhRP which would have standing to bring suit. So, in the case 
of children a “next friend” can bring suit. A next friend is defined as having shown 
good reason that the individual cannot bring case on their own behalf, must be 
dedicated to the best interests of the individual on behalf of whom they are filing, 
and must have a “significant relationship” with them. 
So we have at least two issues. The first is that only persons have the right 
not to be unjustifiably detained. The second is that there are limits on who can bring 
a case on behalf of such persons. The court used both these reasons to deny Wise’s 
motion. Because of these laws, the court found that there was no probability of the 
case succeeding (aka “triviality”) and it was dismissed. 
This would all go quite differently were elephants to be considered, not 
persons, but legal patients. In Chapter Five, I described the two sorts of rights that 
legal patients would have: the right to some degree of freedom from bodily harm 
and interference and the right to sue in civil court. Specifications of the first right are 
beyond the scope of this writing, but one could easily imagine that confinement in 
the manner described, particularly that which violates the AWA, would be 
prohibited by its consideration. I would expect that most confinement would be 
outlawed whose primary purpose is entertainment (as opposed to more 
straightforwardly utilitarian pursuits, such as research). Either way, the second 
right, the right to sue, would certainly be relevant here. 
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Were Belulah, Karen, and Minnie to be able to sue, then the issues of triviality 
and standing would not have arisen. Because sentient nonpersons would have the 
right to freedom from unjustified bodily liberty, whether or not a zoo was 
considered justified, the case would be heard. The judge could not dismiss the case 
because there would be an actual liberty right that the elephants had, and therefore 
they would also have the right to sue if they (or their spokesperson) believed that 
right to be violated. Likewise, the issue of standing, or “next friend”, would not arise. 
Just as with human children, were the legal guardians to be the ones accused of 
violating the subject’s rights, the court would be enabled to appoint a guardian ad 
litem (GAL) to bring case on the subject’s behalf. It would probably not be Steven 
Wise (although I can’t say precisely how the lawyer would be chosen), but some 
lawyer would be assigned to argue the case. Whether or not the animal would win 
the case would depend on a host of things that are, as yet, undetermined. But the 
case would be heard.  
B. Tommy 
Tommy is also a male chimpanzee who was kept alone in a cage in a shed. He 
was an animal actor who was in the 1987 film Project X during which he was likely 
beaten with blackjacks and clubs. He is now kept in the concrete cage with a TV for 
company. Here are some of the highlights of Tommy’s case’s progression from the 
NhRP’s website. This one is a little longer because I’ve included some interesting 





12/2/13: The NhRP files a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in New 
York State Supreme Court to demand recognition of Tommy’s legal 
personhood and right to bodily liberty and his transfer to a sanctuary.  
12/3/13: The writ is denied, but the judge says, “You make a very strong argument. 
However, I do not agree … Article 70 applies to chimpanzees,” because they 
are not persons.  
12/4/14: The Third Judicial Department rules that Tommy “is not a ‘person’” 
primarily because “…unlike human beings, chimpanzees can’t bear any legal 
duties, submit to societal responsibilities, or be held legally accountable for 
their actions.” 
12/4/15: The NhRP files a new habeas petition on Tommy’s behalf. 
3/16/17: Wise argues the capacity to bear duties and responsibilities isn’t a legally 
acceptable reason for denying Tommy personhood. Requiring this “[would 
deprive] millions of humans in New York the ability to go into court.”  
2/26/18: The NhRP filed a motion for permission to appeal, including an amicus 
curiae brief. The brief maintains that the First Department’s ruling “uses a 
number of incompatible conceptions of person which, when properly 
understood, are either philosophically inadequate or in fact compatible with 
…Tommy’s personhood.”  
5/8/18: The motion is denied, but one of the concurring judges, Judge Eugene M. 
Fahey, states “To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had no right to liberty 
protected by habeas corpus is to regard the chimpanzee as entirely lacking 
independent worth, as a mere resource for human use, a thing the value of 
which consists exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should 
consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent value who has 
the right to be treated with respect… The issue whether a nonhuman animal 
has a fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is 
profound and far-reaching. It speaks to our relationship with all the life 
around us. Ultimately, we will not be able to ignore it. While it may be 
arguable that a chimpanzee is not a ‘person,’ there is no doubt that it is not 
merely a thing.” 
 
The first thing that comes up is the issue of Tommy’s personhood. Although 
Tommy is a chimpanzee and not an elephant, the concerns with this are largely the 
same as with the previous case regarding Belulah, Karen, and Minnie, so I won’t 
revisit those points. The second section of interest is when court states that Tommy 
“is not a ‘person’” because “…unlike human beings, chimpanzees can’t bear any legal 
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duties, submit to societal responsibilities, or be held legally accountable for their 
actions.” In other words, the court is making the claim that one can only have rights 
if one also is capable of having responsibilities. This is one strand of thinking within 
legal discourse (the other being that rights and responsibilities can be separated), 
and a potentially problematic one. As we’ve seen, and as Wise eventually pointed 
out, many humans are not, and will never, be beholden to the same responsibilities 
of the average adult human. Lastly, we see Judge Fahey’s discomfort (as we’ve seen 
other judges’ discomfort in Chapter Four) with considering animals as mere 
property.  
Were there to be a third legal category as I am suggesting, persons would not 
be the only category of being with rights. So the arguments over whether Tommy is 
a person or not would not need to take place to begin with. As in the previous case, 
Tommy, a legal patient, would have liberty rights that were being violated, and 
therefore the writ of habeas corpus would not have been so easily dismissed. 
Likewise, the question of whether Tommy is capable of responsibilities would be 
irrelevant. Legal patients may describe exactly those beings who have rights, but 
who have few or no corresponding legal duties. Finally, Judge Fahey’s concern 
would be alleviated because Tommy would not be “merely a thing” anymore. 
These cases may help to illuminate the real need for legal reform that steps 
outside the current person/property dichotomy. If we remain stuck within these 
categories, sentient animals remain stuck as well. They don’t belong, at least in the 
eyes of many, in either group, but remain trapped in the realm of property because 





When we look at the U. S. legal system, we can clearly see that the law is 
trailing behind shifting public opinion and the growing knowledge we have of 
animal minds. The law still treats animals, in most cases, as no more than inanimate 
objects to be protected in order to secure the property owner’s rights. This is 
severely misguided. On the other hand, we can also see that the many attempts of 
getting nonhuman animals recognized as legal persons have failed, and, in fact, do 
not appear close to succeeding. So what can be done? 
I have argued that we need a way of granting all sentient animals rights. This 
is the primary goal of the whole project: to present a realistic and sensible solution 
to the problem. While it may be that certain cognitively advanced animals will be 
granted personhood someday, we cannot wait for that to happen, nor would such an 
occurrence accommodate all sentient beings. I proposed creating a third, new 
category, patiency, to legally house beings who are neither person nor property. 
Such a move would, I believe, address both the legal and philosophical 
concerns with current animal treatment. By creating a new designation, we would 
be enabled to give a class of beings civil rights who are not legal persons. Were all 
animals to remain as property, that would not be plausible. Furthermore, we would 
be able to sidestep the decades old welfare-rights debate, and fill in holes from other 
philosophical and political paradigms which have been suggested. 
In this chapter, I presented both some potential concerns and some potential 
implications of my view which may give people pause. I am not pretending to have 
each detail worked out. Much of the nitty-gritty will not be resolved by a 
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philosopher in her armchair, but by legislators, lawyers, and government agencies. 
There is also more theoretical work to be incorporated, such as a discussion of when 
exactly a legal person’s rights may override a legal patient’s rights. This issue may 
come to bear particularly in certain industries, such as the use of animals in 
scientific research.  
There are also questions about possible expansions of this paradigm to 
include sentient nonpersons other than nonhuman animals. It is conceivable that 
someday other sentient nonpersons would be considered legal patients, such as 
fetuses and other humans with particular kinds of cognitive impairments. Whether 
this is advisable is an entirely different question. Likewise, I have limited the 
discussion to domestic animals, though in theory we could include wild animals as 
well. Doing so would certainly present some practical difficulties, but is nonetheless 
a worthy topic for discussion and exploration. 
I hope that the framework laid out above provides an adequate outline of a 
way out of the current legal quagmire we find ourselves in regarding animals. The 
legal system was not created with them in mind. It doesn’t have to stay that way, 
however. With an increasing awareness of who and what animals are, we cannot in 






Abbott F. V., Franklin K. B., Westbrook R. F. (1995). The Formalin Test: Scoring 
properties of the first and second phases of the pain response in rats. Pain. 60 
(1), pp. 91–102.  
 
About CAPTA: A Legislative History. (2019). Retrieved from 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/about/  
 
Alasdair, C. (2013). Cosmozoopolis: The case against Group-Differentiated Animal 
Rights. Law, Ethics and Philosophy, 2013 (1). Retrieved from 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/39161180.pdf 
 





An Act Concerning Support for Cats and Dogs that are Neglected or Treated Cruelly. 




Anderson, Elizabeth.(1993). Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Asante, C. O. (n.d.). Mechanisms of Pain Processing: Spinal protein translation in the 
rat (Unpublished Doctoral thesis). Retrieved from 
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/14892/1/14892.pdf 
 
Ascione, Frank R. (1997). The Abuse of Animals and Human Interpersonal Violence. 
In Frank R. Ascione & Phil Arkow (eds.). Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, and 
Animal Abuse: Linking the circles of compassion for prevention and 
Intervention. (pp. 50-61). Indiana: Purdue University Press. 
 
Ashley, P. J., Sneddon, L. U., & Mccrohan, C. R. (2007). Nociception in Fish: Stimulus–
response properties of receptors on the head of trout Oncorhynchus mykiss. 
Brain Research, 1166 , pp. 47-54. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2007.07.011  
 
ASPCA. (n.d.). Pet Statistics. Retrieved from https://www.aspca.org/animal-
homelessness/shelter-intake-and-surrender/pet-statistics 
 
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010). False-Belief Understanding in Infants. 





Barker, Robert S. (2015). The Juridical Technique: Excerpts from Introduction to the 
Study of Law by Eduardo Garcia Máynez, 30. U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev, 131, 




Barnes, Robert D. (1982). Invertebrate Zoology. Philadelphia, PA: Holt-Saunders 
International.  
 
Basbaum, A., Bautista, D., Scherrer, G., & Julius, D. (2009). Cellular and Molecular 
Mechanisms of Pain. Cell. 139 (2), pp. 267-84. doi:10.1016/j.cell.2009.09.028  
 
Bateson, P. (1991). Assessment of Pain in Animals. Animal Behaviour, 42, pp. 827-
839. 
 
Beauchamp, T. L. (2008). The Human Use of Animals: Case studies in ethical choice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bentham, Jeremy. (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
 
Berenson, T. (2015, March 5). Ringling Bros., Barnum & Bailey: Why circuses are 
dropping elephants. Time. Retrieved from 
https://time.com/3733447/elephants-animal-cruelty-abuse-circus/ 
 
Blackstone, W. (2016). Commentaries on the Laws of England. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Boly M., Faymonville M. E., Schnakers C., Peigneux P., Lambermont B., Phillips C., 
Lancellotti P., Luxen A., Lamy M., Moonen G., Maquet P., & Laureys S. (2008). 
Perception of Pain in the Minimally Conscious State with PET Activation: An 
observational study. Lancet Neurol., 7(11), 1013-20. doi: 10.1016/S1474-
4422(08)70219-9.  
 
Born Free. (n.d.). Stereotypic Behaviour in Captive Wild Animals: Zoochosis. Retrieved 
from https://www.bornfree.org.uk/zoochosis 
 
Boudreaux, Jessica M. & Thompson Jr, John W. (2015, June). Maternal-Fetal Rights 
and Substance Abuse: Gestation without representation. Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 43(2), pp. 137-140. 
 
Braithwaite, Victoria. (2010). Do Fish Feel Pain? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Brandeis University. (2010, March 23). Evolution of Primordial Chemical Sensor, 





Brumley, Alison M. (1992). Parental Control of a Minor’s Right to Sue in Federal 
Court. U Chicago Law Rev, 58 (1): pp. 333-357. 
 
Bueno-Gomez, N. (2017). Conceptualizing Suffering and Pain. Philos Ethics Humanit 
Med, 12 (7). Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5621131/ 
 
Carlson, Margaret (2011, July 13). Hot Coffee, Cold Cash and Torts: Margaret 




Carnelutti, Francisco. (1955). General Theory of Law. Private Law Publisher. 
 
Carruthers, Peter. (1992). The Animal Issue: Moral theory in practice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Carstens, E. and G. P. Moberg. 2000. Recognizing Pain and Distress in Laboratory 
Animals. ILAR J 41 (2), pp. 62-71.  
 








Chervova, L.S. & Lapshin, Dmitry. (2004). Pain Sensitivity of Fishes and Analgesia 
Induced by Opioid and Nonopioid Agents. Proceedings of the Fourth 
international Iran & Russia Conference on Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
pp. 1420-1425.  
 
Choplin, Lauren. (2016, February 11). New York Supreme Court Denies Kiko’s Second 




Christman, John. (2018). Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy. The Stanford 








Cochrane, Alasdair. (2009). Do Animals Have an Interest in Liberty? Political 
Studies 57(10), pp. 660-679.  
 
Coppolo, George & Gelb, Jennifer. (2002, October 4). Civil and Criminal Liability of 
Corporate Officers and Directors. OLR Research Report. Retrieved from 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2002/rpt/2002-R-0704.htm 
 




Crary, Alice. (2019). The Horrific History of Comparisons Between Cognitive 
Disability and Animality (and How to Move Past it). In Gruen, L & & Probyn-
Rapsey, F. (eds.). Animaladies: Gender, animals, and madness (pp.117-136). 
New York City, NY: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 






CT Law Help. (n.d.). Does Your Child Need a Lawyer? Retrieved from 
https://ctlawhelp.org/en/getting-a-lawyer-appointed-for-your-child 
 
Cyranoski, D. (2012, June 13). Do Brain Scans of Comatose Patients Reveal a 




Danbury, T.C., Hudson, A.L., & Waterman-Pearson, A.E.. (1998). Saturation Binding 
of µ, δ, and κ Opioid Ligands in Chicken Brains. Arch Pharm 358 (suppl. 35) 
(1), p. 105. 
 
DeGrazia, D. (2013). On the Wrongness of Killing. J of Med Ethics, 39 (1), pp. 9. 
Retrieved from https://philpapers.org/rec/DEGOTW  
 
Demertzi A., Schnakers C., Ledoux D., Chatelle C., Bruno M. A., Vanhaudenhuyse A., 
Boly M., Moonen G., & Laureys S. (2009). Different Beliefs about Pain 
Perception in the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: A European 
survey of medical and paramedical professionals. Prog Brain Res, 177, pp. 
329-38. doi: 10.1016/S0079-6123(09)17722-1. 
 





Dickinson, T. (2017). Detailed Discussion of Pet Trusts. Animal Legal & Historical 
Center. Retrieved from https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-
discussion-pet-trusts  
 
Donahue, Charles & Alexander, Gregory. (2007, May 31). Property Law. Retrieved 
from https://www.britannica.com/topic/property-law  
 
Donaldson, Sue & Kymlicka, Will. (2011). Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dreborg, S., Sundström, G., Larsson, T. A., & Larhammar, D. (2008). Evolution of 
Vertebrate Opioid Receptors. PNAS, 105 (40), pp. 15487-92. 
 
Dunlop R. & Laming P. (2005). Mechanoreceptive and Nociceptive Responses in the 
Central Nervous System of Goldfish (Carassius Auratus) and Trout 
(Oncorhynchus Mykiss). Journal of Pain 9, pp. 561-568.  
 
Eisemann, C. H., Jorgensen, W. K., Merritt, D. J., Rice, M. J., Cribb, B. W., Webb, P. D.  & 
Zalucki, M. P. (1984). Do Insects Feel Pain? A biological view. Experientia, 40 










Everaerts W., Gees M., Alpizar Y. A., Farre R., Leten C., Apetrei A., Dewachter I., van 
Leuven F., Vennekens R., De Ridder D., Nilius B., Voets T., & Talavera K. 
(2011). The Capsaicin Receptor TRPV1 is a Crucial Mediator of the Noxious 
Effects of Mustard Oil. Curr. Biol., 21 (4), pp. 316–21.  
 
Falconer, Douglas P. (1935). Child and-Youth Protection. In Fred S. Hall (ed.). 3 
Social Work Yearbook, 3, pp. 63-66. 
 
Favre, David & Tsang, Vivien. (1993). The Development of the Anti-Cruelty Laws 




Favre, David. (2003). American Wildlife Law - An Introduction. Animal Law Web 





Favre, David. (2010). Living property: A new status for animals within the legal 
system. Marquette Law Review. 93: 1021. Retrieved from 
https://www.animallaw.info/article/living-property-new-status-animals- 
within-legal-system  




Feinberg, Joel. (1978). Human Duties and Animal Rights. In Richard K. Morris et 
Mickael W. Fox (eds.). The Filth Day: Animal rights and human ethics (pp.45-
69) Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books.  
 
Feldt, K. S. (2000). Checklist of Nonverbal Pain Indicators. Pain Manag Nurs, 1 (1), 
pp. 13-21. doi:10.1037/t31150-000  
 




Find Law. (2019b). Civil Cases vs. Criminal Cases - Key Differences. Retrieved from 
http://litigation.findlaw.com/filing-a-lawsuit/civil-cases-vs-criminal-cases-
key-differences.html   
 








Fish and Pain Behavior. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.fishpain.com/fish-and-
pain-behaviour.htm  
 
Fish Pain. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.fishpain.com/fish-and-pain-brain-
structures.htm  
 
Francione, Gary L. (1996). Animals as Property. 2 Animal L. I. Retrieved from 
https://www.animallaw.info/article/animals-property 
 
Francione, Gary L. (2003). Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative 





Francione, Gary L. (2015) Animal Rights: The abolitionist approach. Utah: Exempla 
Press.  
 
Francione, Gary L. & Garner, Robert. (2010). The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or 
regulation? New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 




Gartrell, Brett. (n.d.). The Recognition and Relief of Pain in Birds. Retrieved from 
https://anzccart.org.nz/app/uploads/2017/06/Gartrell.pdf 
 
Gentle, M.J. & Hunter, L.N. (1990). Physiological and Behavioural Responses 
Associated with Feather Removal in Gallus Gallus Var Domesticus. Research 
in Veterinary Science 50, pp. 95-101. 
 
Gentle, Michael J. (1992). Pain in Birds. Animal Welfare, 1 (4), pp. 235-247. Retrieved 
from http://www.upc-online.org/thinking/pain_and_suffering.html  
 
Gentle, Michael J. (2011). Pain Issues in Poultry. App An Beh Sci, 135 (2011), pp. 252-
258. 
 




Giordano, J. (2005). The Neurobiology of Nociceptive and Anti-Nociceptive Systems. 
Pain physician, 8 (3), pp. 277-90.  
 
Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc. 844 F.Supp (151 S.D.N.Y., 1994) 
 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. (2016). Other Minds: The octopus, the sea, and the deep origins 
of consciousness. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
 
Gradin, T., & Deesing, M. (2002, May 17). Distress in Animals: Is it fear, pain or 
physical stress? In, American Board of Veterinary Practitioners – Symposium. 
Conducted in Manhattan Beach, CA. Retrieved from 
https://www.grandin.com/welfare/fear.pain.stress.html  
 




Greenacre, C. B., Takle, G., Schumacher, J. P., Klaphake, E. K., & Harvey, R. C. (2006). 
Comparative Antinociception of Morphine, Butorphanol, and Buprenorphine 
 
 147 
Versus Saline in the Green Iguana, Iguana Iguana, Using Electrostimulation. 
Journal of Herpetological Medicine and Surgery, 16 (3), pp. 88-92. 
doi:10.5818/1529-9651.16.3.88  
 
Greenacre, C. B., Takle, G., Schumacher, J. P., Klaphake, E. K., & Harvey, R. C. (2006). 
Comparative Antinociception of Morphine, Butorphanol, and Buprenorphine 
Versus Saline in the Green Iguana, Iguana Iguana, Using Electrostimulation. 
Journal of Herpetological Medicine and Surgery, 16 (3), pp. 88-92. 
doi:10.5818/1529-9651.16.3.88  
 
Greenwood, Arin. (2016, January 4). Here Are The Surprising, Preventable Reasons 




Guttmacher Institute. (2019, July 1). An Overview of Abortion Laws. Retrieved from 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws.  
 
Hacket. Taylor, Paul. (1986). Respect for Nature: A theory of environmental ethics. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Harrison, P. (1991). Do Animals Feel Pain? Philosophy ,66 (255), pp. 25-40. 
doi:10.1017/s0031819100052827  
 
Hawkins, M. G. (2006). The Use of Analgesics in Birds, Reptiles, and Small Exotic 
Mammals. Journal of Exotic Pet Medicine, 15 (3), pp. 177-192. 
doi:10.1053/j.jepm.2006.06.004  
 




Hinsch, H., & Gandal, C. P. (1969). The Effects of Etorphine (M-99), Oxymorphone 
Hydrochloride and Meperidine Hydrochloride in Reptiles. Copeia, 1969 (2), 
pp. 404-5. doi:10.2307/1442099  
 
Holden, J., Jeong, Y., & Forrest, J. (2005). The Endogenous Opioid System and Clinical 
Pain Management. AACN Clin Issues, 16 (3), pp. 291-301.  
 
Holpuch, A. (2015, March 5). Ringling Bros Circus to Phase out Elephants by 2018. 
The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/mar/05/elephant-acts-phased-out-2018-us-circus 
 





Illich, P. A., & Walters, E. T. (1997). Mechanosensory Neurons Innervating Aplysia 
Siphon Encode Noxious Stimuli and Display Nociceptive Sensitization. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 17 (1), pp. 459-469. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.17-01-
00459.1997  
 
International Association for the Study of Pain. (n.d.) https://www.iasp-
pain.org/terminology?navItemNumber=576#Pain 
 
Jamieson, D. (2010). Ethics and the Environment: An introduction. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 





Kagan, Shelly. (2019). How to Count Animals: More or less. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Kandel, E. R., Jessell, T., Schwartz, J., & Siegalbaum, S. A. (2014). Principles of Neural 
Science . NY, NY: McGraw-Hill Medical.  
 
Kanui T. I., Hole K., Miaron J.O. (1990). Nociception in Crocodiles: Capsaicin 
instillation, formalin and hot plate tests. Zoolog Sci, 7, pp. 537-540.  
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998).  
Kavaliers, M., Courtenay, S., & Hirst, M. (1984). Opiates Influence Behavioral 
Thermoregulation in the Curly-Tailed Lizard, Leiocephalus Carinatus. 
Physiology & Behavior, 32 (2), pp. 221-224. doi:10.1016/0031-
9384(84)90133-1  
 
Keefe, Francis J., Fillingim, Roger B., & Williams, David A. (1991). Behavioral 
Assessment of Pain: Nonverbal measures in animals and humans. ILAR 
Journal, 33 (1-2), pp. 3-13.  
 




Kittay, E. F. (2005). At the Margins of Moral Personhood. Ethics, 11 6(1), pp. 100-
131. 
 
Kleiman, D. G. (2012). Wild Mammals in Captivity: Principles and techniques for zoo 




Kristol, Irving. (1972). On the Democratic Idea in America. New York, NY: Harper & 
Row. 
 
LA Rev Stat § 9:121 (Louisiana, 2000) 
 
Ladwig, B. (2015). Against Wild Animal Sovereignty: An interest-based critique of 
Zoopolis. Journal of Political Philosophy, 23 (3), pp. 282-301. 
doi:10.1111/jopp.12068 
 
Lenwood Williams v. The Shipping Corporation of India. 653 F.2d 875 56 A.L.R. Fed. 
667 (4th Cir. 1981) 
 
Lichtenberg, J. (2010). Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the “New Harms”. Ethics, 
120 (3), pp. 557-578. Retrieved from 
http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/LichtenbergNDPDNH.pdf  
 
Linder, D. O. (n.d.). The Right of Privacy. Retrieved from 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html  
Linton, Paul Benjamin. (2011). The Legal Status of the Unborn Child Under State 
Law. St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy, 6.1, pp. 141-155. 
Lynne Sneddon. (2002). Anatomical and Electrophysiological Analysis of the 
Trigeminal Nerve in a Teleost Fish, Oncorhynchus mykiss. Neuroscience 
Letters 319, pp. 167–171  
 
Maillard, K. N. (2012). Rethinking Children as Property. College of Law Faculty 
Scholarship, 75. Retrieved from 
https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1074&context=lawpub 
 
Maine Title 19-A, part 3, chapter 51, §1507. Retrieved from 
http://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/19-A/title19-Asec1507.html  
 
Make one whole. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/make one whole 
 
Marino, L., & Colvin, C. M. (2015). Thinking Pigs: A comparative review of cognition, 




Martin, Elizabeth A. (2003). Oxford Dictionary of Law (7th ed.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
McMahan, Jeff. (2002). The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the margins of life. Oxford 
 
 150 
University Press: Oxford.  
 
McMahan, Jeff. (2015). Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice. Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 25, (1), pp. 3-35. 
 
Mental Incompetency. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Mental Incompetency  
 




Miller, S. G. (2016, May 17). Do Fetuses Feel Pain? What the science says. Retrieved 
from https://www.livescience.com/54774-fetal-pain-anesthesia.html 
 
Moseley, G. L. (2012). Teaching People About Pain: Why do we keep beating around 
the bush? Pain Management, 2 (1), pp. 1-3. doi:10.2217/pmt.11.73  
 
Myers, John. (2008). A Short History of Child Protection in America. Family Law 
Quarterly, 42, pp. 449-463.  
 
National Child Abuse and Neglect Training and Publications Project (2014). The 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act: 40 years of safeguarding America’s 
children. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Children’s Bureau. Retrieved from 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/capta_40yrs.pdf 
 
National Research Council (US) Committee on Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in 
Laboratory Animals. (2009). Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory 
Animals. Washington DC: National Academies Press (US).  
 
NhRP. (2019). Clients, Beulah, Karen, Minnie (Elephants). Retrieved from 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/clients-beulah-karen-minnie/ 
 
Nibert, David. (2002). Animal rights, human rights: Entanglements of oppression and 
liberation. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Nodding, Nel. (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. 
University of California Press. 
 
Norcross, Alastair. (2011, April 9). Animal Ethics: Ignored perspectives. Conference 
conducted at the meeting of Colorado State University. 
 
Nordgreen, J., Horsberg, T. E., Ranheim, B. & Chen, A. C. N. (2007). Somatosensory 
Evoked Potentials in the Telencephalon of Atlantic Salmon (Salmo Salar) 
 
 151 
Following Galvanic Stimulation of the Tail. J. Comp. Physiol. A 193, pp. 1235-
1242. 
 




Pain and Pain Analgesic. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.fishpain.com/fish-and-
pain-analgesic.htm  
 
Pallotta, N. (n.d.). Unique Connecticut Law Allows Court-Appointed Advocates to 
Represent Animals. Retrieved from http://aldf.org/article/unique-
connecticut-law-allows-court-appointed-advocates-to-represent-animals/ 
 
Pastor, J., Soria, B., & Belmonte, C. (1996). Properties of the Nociceptive Neurons of 
the Leech Segmental Ganglion. Journal of Neurophysiology, 75 (6), pp. 2268-
2279. doi:10.1152/jn.1996.75.6.2268  
 
Perri, C. D., Thibaut, A., Heine, L., Soddu, A., Demertzi, A., & Laureys, S. (2014). 
Measuring Consciousness in Coma and Related States. World J Radiol, 6(8), 
pp. 589–597. doi: 10.4329/wjr.v6.i8.589. 
 




Pine Tree Legal Assistance. (n.d.) What is a Guardian ad Litem? Retrieved from 
https://ptla.org/what-guardian-ad-litem 
 
Posner, Richard A. (2004). Animal Rights: Legal, philosophical, and pragmatic 
perspectives. In Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum (Eds.). Animal 
Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (pp. 51-77). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 




Prato, V., Taberner, Francisco J., Hockley, James R.F., Callejo, G., Arcourt, A., Tazir, B., 
Hammer, L., Schad, P., Heppenstall, Paul A., Smith, Ewan S., & Lechner, Stefan 
G. (2017). Functional and Molecular Characterization of Mechanoinsensitive 
“Silent” Nociceptors. Cell Reports, 21, (11), pp. 3102-15. 
 
Rakic, P. (2009, October). Evolution of the Neocortex: A perspective from 
developmental biology. Nat Rev Neurosci, 10 (10), pp. 724-735. Retrieved 




Rao, N. (2011). Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law. Notre Dame Law 
Review, 86. 
 
Read, Matt R. (2004). Evaluation of the Use of Anesthesia and Analgesia in Reptiles. J 
of the AVMA, 224 (4), pp. 547-552.  
 
Rech, H., R., J., D., Briggs, & L., S. (2012, March 21). Effects of Combined Opioids on 
Pain and Mood in Mammals. Pain Research and Treatment, 2012. Retrieved 
from https://www.hindawi.com/journals/prt/2012/145965/  
 
Regan, Tom. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. Oakland, CA: University of California 
Press. 
 
Regan, Tom. (2011, July). How to Prolong Injustice. Retrieved from https://mail.all-
creatures.org/articles/ar-regan-prolong.html 
Robertson, John A. (1994). Children of Choice: Freedom and the new reproductive 
technologies. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
Robinson, Brian. (2003, May 8). Can a Fetus Like Laci’s Sue? Retrieved from 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/story?id=90649&page=1 
 
Roden, G. J. (2010). Unborn Children as Constitutional Persons. Issues Law Med., 25 
(3), pp. 185-273.  
 
Rolston, Holmes. (1989). Environmental Ethics: Duties to and values in the natural 
world. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.  
 
Russo, C. M. (2015, May 8). If You Love Elephants, Don't Ever Ride Them. Here's 
Why. The Dodo. Retrieved from https://www.thedodo.com/elephant-rides-
trek-1132645600.html 
 
Savigny, Frederich Carl. (William Holloway). (1867). System of the Modern Roman 
Law. (trans.). Madras: J Higginbotham. 
 
Schoenbrod, David. (2008). "Delegation." In Ronald Hamowy. The Encyclopedia of 
Libertarianism. (pp. 117–18). Thousand Oaks, CA. SAGE Publications, Inc. 
 
Scotton, G. (2019). Metaphors and Maladies: Against psychologizing speciesism. In 
Gruen, L & & Probyn-Rapsey, F. (eds.). Animaladies: Gender, Animals, and 
Madness (pp. 101-116). New York City, NY: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Shah, M. K. (2001). Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an Unborn Child: 




Sherwood, L., Klandorf, H., & Yancey, P. H. (2012). Animal Physiology: From genes to 
organisms. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.  
 
Singer, P. (1975). Animal Liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals. New 
York, NY: Harper Collins. 
 
Singer, P. (1989). All Animals are Equal. In Tom Regan & Peter Singer (eds.). Animal 
Rights and Human Obligation (2nd ed.) Retrieved from 
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/philosophy/animals/singer-text.html  
 
Singer, P. (1990). Do Animals Feel Pain? In P. Singer (ed.). Animal Liberation. (pp. 
10-15). New York: Avon Books. Retrieved from http://www.animal-rights-
library.com/texts-m/singer03.htm 
 
Singer, P. (1990). The Significance of Animal Suffering. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 13(1), pp. 9-12. 
 
Singer, P. (1993). Practical Ethics (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press: New York.  
 
Sladky K. K. (2010). Reptile Analgesia: Is laughter the best medicine for pain? North 
American Veterinary Conference Proceedings, pp. 1708-1710. 
 
Sladky, K. K., Miletic, V., Paul-Murphy, J., Kinney, M. E., Dallwig, R. K., & Johnson, S. M. 
(2007). Analgesic Efficacy and Respiratory Effects of Butorphanol and 
Morphine in Turtles. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, 
230 (9), pp. 1356-1362. doi:10.2460/javma.230.9.1356  
 
Smeets, Wilhelmus J.,  Smeets, Wilhelmus J. A., & Reiner, Anton. (1994). Phylogeny 
and Development of Catecholaminergic Systems in the CNS of 
Vertebrates. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press; pp. 135–181.  
 
Smith, Jane A. (1991). A Question of Pain in Invertebrates. Institute for Laboratory 
Animals Journal, 33 (1-2), pp. 25-31. Retrieved from 
https://www.abolitionist.com/darwinian-life/invertebrate-pain.html 
 
Sneddon, L. U., Braithwaite, V. A., & Gentle, M. J. (2003). Do Fishes Have Nociceptors? 
Evidence for the evolution of a vertebrate sensory system. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 270 (1520), pp. 1115-
1121. doi:10.1098/rspb.2003.2349  
 
Sneddon, L. U., Elwood, R. W., Adamo, S. A., & Leach, M. C. (2014). Defining and 








State of Connecticut Judicial Branch. (2017). Accelerated Rehabilitation. Retrieved 
from https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/CR137D.pdf  
 
Stettner v. Graubard. 82 Misc. 2d 132, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683 (New York, 1975) 
 
Strauss, M. (2018, August 16). Americans Divided Over Use of Animals in Scientific 




Sullivan, K. (n.d.). Animal Attractions at Fairs Are the Worst. Retrieved from 
https://www.peta.org/features/animal-attractions-at-fairs/ 
 
Sumner, L. W., & Frey, R. G. (1983). Interests and Rights: The case against animals. 
The Philosophical Review, 92 (3), pp. 447. doi:10.2307/2184490  
 
Taylor, S. (2014). Interdependent Animals: A feminist disability ethic-of-care. In 
Adams, Carol J. & Gruen, Lori (eds.). Ecofeminism: Feminist intersections with 
other animals and the earth (pp. 109-126). New York City, NY: Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
 
The Animal Welfare Act - Public Law 89-544 Act of August 24, 1966 (amended 
2013). Title 7 U.S.C., § 2131-2156.  
The Deputy Attorney General. (1999, June 16). Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations. Retrieved from 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF  
The Elder Law Clinic. Guardianship or Power of Attorney: Which one do you need? 




The Law Dictionary. (n.d.). What is Property Rights? Retrieved from 
https://thelawdictionary.org/property-rights/ 
 
The Law Dictionary. (n.d.). What is Property? Retrieved from 
http://thelawdictionary.org/property/  
 
The Nervous System and Senses. (2018, August 29). Retrieved from 
https://ornithology.com/ornithology-lectures/nervous-system-senses/  
 





The People of the State of New York v. Michael Garcia. 29 A.D.3d 255 (N.Y.A.D. 1 
Dept., 2006) Retrieved from https://www.animallaw.info/case/people-v-
garcia 
 
The Times Editorial Board. (2014, December 26). California's Egg-Laying Hens to Get 




Tomasik, B. (2017). Do Bugs Feel Pain? Retrieved from https://reducing-
suffering.org/do-bugs-feel-pain/ 
 
Tracey, W., Jr., Wilson, R., Laurent, G., & Benzer, S. (2003). Painless, a Drosophila 
Gene Essential for Nociception. Cell. 113 (2), pp. 261-73. doi:10.1016/s0092-
8674(03)00272-1  
 
Twenty-Eight Hour Law of 1873 (amended 1994). 49 USC, Section 80502. 
 
United Nations Human Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
(1966). Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx  
 
United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (n.d.). Retrieved 
from http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/  
 
United States Code. (2012). 1 U.S.C. § 1-8.  
 




United States Depertment of Agriculture. (2019, April 23). Research Facility Annual 




United States Department of Agriculture. (n.d.). Animal Welfare Act. Retrieved from 
https://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/animal-welfare-act 
Vandevelde, Kenneth J. (1980). The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The 
development of the modern concept of property. Buff. L. Rev. 29(2), pp. 325-
367. 
Vlaeyen, Johannes W., Van Eek, Hugo, Groenman, Nico. (1987). Dimensions and 




Wagman, Bruce A., Waisman, Sonia S., & Frasch, Pamela D. (2010) Animal Law: Cases 
and materials (4th ed.). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 
 





Weld, M. M., & Maler, L. (1992). Substance P-Like Immunoreactivity in the Brain of 
the Gymnotiform Fish Apteronotus Leptorhynchus: Presence of sex 
differences. Journal of Chemical Neuroanatomy, 5 (2), pp. 107-129. 
doi:10.1016/0891-0618(92)90038-r  
 
Wenar, Leif. (Edward N. Zalta). (2015, Fall). Rights. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (ed.), Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/. 
 
West, G., Heard, D., & Caulkett, N. (2008). Zoo Animal & Wildlife Immobilization and 
Anesthesia. J of Wildlife Diseases, 44 (2). Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280988505_Zoo_Animal_Wildlif
e_Immobilization_an d_Anesthesia  
 
Wikipedia. (2011). Precautionary Principle. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precautionary_principle 
 
Wisch, R. F. (2010). State Anti-Cruelty Laws. Retrieved from 
https://www.animallaw.info/intro/state-anti-cruelty-laws 
 
Wise, S. (2000). Rattling the Cage: Toward legal rights for animals. New York, NY. 
Perseus Publishing.  
 
Wise, S. (2002). Practical Autonomy Entitles Some Animals to Rights. Nature, 416 
(6883), pp. 785-785. doi: 10.1038/416785a  
 
Wise, S. (2003). Drawing the Line: Science and the case for animal rights. New York, 
NY: Basic Books. 
 
Wise, Steven M. (2004). Animal Rights, One Step at a Time. In Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum (Eds.). Animal Rights: Current Debates and New 
Directions (pp. 19-50). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Witt, John. (2011, Oct 24). What Is The Basis For Corporate Personhood? All things 
considered. [Radio interview]. 
 
Wittenburg, N., & Baumeister, R. (1999). Thermal Avoidance in Caenorhabditis 
 
 157 
Elegans: An approach to the study of nociception. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 96 (18), pp. 10477-10482. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.96.18.10477  
 
Wolfensohn, S., Shotton, J., Bowley, H., Davies, S., Thompson, S., & Justice, W. S. 
(2018). Assessment of Welfare in Zoo Animals: Towards optimum quality of 
life. Animals, 8(7): 110. doi:10.3390/ani8070110 
 
Wood, Matt. (2018). Why Birds are Smarter than You Think. University of Chicago 




Wood, S. (2018, September 8). Anatomy and Physiology of Pain. Nursing Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.nursingtimes.net/clinical-archive/pain-
management/anatomy-and-physiology-of-pai n/1860931.article  
 
Woolf, C. J., & Ma, Q. (2007). Nociceptors—Noxious Stimulus Detectors. Neuron, 55 
(3), pp. 353-364. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2007.07.016  
 
Wyness, L. (2016, August). The Role of Red Meat in the Diet: Nutrition and health 
benefits. Proc Nutr Soc, 75 (3), pp.227-32. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26643369 
 
Zimmer, C. (2010, September 3). The Worm in Your Brain. National Geographic. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2010/09/03/th
e-worm-in-your-brain/  
 
